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BEQUEST OF
GEORGINA LOWELL PUTNAM
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I. Le Marchant

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from Sir G. Stephen /

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ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE

OF

BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEES

OF

THE SLAVE TRADE.

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ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE
GIVEN
BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEES
UPON
THE SLAVE TRADE.

BY A BARRISTER.

"I left it off like a fool, because I thought there would be a retribution for all that blood."—(*Vide Dr. Cliffe's evidence before the Lord's Committee, 2165.*)

"The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."

LONDON:
PARTRIDGE AND OAKEY, 34, PATERNOSTER-ROW.
1850.

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THE following papers were written for the *Patriot* Newspaper, and are republished in their present form by permission of the Proprietors of that Journal. The immediate object of this republication is, to facilitate reference to the Evidence before the Slave-Trade Committees of both Houses, by such Members as intend to take a part in the expected debate on the policy of removing the Preventive Squadron from the African station. In reference to the Evidence taken by the Lords' Committee, it must be explained, that it not having been published till most of these papers had already appeared, the writer was unable to analyze it except in a separate form; but, for reasons stated in the commencement of this supplementary analysis, it will appear that this is not, altogether, to be regretted.

It also seems proper to remark here, what is subsequently repeated in more detail, that in the comments made on the Commons' Committee, though he is obliged to speak of them collectively, he must be understood to except the Anti-Slavery Members upon it, for all of whom he entertains unqualified respect.

It is felt that this analysis, elaborate as it is, might have been advantageously extended, were it not for the reluctance with which readers take up a bulky pamphlet on a subject of partial interest: for any other defects the Writer's only apology is, that the Evidence was perused, and the analysis of it dictated, on a bed of severe sickness of very long duration; but full reliance may be placed on the accuracy of the quotations and numerical references.

GRAY'S INN-SQUARE,
17th January, 1850.



INTRODUCTION.

It is proposed in the following pages, to supply an Analysis of the Evidence given before the Select Committees of the House of Commons appointed in 1848, 1849, to inquire into the best means for the extinction of the Slave Trade; previously, however, to entering upon our task, it will be convenient to explain the altered state of parties in reference to the great questions connected with Africa and the West Indies.

There can be few persons who require to be told that, in former times, the cause of the Colonial Slave was taken up essentially by two parties—the Whigs and “the Saints,” as it was then the fashion to designate them. The Whigs gave their support on general principles of civil liberty; while the Saints, a small but influential body, espoused the same side on principles of Christian duty. The Pro-slavery party consisted of the West Indian planters, with their creditors and consignees, who always possessed a sufficient number of votes, under the rotten-borough system, to purchase a protective alliance with the Tories. The great mass of the public hung back as indifferent spectators of the Anti-Slavery war, till in 1830 some very active measures were taken to create a general interest in the merits of the controversy. About that year the Anti-Slavery Society, essentially consisting of Whigs, Saints, and Quakers, succeeded in effecting a great popular movement; the result of which was the total abolition of Colonial Slavery throughout the British dominions, as the first great measure of the first reformed Parliament.

A generation has almost passed away since that great event; and, in the interval, circumstances have occurred which have entirely changed the whole aspect of the political world, and especially in reference to the interests of

Africa, as well as of the West Indian colonies. We find that men who previously belonged to the Abolition party, and who would still, perhaps, call themselves Abolitionists, have practically seceded from it; while others, who for half a century opposed them, and who always affected a contemptuous abhorrence of their principles, are now fighting in the same ranks, in compulsory, not friendly alliance. Nor is this all: even among the most staunch of the Anti-Slavery veterans, a schism has crept in, founded upon that policy of Universal Peace which has of late years been much forced upon public attention, and which has naturally found its warmest advocates among the Society of Friends; while, to complete the confusion of old alliances, the doctrine of financial reform, and the consequent duty of rigid public economy, have detached a powerful section from the Abolition party in the ultra-liberal members of the House of Commons. Thus, what with the free-trade principle, the peace principle, and financial parsimony, that party which, in 1832, appeared omnipotent, now begins to exhibit all the feebleness of a house divided against itself; while those who remain true to their old faith, look with doubt and suspicion upon the faces of new allies, with whom co-operation seems unnatural, and ultimate success impossible. It is extremely difficult for a West Indian and an Abolitionist of the old school to meet with the conviction that humanity and planting are now allied in interest; and it is scarcely less difficult, and far more painful, to discover that principles of Universal Peace have ranged some of our warmest friends in array against us, to the direct encouragement of Slavery, and of its concomitant and yet more serious evil, the Slave-trade.

It has resulted from this state of parties, that a new Anti-Slavery controversy has sprung up; a controversy involving a great many issues utterly distinct, but not all equally important in character. It is necessary to a correct understanding of the evidence before the Slave-trade Committee of the House of Commons, (for, though we shall advert to it hereafter, the Lords' evidence is not yet published,) to enumerate and explain the principal of these issues; a classification of the evidence upon any other plan will be absolutely impossible.

We confess our ignorance with shame, but we must acknowledge that we are uninformed as to the precise origin of Mr. Hutt's Committee. Mr. Hutt himself, though a very respectable gentleman, is very little known, except

as the proprietor, or, more correctly speaking, we believe, as the manager of some extensive collieries in the north of England. As an Anti-slavery man, and even as a public man, he is scarcely known to the world. Of the other members of the Committee, as originally nominated, there were only two, namely, Sir Robert Inglis and Colonel Thompson, who had ever taken any part in Anti-slavery proceedings; but Sir Edward Buxton was afterwards added to the number. The rest of the Committee, though highly respectable, do not rank in the first class of our representatives; nor, if we except Mr. Gladstone, are endowed with any peculiar knowledge that may be presumed to qualify them in any special manner, for discovering "the best means which Great Britain can adopt for providing for the final extinction of the Slave-trade." So it is, however, that on the 24th of February, 1848, this somewhat heterogeneous body of legislative functionaries was selected for the very important task of determining the fate of Africa. Were we to draw our conclusions from the reported evidence, we should be strongly disposed to think that the prime movers in this affair had anything in view rather than the extinction of the Slave-trade; but we prefer leaving it to others to form their opinions for themselves, after attentively perusing our abstract of that evidence.

It cannot be denied, that the terms of the inquiry delegated to this Committee, are so large as to admit of the introduction of any and every topic involved in our Colonial economy; we are not warranted, therefore, in blaming the Committee exclusively for the rambling, discursive, and disjointed manner in which they have proceeded; but still, we think that their inquiry ought, by the terms adopted by the House, to have been confined more strictly to matters directly bearing on the extinction of the Slave-trade. Instead of this, they have raised the ten following issues; and, with but one exception, the inquiry upon each of them is vague and superficial.

The first issue is, whether the preventive Squadron has succeeded, or will succeed, in suppressing the Slave-trade.

The second issue is, whether the Slave-trade has increased of late years; and, if it has, to what causes such increase is to be ascribed.

The third issue is, whether the horrors of the middle passage, or the sufferings previous to embarkation, have been increased by the vigilance of our cruisers.

The fourth issue is, whether the Brazilian demand for

slaves is necessarily insatiable, or one that admits of a glut by superabundant supply.

The fifth issue is, whether treaties with the Brazilians can be relied upon for the suppression of the traffic, in lieu of a blockading squadron.

The sixth issue is, whether a legal trade, if once established, will supersede the Slave-trade.

The seventh issue is, whether the African or the Brazilian coast is the best cruising-ground for our squadron.

The eighth issue is, whether our West Indian Colonies are in rapid progress to ruin; and, if so, whether it is attributable to the difficulty of competing with Slave-labour.

The ninth issue is, whether that ruin may be averted by free emigration, with or without a protecting duty of 10s.

The tenth issue is, whether free emigration from Africa can be arranged without being made a colour for Slave-dealing transactions.

Such are the issues raised upon this inquiry. There are many others of minor consequence, that naturally present themselves in the progress of it,—such as the moral and physical character of the various African nations; the progress of Sierra Leone as a colony; the relative mortality of the former and the present system of Slave-trading; the nature and value of African produce; *cum multis aliis*; but the interest of the inquiry, as regards the Committee, is obviously confined to the ten issues above enumerated. Among these, the first and the last appear to have occupied nine-tenths of their attention; while the third, which, practically, and on every principle of common sense, ought to have been regarded as a very unimportant element in the discussion, is invested with consequence only inferior to the first.

The second to the seventh of these issues inclusively, will require but little reference to the conflicting evidence, and may be hereafter disposed of in a very summary manner, by simply referring to the numbers of the questions that relate to them, and to the mere tenor of the replies; but we feel it necessary to specify them, that our readers may understand how all these matters are linked together by our opponents, in order to deduce a kind of cumulative argument in favour of that measure which they have put forward as the grand desideratum; namely, the removal of the Squadron.

The motive for this is obvious, and the policy has, to a

great extent, succeeded. By decrying the efficiency of the Squadron and the blockading system, involving, as they do, an annual expenditure of half a million, the Financial Reformers are won over to a man. By aggravating the horrors of the middle passage, and throwing the responsibility of them upon the vigilance of our cruisers, a successful appeal is made to the humanity of every short-sighted, muddle-headed Abolitionist.* And lastly, by upholding the efficacy of free immigration as a sovereign remedy for West Indian distress, the West Indian party is conciliated to a removal of the Squadron, because its preventive duty, especially in reference to the equipment article, is scarcely compatible with a system of emigration, and would expose us to reasonable suspicion on the part of Foreign States, that we were but seeking to make a monopoly of the very trade which we were pretending to suppress.

As was to be expected, the periodical press have, almost without exception, adopted the reasoning thus ostentatiously put forward, and hallooed on the Committee and the Government to the removal of the cruisers. The *Times*, especially, has taken the lead in this cry of pseudo-humanity and pseudo-economy; nor has it scrupled to sustain the cry by garbled quotations of the evidence, and false statements of its general bearing. This example has been followed by many journals of inferior note; and, though pamphlet upon pamphlet has been published, and several of them from very able pens, to set the public right, these efforts have been in vain. No pamphleteering can make head against the Daily Press, however gross the falsehoods, or superficial the sophistry, by which it is attempted to mislead the public mind. There is, however, on the present occasion, a ground upon which we rest much hope. It is very clear, from two circumstances, that Parliament is not, as yet, labouring under any similar delusion as to the value of the evidence; for, on the one hand, Mr. Hutt did not venture to draw the attention of the House to the last Report which he laid upon the table; while, on the other, Lord John Russell, just before the adjournment, gave an emphatic assurance that, early in the next session,

* We acknowledge many remonstrances from some very respectable Abolitionists, on the propriety of these adjectives, but much as we regret that the cap should fit so many, we intended no personal application of them and therefore cannot expunge them.

the whole subject would undergo serious discussion. We trust that the series of articles which we propose to publish on the evidence, will materially aid in bringing that discussion to a result which, in our view, will be satisfactory.

We have adverted to the rambling and disjointed manner in which the examination of the witnesses has been conducted; yet considerable ingenuity is displayed in selecting the topics of examination, and therefore before we enter upon our analysis, we must further premise some remarks upon the terms of two or three of the issues that have been raised; some of them (and we have conscientiously endeavoured to state them fairly as they are presented by the Committee) being put forward in that we must regard as an artful and a deceptive form.

As respects the first, and that to which both the Committee and the Press have given the greatest prominence, the very slightest consideration will suffice to show, that it does not fairly raise the real point in dispute. The question is not, whether the Squadron has succeeded, or will succeed, in *suppressing* the Slave-trade? If this were the real question, we at once, sturdy Abolitionists as we profess ourselves to be, must concede the point. We do not believe, nor did we ever suppose it possible, that the Squadron will *suppress* the Slave-trade. The substitution of two letters makes all the difference. It is in the hope of *repressing*, not of *suppressing* the Slave-trade, that all reasonable men insist upon the blockade. What can be more absurd, on the face of it, than to suppose, that four-and-twenty cruisers can extinguish a smuggling trade where the profits are a thousand per cent.? We entirely agree with our opponents, that, whether the line of coast to be blockaded be 4,000 or 400 miles, a naval force will never be able to extinguish an illegal trade of such enormous value. When we talk of extinction or suppression, we use large terms, implying an object which cannot be achieved by any single means, however great or powerful. We are sustained by the authority of Sir Fowell Buxton (though, by the misquotation of his opinions, the *Times* has endeavoured to range him with the opponents of the blockading system), who, in his celebrated book, "The African Slave-trade and its Remedy," after suggesting (p. 299) "two distinct kinds of *preparatory* measures," viz., "1st. An augmentation of the naval force employed in the suppression of the Slave-trade, and the concentration of

that force on the coast of Africa," and 2ndly, "a corresponding chain of treaties with native powers in the interior," adds: "If I am asked, whether I expect this to effect its total abolition, I answer distinctly, No: such measures may reduce, and even suspend, but they cannot eradicate the evil." He proposed these two measures, "not as a remedy, but as an expedient necessary for a time, in order that the real remedy may be applied in the most effectual manner;" namely, by the introduction of commerce and Christianity; thereby working out the civilization of the continent.

And such was the general opinion of the country, as well as of our representatives, and especially of Lord John Russell, when he wrote that celebrated letter which, like Buxton's book, has been quoted adversely to its real purport. His Lordship truly said, when writing to the Lords of the Treasury, that the foreign Slave-trade "is an evil which can never be adequately encountered by any system of mere prohibition and penalties." And therefore, his Lordship very rightly promoted the Niger Expedition, but did not attempt to meet the heavy expence of it by any reduction of the blockading force. We shall find, as we examine the evidence, that such, too, is the opinion of nearly every witness examined by the Committee. But the chairman, throughout the proceedings of the Committee, artfully proposed the question of the adequacy of the naval force to *suppress* the traffic; and the answer being, of course, that its powers were not equal to the suppression, the opponents of the Squadron, and more especially the *Times*, have been careful to quote such answers, without adding the witness's further opinion, that, to accomplish total suppression, other means must be combined! Indeed, were it not for the artful and pertinacious way in which the issue thus presented to the public has again and again been declared to be decided adversely to the Squadron, it would seem to be a waste of time to reason upon such a point. Who could ever imagine that a reform in the police would extinguish metropolitan crime? Or, to put a case yet more similar, was it ever supposed that our preventive service on the coast would extinguish smuggling? All such bodies are constituted in aid of order and peace, but only as powerful auxiliaries of the law. The total extinction of crime or of immorality is to be looked for only in that universal diffusion of moral and religious principle to which we may daily approximate,

but which we shall never fully attain while human nature remains unchanged.

In the preceding remarks we have not forgotten the evidence of Dr. Lushington, given in answer to questions 951 and 956, of * 1849; nor does it appear to us that there is any inconsistency between Dr. Lushington's statements and our own, that the Squadron is to be regarded solely in the light of a preventive or repressing force; for it will be observed, on a close examination of the evidence of that most important witness, that in conjunction with the Duc de Broglie, he was engaged in reconstructing the Squadron in a new form, and a far more efficient one, with a view to go beyond the limited object hitherto entertained, and if possible, to put down the trade altogether. We must not anticipate the remarks which we shall have to make hereafter upon Dr. Lushington's evidence, which in many points is far the most important brought before the Committee; but in reference to the character of the Squadron, as contemplated by every other witness while under examination, we are warranted in saying, that it is only in regard to its preventive services that their evidence ought, in fairness, to have been taken, because they spoke of times antecedent to Dr. Lushington's negotiation with the Duc de Broglie.

We must not lose sight of historical fact. It was no doubt the duty of our cruisers, and perhaps formed part of the Admiralty instructions, to capture all British vessels engaged in Slave-trading, from the time that British Slave-trading was abolished. Sir William Grant even went farther, and decided in the Cockpit, that slavers captured during the war were good prize, unless sailing under a flag that legalized the trade; but we believe it was only in the year 1819 that cruisers were specially appointed to look after and intercept such vessels upon what is called the African station. So far, however, from its being contemplated that these cruisers would suppress the Slave-trade, they were restricted for many years from all interference with the foreign trade, except within given latitudes, and under special circumstances. Our treaties with Spain and Portugal enabled us to take off these restrictions in 1839; but it is only within the last ten years that our cruisers have been at liberty to use all their powers as a preventive police. How then could it be expected that they could suppress the trade?

* Where we use this expression in the following pages, we refer to the Parliamentary papers of 1849.

This view, however, of their true position has been carefully kept out of sight by the Committee, as tending to counteract that prejudice against the Squadron which it was their object to create.

This may seem a heavy accusation to prefer; but whether or not we are warranted in making it, will be seen by referring to another omission in the evidence yet more marked in its character. It is obvious, that if the object had been an honest inquiry into the efficiency of the Squadron in discharging the duty to which it was appointed, an important branch of such an inquiry was to be found in the extent to which *British* Slave-trading had been prevented. For our own part, we do not hesitate to say, that if the last thirty years had not witnessed the capture of a single slaver, we should not have grudged the expence of a Squadron which had for the same period spared us the ignominy of a single capture under British colours. It is our firm persuasion, that we owe exemption from this disgrace to our cruisers, and to our cruisers alone. Yet, among the 9,434 questions addressed to the witnesses, we can scarcely find one, even from an Anti-Slavery member, that pries into the preventive service of the Squadron as regards British Slave-trade! Nor can this be considered as merely a casual omission; for there were several occasions on which the witnesses almost invited pointed interrogation upon the subject. Without going further, we may quote the whole case of the *Guiana*, 5,537; the *Lady Sale*, 4,860; and the *Mauritius*, mentioned by Lord Palmerston, 24; but, broadly as the hint was given (though not intentionally, to be sure, either by Mr. Moore or Mr. Horsfall), it never was taken; the question was never put to a witness, "To what extent do you consider that the presence of our Squadron has restrained British vessels from Slave-trading?" Dr. Lushington volunteered a strong opinion on this point, (963 and 968, of 1849,) but it was thrown away upon the Committee.

It does not appear to be out of place, in considering the terms of this first and principal issue, to advert to the strong reasons which notoriously existed for making this a prominent head of inquiry in a Parliamentary scrutiny into the utility of the Squadron.

In the first place, it was truly, as well as boldly, stated by Mr. Macqueen, that the West Indian object at this moment is, under a covert name, to re-establish the Slave-trade. "Is it your opinion," asked Mr. Barkly, "from the ac-

quaintance you have with your West Indian fellow-subjects, that they would be inclined, under any possible circumstances that might exist with reference to African emigration, to embark in anything resembling the Slave-trade?" "Yes, I have no hesitation in saying, that some of them have said so. I appeal to a memorial from the Chamber of Commerce in Jamaica, in which they avow that object, and call upon the Government to allow them to go to the coast of Africa, and ransom the prisoners of war brought to the coast. When I see one class of people doing that, I should be very apprehensive that others might follow their example."

"Do you think that when the Chamber of Commerce of Jamaica adopted a proposal which had been already made by a member of the House of Commons in his place in Parliament, it was their wish, in taking up his plan, to encourage the re-establishment of the Slave-trade?—*They state so, decidedly,*" (*vide* 8,295 *et seq.*)

This, it must be confessed, was pretty strong evidence, and from a very competent party (in fact one of themselves, and long their coadjutor), of the disposition of the West Indians. Lord Palmerston (*vide* 24, of 1848) adverted to the Mauritius; but he did not, as he might have done, expose the Slave-trading disposition in that colony. We will supply the omission. The investigation to which he alludes commenced in 1826, and terminated in 1829. It was instituted by Buxton, and supported by the Government of the day. In the result it appeared that not less than 70,000 slaves had been smuggled into the Mauritius by British subjects since Slave-trading had been declared felony! This result was demonstrated to the satisfaction of Sir George Murray, at that time the Colonial Minister. Sir George promised redress, if the matter were not further pressed in Parliament; and he took measures for the emancipation of all who could prove their illegal importation. Buxton was not a man to be defrauded thus; and he insisted upon the *onus* of proof being thrown upon the alleged proprietors. This point, too, was conceded; but the obvious approach of general emancipation terminated the discussion before any practical course could be adopted. We speak of facts within our personal knowledge, and the voluminous evidence then collected is in our possession in its original form. Does not this, again, argue a Slave-trading disposition on the part of British subjects, that requires the preventive service of British cruisers?

Once more : A few years ago, a person of the name of Zulueta was tried at the Old Bailey, on the charge of slave-trading. It is rather singular, that this name of Zulueta is constantly recurring in Slave-trade papers ; we find it repeatedly mentioned, and in no favourable manner, in this printed evidence (*vide* 27, of 1849) ; Zulueta was acquitted ; but certain evidence, which was ruled to be inadmissible, was subsequently printed, and extensively published. It appeared from this evidence, that a vessel which had been already seized by our cruisers on suspicion, was purchased at about half its value at Portsmouth, was sent to Cadiz for slave-trading instructions, and was recaptured off Gallinas with those instructions on board, being, at the time, under the command of an Englishman. This case, from peculiar circumstances, obtained a degree of notoriety that made it impossible for any member of the Committee to be ignorant of it. We may again ask, whether such a case does not prove the necessity for a preventive police to guard against British slave-trading ? We will only add, upon this point, that there is direct evidence before the Committee, to establish the indirect participation of our fellow-subjects. " There are many English, no doubt, at Rio, now engaged in the Slave-trade," (*vide* 1,684.) " There are certain descriptions of goods manufactured in England which have no other application than the Slave-trade ; and those go out, you may say daily, from the port of Liverpool to the coast of Africa," (*vide* 5,546.) And again ; " It is the fact, there is no denying it, that there is English capital employed in growing sugar at Cuba and in the Brazils ; there is not an English commercial house connected with one place or the other, whose capital is not, more or less, (it is quite impossible to draw the line) engaged in bringing slaves from the coast of Africa in one sense you may say," (*vide* 2,968.) This imputation, Mr. Macgregor Laird (at 4,773) makes a vain attempt to explain away.

It is our firm conviction, that, if 800,000 slaves have been smuggled into Cuba and the Brazils since 1819, which we very much doubt, (for we shall hereafter show Mr. Bandinel's inconsistency,) a much larger number would have been exported during the same time in British bottoms, but for the vigilance of our cruisers. They ought, therefore, to have credit for efficiency to that extent. To go more closely into the matter, let us ask, what is there to prevent it ? Take the case of the two vessels, the Guiana

and the *Lady Sale*, mentioned in terms of bitter complaint by the witnesses Moore and Horsefall. It is clear, that in those cases, whether the vessels were rightly condemned or not, the adventure so closely resembled slave-trading voyages, as to vindicate their capture. Had they been really slave adventures, it is apparent, that, but for the cruisers which captured them, perfect impunity would have attended them. Again; take the case of *Zulueta's* vessel: the man was acquitted, and we pronounce no opinion upon the verdict; but the vessel was condemned. She would a second time have escaped with impunity, but that she was captured by our cruisers. Then, why may not a hundred British vessels, in a similar manner, clear out for Cadiz, there ship their crew, and their equipments, barter their toys and their muskets for Slaves at the *Galinas*, transport them to Bahia, and bring home again to Liverpool a cargo of slave-grown sugar? Obviously, it is our Squadron, with a distant view of the Old Bailey and transportation as the inevitable result of capture, which alone prevents it; and is this restrictive efficiency to go for nothing? We are justified then, in our assertion that the efficiency of our cruisers in restraining British Slave-trading, ought to have been a prominent head of inquiry. We have dwelt at some length upon the objectionable form in which the Committee have raised the first issue, not only for its intrinsic importance, but because the newspapers have exultingly put it forward, and challenged controversy upon it, in a tone that implies, that it is the only question in dispute. Let it however, be correctly stated as a question, not of suppression, but of repression, not of extinction, but of prevention, and we undertake to prove, that, with the exception of one or two wiseacres, who frankly say that the Slave-trade must be legalised, nearly every witness is in favour of continuing the Squadron, with more or less qualification of opinion.

We have already objected to the unreasonable importance that is studiously given to the third issue; but it is, also, unfairly put. Without going so far as Lord Denman does, in his first letter to Lord Brougham, (though we quite agree with him, that a premature death is less to be deplored than a life of colonial slavery,) we maintain that, if the question of comparative mortality and suffering is to be raised at all, where results of unspeakably larger importance are under discussion, the right form of issue will be, "Are the sufferings of the middle-passage so much aggra-

vated in a contraband trade, as to counterbalance all the evils which may be anticipated from rendering that trade legal?" Under such a form, we are naturally led, in the first instance, to consider, and in minute detail too, what are the evils likely to result from legalising the trade. And this involves not merely the actual increase of the number of those exported into slavery, their sufferings on the middle-passage, with the diminished care always bestowed on goods of diminished value, but the wars and burnings, and rapine rekindled in those places on the African coast, which are now tranquilly progressing in civilisation and prosperity. Moreover, under such an issue, the great question of economy between breeding and importation, which, hitherto, has been scarcely glanced at by the Committee, must have been fairly opened. We find from the evidence, that a large class of the Brazilian slaves, all being young men in the prime of life, die off in eight years, (*vide* 5,109,) while the rest of the slave population only have an expectation of life for sixteen years, (*vide* 5,124.) If this be the case when slaves cost 50% each, it is fair to infer, that, if the price is reduced, by legal and unlimited supply, to 25%, the slaves will be so *used up* as to take fifty per cent. also off their expectation of life; subject to the doubt alone whether human nature can stand any increase of their present labour. Now, in comparing the aggravation of suffering in the contraband middle-passage, with the sufferings occasioned by legalising the trade, these additional murders must be taken into the account; and they will make a heavy item, as a very simple arithmetical process will prove. If the two classes we have mentioned are about equal, the average expectation of slave-life in the Brazils will be twelve years at present; but, by reducing the value of the "animal" 50 per cent., the expectation of life will be reduced to six years; or, in other words, the stock will be used up in six years instead of twelve; which, on every principle of Cocker, would be equivalent to the immediate and instant murder of one-half of the slave population! It is generally supposed, that the slave population of the Brazils is about 2,000,000: thus, the very first set-off against the alleviation of the middle-passage sufferings under a legalised system, would be a *per contra debit*—"to the murder of Brazilian slaves 1,000,000!!!" We challenge contradiction to this statement. We will defy every advocate for legalising the trade to get out of the dilemma, if the high authority of

Dr. Thompson on Brazilian mortality is, as we believe, unquestionable. The rest is mere matter of calculation, in which even Mr. Hume could scarcely make an error, and even *The Times* could scarcely mystify its readers. If it is true economy to use up a horse that costs 50% in twelve years, it must be true economy to use up in six years a horse that only costs 25% ; and if you have a pair of horses which now will last you twelve years, to reduce their expectation of life to one half, is equivalent to shooting one of them on the instant : there is not a job-master, or even a hackney-coachman, or a coach-horse in London, who will not subscribe to the truth of this calculation. But the Committee have so framed their third issue as entirely to exclude us from this set-off. As they had before them precisely the same data that we have, are we to attribute it to dullness, or to wilful perversion of the evidence, when they report to the House, a resolution of the 10th of August, 1848, " That the sufferings and mortality of slaves in the barracoons and in the middle-passage are appalling to humanity ; and the intensity of the sufferings, and the amount of the mortality, are unexampled in the history of the Slave-trade " ?—(*vide* page 4, of the 4th Report). With the exception of the word, " unexampled," the resolution may be true enough ; but, will it fairly convey the real issue, unless we add an apprehension, equally founded upon the evidence, that this incident of the contraband trade admits of no remedy by removing the Squadron, except at the risk of a murderous sacrifice of half the slave-population of the Brazils ? We must declare our feeling, that the most practised lawyer in the chicanery of pleading, could scarcely have devised a more ingenious paragraph for disguising the truth.*

On the other issues, as they appear to us to be raised by the Committee, though we think that some of them are injudiciously narrowed, and many of them are scarcely relevant to the question delegated to their inquiry, we offer no remark ; except that the last, upon Emigration, is

* Since the type was set up, the Lords' Evidence has made its tardy appearance ; the extracts given to their Lordships by Mr. Stokes, from the evidence taken by the Commons in 1792, conclusively show that human ingenuity cannot conceive any aggravation of the cruelties practised by British Slave-traders under a legalised system. We strongly recommend a perusal of this gentleman's evidence to the new Anti-Slavery Committee and their reporter.—(*Vide* 2775 of the Lords' Evidence.)

the only one, throughout the whole of these volumes, on which investigation has been fairly and legitimately pushed to its proper results. We must not be misunderstood by those of our readers who have not access to the evidence, or who want time to read it: the ten issues which we have enumerated for the purpose of simplifying the evidence, are not given in words selected by the Committee, either in their resolutions, or in any part of their proceedings; but we have framed them, after a most attentive perusal of the questions, to express the precise points which the Committee appear to have considered as the most important for their consideration:

Happily, so long is the interval that has elapsed since Englishmen were familiar with the terms Slavery and Slave-dealing, that, we suspect, a large majority of the present generation have no definite idea of the meaning of the terms. They think it is something very horrible; but it is so shrouded in a veil of mysterious iniquity, that the loathsome and dreadful reality is appreciated by few. It is with us an every-day occurrence, to fall in with amiable, and even sensible people, who express their surprise at the interest we take in a subject so remote from the daily affairs of life. Now and then the surprise is carried further, and where intimacy excuses the freedom, some well-meaning friend will begin upon the hackneyed theme, "Why not bestow your zeal upon white suffering nearer home?" Even in the House of Commons, some few individuals are found openly taunting the Anti-Slavery members with their African enthusiasm; thus betraying either an ignorance disgraceful to a legislator, or a callousness of heart discreditable to humanity. It might be replied to all these objectors, in the words of Lord Denman,—that the system is so horrible, that no language is capable of doing justice to its cruelty, or of reprobating as they deserve the miscreants who conduct it; but we shall not be betrayed into strong language (if any language can be called too strong on such a topic) in our endeavour to make our readers understand the real character of that evil against which we would enlist their indignation. We will describe the Slave-trade, as nearly as we can, in the words of those witnesses who are the least likely to exaggerate. "The greater proportion of them" (the slaves), says Mr. Macqueen, "are captured by what they call the *Razzia* system; that is, inroads for the purpose of catching people; but, in Southern Africa, almost the

whole of the slaves carried to the east coast, and to the west coast, 'are entirely the produce of wars,' (*vide* 8,272.) "A great number of them," says Mr. Carr, "must have been taken in war or kidnapped by chieftains." And, when asked the meaning of "kidnapped," he answers: "A chief would go and attack a town, and if he had a number of war-men with him, he would perhaps surround the town at night, and, in the morning, would capture as many as he could," (*vide* 1,766.) "The greater part of the slaves," says Mr. Duncan, "are obtained by war and slave hunts," (*vide* 3,151.) "A quarrel arose among the people," says the Rev. Henry Townsend, "and some fighting took place; and ultimately, one of the towns was destroyed, and the people carried into slavery, as many as they could take; and those that escaped, joined those that had besieged them, and made an attack upon others; and so they went from town to town; an army of people of the worst class of society attacked the towns, each town in succession, until the whole country was in a state of disorder," (*vide* 7,733.)

When the slaves have been thus obtained (and cases are mentioned in which the kidnappers have recourse to the desperate measure of firing a village), they are conveyed from market to market, and repeatedly sold before they reach the coast, where they are placed in barracoons, or large stores built of cane, to await the arrival of a slave-ship. They are usually chained in their progress to the coast, and in the barracoons, to prevent their escape; but they appear to be otherwise well-treated in respect of food and water; and it is only justice to the African slave-dealer to say, that the atrocities of the case rarely begin till the white man enters the scene. What those atrocities are, we will state upon authority that cannot be questioned; that of a slave-dealer himself, who actually had the audacity to come forward as a witness in a Committee-room of the House of Commons. We shall revert to this strange circumstance hereafter: we will only observe at present, that Mr. Hutt has yet to explain it in his place. For the sake of his next election, if not for the sake of common decency, we hope that explanation will be satisfactory; but if there is a particle of Anti-Slavery spirit in the House, we suspect that he will find it difficult. "The slaves," says this witness, "are jammed in, as I observed before; they are packed in upon their sides, laid in heads amongst legs and arms, so that it is very difficult frequently

(until they become very much emaciated so as to leave room) for them to get up alone without the whole section moving together. Small boys would be permitted to get up; small boys are never confined; but the way in which they are put in now is, that they are generally jammed in in such masses, that, even allowing that there was elevation sufficient for them to rise up, they could not rise without the whole section rising. They make two or three slave-decks in a vessel which has, perhaps, six feet between her deck and beams above; there would be three tiers of slaves stowed away; sixteen to eighteen inches would stow them in; they are put like books upon a shelf, consequently there is plenty of room for them to lie flat, but not enough for them to elevate; they can turn from side to side by the whole section turning, not otherwise, until they have become a good deal emaciated, and some have *died out*; that, of course, makes more room for the remainder," (*vide* 4,223 to 4,227). On being asked, whether it is possible for the person who supplies food to get among them to deliver each his portion; he replies: "If I were to speak the truth, it would be this: the vessels are so extremely offensive, that it is perhaps the greatest punishment to which you can put any person on board. There is some half-witted person whom they generally have almost on purpose for it, to pass the food round to them; and he is in such a hurry in doing it, that those who are the nearest are more likely to get a double portion of food, than that he should go round the sides of the vessel. He should help each one singly, but, from the excessively filthy state, it is not always done: he has to get upon a mass of filth, and almost upon a mass of living bodies at the same time. In the case of one of them dying, the body lies there till perhaps an alarm is given, and in the morning it is generally thrown overboard. There may be instances, and, I believe, there have been instances, in which they have remained until they have increased the amount of putridity; and, in fact, when they have been thrown overboard, you could hardly keep them together, because the putrefaction would be so rapid in a temperature of that kind, that in a few hours decomposition would take place; they would hardly hold together to be thrown overboard. There are, no doubt, instances where the bodies have been three or four days before they could be got out. The most favourite cargoes at the present time are boys of eight to twelve years of age, because at

that age they are smaller and packed more conveniently," (*vide* 4,256, *et seq.*) When these poor wretches are landed, the same witness says: "Their knee-bones appear almost like the head of a person; from the arm you may slip your finger and thumb up; the muscular part of the arm is gone; it is mere bone covered with a bit of skin; the abdomen is highly protuberant; a man takes them up in his arms and carries them out of the vessel; a great many of them are lifted up on deck; a good many make attempts; they could not stand, even if they were not so much emaciated; the muscles have lost the power of supporting them; the eye has lost its speculation,—it has an idiotic appearance, a leaden appearance, in fact, a sunken appearance,—it is almost like the boiled eye of a fish; they are reduced to the lowest stage in which it is possible to say that they are yet living," (*vide* 4,305, *et seq.*)

Only conceive that the perpetrator, the dealer, the money-maker by such horrors, should stand face to face with a body of our Representatives, and with shameless audacity thus avow the nature of the horrid trade by which he lived! But even such a man's evidence may be received as credible against himself; it is easy to confirm it. Captain Matson says, in answer to question 1,474: "If the vessel could take 300 slaves moderately crowded, the captain would take half as many again, say 450, and cram them on board, below, and on the decks, for the sake of putting them to the test, knowing that all those who were not likely to cross the Atlantic would sicken during the first forty-eight hours; then, directly they show the symptoms of weakness on account of their weak constitution, *they are put on one side on the deck; no food or water is given them, and they are allowed to die; they are then thrown overboard; the sickly slaves are placed on deck that they shall not live; that they shall be allowed to die,*" (*vide* 174, *et seq.*) Once more: "When I got on board," says Captain Hoare, "the state of the vessel and her decks was such, that I could hardly stand on them from the filth and dirt. After clearing the hold, I found nine of the slaves dead; I think I took nine dead bodies out; they were in a horrid state altogether," (*vide* 6,008). It is needless to multiply these extracts: there is much evidence to the same effect; but enough has been given to convey some faint idea of that system which some parties desire to see again legalised. As regards the condition of

the slave in the Brazils, it is unnecessary to say one word after having quoted the significant mortality stated by Dr. Thompson: the slave-dealer admits (at question 4,273), that eighteen is the age at which the slave begins the life which, according to Dr. Thompson, must terminate, as may chance to be the nature of his occupation, in eight or sixteen years !!!

CHAPTER II.

To follow our proposed classification of the evidence, let us now take the first issue, whether the Preventive Squadron has succeeded, or will succeed, in suppressing the Slave-trade, or, as we correct the word, in *repressing* it.

The Committee have examined fifty-four witnesses, and, with few exceptions, all have been interrogated more or less upon this issue. Of these there are seventeen naval men, including three in the merchant-service. We certainly are not inclined to admit that naval men are the best of all witnesses on points of national policy; nor, indeed, upon any subject unconnected with the technicalities of their profession: for many reasons they are necessarily less competent than persons of almost any other class to form a sound judgment upon the general affairs of life. The early age at which their profession begins, their habitual imprisonment in ships of war, and the almost slavish subordination to the judgment of their seniors, to which they are subjected by naval discipline, combine to disqualify most naval men for the every-day business of civil life. But, inasmuch as the public have taken it for granted that naval men must be the judges whether naval operations have succeeded in carrying out a civil policy, in deference to this public opinion, we will commence with their evidence.

Captain Denman was the first naval witness examined. He has acquired too extensive and too favourable a notoriety as the commander of an African cruiser, without reference to the distinguished name which he inherits, to render it necessary to add, that he is a man of remarkable intelligence and address; yet, while we render him this justice, we are compelled in candour to say, that his evidence would have been more satisfactory to us, had it been less obviously warped by professional feeling, because it has occasionally given a sanguine character to the expres-

sion of his opinions, which will detract from their value; we allude to such answers as to questions 224, 225, and those which immediately follow.* But Captain Denman is quite right when he says (372), "I despise no means of assailing the Slave-trade, but would combine them all; the Squadron, the cultivation and civilization of the natives, and the encouragement of lawful commerce."

It was not to be expected, when Captain Denman's principles were so well known, that a direct question would be put to him as to the value of the Squadron; but in several places he casually proves its efficiency. In his reply to question 305, he says: "Comparing the present amount of Slave-trade with the year 1839, I believe its extent now is under one-third of what it was then;" and again, in answer to question 366, "I deny that the Slave-trade is as bad as ever; because I know, from my own experience, that at the present moment, even admitting that the statements are true from Brazil (and we all know how much it has now become the interest of the slave-dealer to exaggerate his successes), the Slave-trade is not much more than one-third what it was when Sir Fowell Buxton wrote, which was just at the period when the equipment articles were coming into play." The whole context shows that Captain Denman attributes this reduction of the Slave-trade to our naval police; but Captain Denman has a plan of his own, and, like all plan-mongers (we claim no exemption for ourselves), conceives that plan to be the panacea. We believe that he is entitled to the credit of having been the first man to carry war into the enemy's territory, by destroying the barracoons, or storehouses for slaves. This bold step immediately suppressed the Slave-trade at the Gallinas; although we infer from the evidence of Sir Charles Hotham, that in 1848 (*vide* 805), the barracoons had been re-established, and the trade revived there. Captain Denman, a little flushed perhaps with this success, founded upon his experience a plan for the close blockade of the whole of the Slave-trading coast, which, in connection with the destruction of the barracoons, will, in his opinion, entirely suppress the trade: this plan is developed in a paper handed in at question 245. The examination of this witness, as well as of many others, had

* In justice to Captain Denman, it is right to refer the reader to his evidence before the Lords' Committee, when he was allowed full scope to his explanations—a privilege of which only the slave-dealer Cliffe could boast before the Commons' Committee.

reference principally to the practicability of this plan. As this is a correlative issue of minor, though great importance, we cannot afford space for the discussion of it; but we acknowledge our impression, founded chiefly upon the evidence of Sir Charles Hotham (*vide* 476 and 580), to be that Captain Denman's plan is only partially applicable to the coast, though a good plan wherever it can be brought to bear.

Captain Denman must undoubtedly be classed as a witness in favour of the Squadron.

Captain Butterfield, of the Royal Navy, is the next naval witness; and, at the beginning of his examination (*vide* 521), he avows his general concurrence in Captain Denman's evidence. He states (528), and upon the authority of nine years spent on the African coast, that he "was supposed to have captured with the vessels under his orders three-fifths of the slave-vessels, in consequence of which frequent captures (*vide* 530), he found the Slave-trade very much diminished before he left the station." At another place he says: "From the vigilant guarding of the English cruisers, the Slave-trade was given up at Ambriz certainly," (*vide* 611 and 648 *et seq.*) But he is more specific than this as to the efficiency of the Squadron. Being asked whether the Slave-trade would have been suppressed if the same vigilant proceedings which he adopted in 1842 had been continued, the question having reference to those parts of the coast on which he had been employed, he replies: "I think there is no doubt of it; it would have been suppressed while the Squadron remained there; but whether it would have occurred again or not, I do not know: if you had withdrawn the Squadron, I dare say it would have grown up again; there is no doubt of it," (*vide* 641 *et seq.*) This is the most direct evidence given by Captain Butterfield, because no question was put to him tending to a more explicit answer; but on this evidence we submit, that Captain Butterfield also is a witness in favour of the Squadron.

Captain W. Allen is the next naval officer examined; and we at once admit that his opinion *appears* to be adverse; but it is expressed with a reserve that deprives it of any importance. His words are: "My impression is, that the Squadron has not produced the effect of suppressing the Slave-trade, and that it has very much aggravated the evil of it." But he adds, immediately afterwards: "It is a difficult question, and probably I have not sufficient

information upon the subject to pronounce an opinion." Presently afterwards he admits, that "he was not witness to any Slave-trade;" that "he was not employed on the service, and cannot undertake to give any evidence on the subject;" that "he has had no experience on the subject on the coast of Africa;" that "he had less information there than in England;" that "he never came in contact with any slaver, nor saw a slave-vessel that had been captured; nor ever had enough intercourse with officers of the Squadron to form an opinion upon the subject:" in fact, he adds in so many words: "I do not consider it proper to give an opinion on the subject," (*vide* 998, 1,003, 1,008, 1,015 to 1,019.) We think that, after these reiterated disclaimers of knowledge, we are entitled to set down Captain Allen as a neutral witness; under any circumstances, we should not have attached much weight to his opinion, because, while we give him all credit for his Niger services, we are compelled to say, that his publications in various forms exhibit a measure of self-complacency and pretension that greatly reduces the value of his opinions.

Nor do we approach the evidence of Captain Matson, R.N., though a witness favourable to our views, without feeling compelled to admit, that he, too, has excited a little distrust for sufficient reasons. Our present purpose is, not to *make out a case*, but to give an honest abstract of the Evidence; and hence we feel it right to premise, that, on many points of inferior moment, Captain Matson is contradicted by so many witnesses as to warrant distrust of his accuracy. We are loth to make a charge without sustaining it, and, therefore, without digressing too far from the immediate subject, we will refer to his answers to questions 1,321 as opposed to 5,546, 5,550, and to 1,467, as opposed to 2,404, 2,537, 2,692, 2,744, 7,417, and, in fact, we may say, to universal testimony: so, again, his answer to question 1,561 is contradicted by 2,090, 2,410, and 5,701; and his answer to 1,567 is proved to be utterly erroneous by Mr. Macqueen at 8,262, and in the Appendix No. II. page 203 of the third Report of 1848. But, though he may be inaccurate in some of his facts, his general knowledge of the subject is so conspicuous, that his judgment upon admitted facts must be deemed entitled to great weight; and that judgment is in our favour. He tells us, that "the Slave-trade has always diminished in proportion to the strength and efficiency of the British

Squadron on the coast," (*vide* 1,362;) that "all the efforts of the Slave-traders were frustrated on that part of the coast" (confining his remarks to that part which, he says, is the principal Slave-trading coast in Africa) "between 1839 and 1842; and that they gave up their establishments, and wound up their affairs," (*vide* 1,363.) And again, in answer to the following question (1,364), whether Brazil would not contrive to be supplied with slaves in some way or other, he says: "I do not think so, and I think that the opinion of others is much better than my own; I may quote the opinion of the Slave-traders themselves; and, with reference to Mr. Wise's letter, the statements there may be taken as the opinion of foreigners, and of Brazilian Slave-merchants. The same opinion was expressed by a very old Brazilian Slave-merchant, before the Sugar and Coffee Committee the other day; he did not for one moment doubt, and the people in Brazil now do not doubt, that you could stop the Slave-trade; and they express their surprise, through Mr. Wise, that we have not done it; and they question our intentions, because we have not done it. I can answer for the opinions often expressed to me by Slave-merchants themselves, with whom I was on very intimate terms; they do not doubt our power to stop the Slave-trade entirely."

In a subsequent part of his examination, being more specifically pressed upon the point, he states (1,483): "The employment of a blockading force is most essential to the suppression of the Slave-trade; and" (in the next answer, 1,484) "there can be no doubt that, if the British Squadron were withdrawn, the Slave-trade would increase:" which increase he presently afterwards (1,487) fixes at "a much greater amount" than two to one of the present numbers. That no doubt may exist as to his opinion, he adds emphatically at 1,489: "I think the presence of a naval blockade on the coast of Africa is essential for the final extinction of the Slave-trade; indeed, I have not the slightest doubt of it in my own mind." This is conclusive; and Captain Matson is clearly in favour of the Squadron.

We proceed to the evidence of Captain Birch, R.N. On the same principle of fairness, we will quote the adverse opinion of Captain Birch. He is asked (question 2,401), whether we can effectually put down the Slave-trade, if we are allowed to destroy the barracoons, to double the blockading force, and to punish the crews: he answers: "I believe that we may go on with the Squadron

that we have on the coast now to eternity." If this answer stood alone, it would embarrass us; but when we couple it with other replies, we find it sufficiently apparent, that the apprehended eternity of the blockade rests on the hypothesis, that it is taken as the *only* means of suppression; for, at 2,337, this witness says: "He most decidedly approves of the plan of destroying the barracoons, as a means of preventing the Slave-trade;" an opinion which he had previously expressed, in terms equally strong, at 2,250 *et seq.* Again; in answer to Sir Robert Inglis (2,341), he says: "I consider that the presence of a blockading force is the first essential towards the suppression of the Slave-trade." This is one of the cases to which we have alluded, in which the evidence has been partially quoted, when, if fairly given, it is found to be favourable to the Squadron. On the whole, therefore, Captain Birch is also with us.

The next naval Witness is Captain Wyvill, R.N., who was employed on the Eastern Coast: his opinion is very plainly given. After speaking of the decrease of the Slave-trade, (*vide* 3,547,) he "attributes it to the strict look-out which is kept" (3,567); "he attributes the falling off in the Slave-trade *entirely* to the blockading Squadron: were the ships taken away, there would be no difficulty in their supplying 75,000 slaves every year." (3,569.) "If the persons engaged were punishable, the treaties between England and Portugal would be sufficient to stop the Slave-trade, if the Squadron were kept up." (3,608.) As these opinions are in no way qualified, Captain Wyvill is, of course, a favourable witness.

And this evidence is confirmed by Lord John Hay, a member of the Committee, who was also examined. Alluding to the Eastern Coast, after observing that smaller steam-vessels ought to be employed upon it, he adds: "Then I think it possible that, having five of these larger ones, you might effectually check the trade on the East Coast." (3,692.) And again, in answer to questions 3,758 *et seq.*, he "recommends a considerable increase of the steam force, as best adapted to the suppression of the Slave-trade on the West Coast." For obvious reasons, Lord John Hay, as a Lord of the Admiralty and a member of the Committee, could not with propriety be very closely pressed; but we think that we are fairly warranted by these quotations, in ranging him on our side.

The next witness, Captain Claxton, R.N., was not

asked any question bearing on the issue: he merely tendered himself to offer the Great Britain as a negro emigrant ship; he may, therefore, be set aside altogether.

Captain Forsham is a Liverpool trader; and, although we admit that, in answer to question 4,484, he gives it as his opinion, "that it would not be possible for the British Squadron to prevent the carrying away of slaves from one point or another of the African Coast, and that, as long as there is a demand for slaves, they will be procured from the coast of Africa from some point or another," (*vide* 4,485,) we shall nevertheless take the liberty of claiming him as a witness on our side, in virtue of the following answers: "From my own experience, and what I have heard, I have known the Squadron to be successful in capturing slaves," (*vide* 4,480). "In the rivers that I have spoken of, the presence of our cruisers has been very effective in repressing the Slave-trade." (4,566.) "The British Squadron has been the means of suppressing the Slave-trade to some extent, as far as making captures." (4,586.) "I think that the Slave-trade would revive in the Bonny and New Calabar rivers, if the Squadron were removed." (4,593 and 4,594.) In the absence of more specific evidence, this seems to be pretty decisive; and we may observe in passing, that it is a curious feature of this inquiry, that no witness is very closely pressed for an opinion after such general expressions as these in favour of the Naval force!

Captain Mansell, R.N., whose very name is ominous, is an avowed sceptic as to the efficiency of the Squadron; nevertheless, he has given answers so much at variance with this scepticism, that we shall claim his evidence in favour of it. If we were disposed to treat him as a hostile witness, the answer given by the slave-dealer to question 4,687 would justify our dismissing him without further notice; for we can attach no weight to testimony of which a slave-dealer observes, that "he perfectly agrees in the whole of it." How does Captain Mansell himself like being thus bracketed with the wholesale murderer of men, women, and children? There are also minor points on which Captain Mansell is directly contradicted by other witnesses. For instance, how can he reconcile his reply to questions 4,663 *et seq.*, respecting the health of the station, with Sir Charles Hotham's answer to questions 913 *et seq.*? But it is not our interest to run down Captain Mansell, as we intend to make use of him. We will deal fairly, and give his adverse opinion first. In reply to question (4,607),

he states: "I am perfectly convinced that it would be impossible by any means of naval force to suppress the Slave-trade, so long as there existed a high demand for slaves on the other side of the Atlantic." So far, Captain Mansell is against us; but, in answer to questions 4,636 *et seq.*, he at once avows: "I have no doubt that there would be a very great extension of the Slave-trade temporarily, if the Squadron were removed." And immediately he explains the word "temporarily" by adding, that the limit to the time would be, "when the trade was perfectly satiated." Now, Captain Mansell must forgive us for saying, that even the patronage extended to him by a slave-dealer cannot prejudice him so far in our esteem, as to make us believe that he is in favour of extending the Slave-trade till it is satiated! Yet he admits, that this would result from withdrawing the Squadron; we are therefore compelled, in spite of himself, to put the gallant officer in the class of favourable witnesses.

Dr. Thompson is a surgeon in the Navy; and he, too, must not be judged by a few hasty words. To pass over what we must call, not only an illogical, but a somewhat absurd train of reasoning, in answer to questions 5,003 *et seq.*, where he endeavours to make out, that the excitement produced by the Squadron stimulates the Slave-trading spirit, though he admits, at 5,043, that it is a matter of mere pounds, shillings, and pence, he states (5,071): "The Slave-trade is not to be put down by preventive force;" and, at 5,256, "I believe that no preventive means will ever produce the desired good." Is Dr. Thompson, then, in favour of removing the Squadron? By no means; on the contrary, when the question is specifically put to him, at 5,047, he answers: "I should certainly hesitate to advise that the Squadron should be withdrawn." And again, at 5,082, when the question of withdrawing the Squadron is repeated in another form, he tells us: "If the native chiefs are left to themselves, no doubt they will openly continue the Slave-trade, and do everything that they possibly can to favour it." It is to Dr. Thompson that we are indebted for the mortality statistics of Brazils, whereby it is shown (5,109 to 5,124), that, under the most favourable circumstances, the slave who begins work at the age of eighteen (4,273), is killed off at the age of thirty-four. No wonder, therefore, that Dr. Thompson is opposed to the open continuance of the Slave-trade, and to the removal of the Squadron.

Captain Stopford, R.N., has the candour to admit, that he never was on the coast of Africa, (*vide* 5,601;) yet, notwithstanding this avowed ignorance, he expresses an opinion (5,612), "that the efforts of the Squadron do not diminish the Slave-trade." Nevertheless, he thinks that, by an increase in the Squadron, "supposing expense not to be a consideration, the work of suppression might be done," (*vide* 5,592;) and, in another place he says, forgetting, for the moment, that British and American Slave-trading are declared piracy, "I should not, certainly, remove the Squadron entirely; but the vessels I should keep there would be for the purpose of preventing piracy, and not the Slave-trade," (*vide* 5,596.) We think we are warranted in claiming Captain Stopford.

With respect to the next witness, Captain Hoare, we must give him up to our opponents, for he goes the whole hog, and would revive the trade, (*vide* 6,053.) This is honest at all events, and saves a great deal of trouble. It is true, that the young gentleman (for we suspect from his evidence that he must be very young indeed), has some misgivings as to the term Slave-trade, and even avows (*vide* 6,055), that he is "impressed with the horrors of purchasing his fellow-creatures;" he, therefore, "would not recommend the encouragement of the Slave-trade at all, under the denomination of Slave-trade; he may there be thought inconsistent again; but, under those circumstances he should not recommend it under the name at all of Slave-trade," (*vide* 6,056.) This sweetly-innocent answer, which savours much of the amiable simplicity of a youth of fifteen, is given in his own words; and, after such a quotation, with the emphatic opinion in favour of legalizing the trade given at 6,053, we will not attempt to assert a claim to the witness; nor do we think it worth while to expose either his ignorance or his inconsistency; he is as useless to our opponents as he is worthless to us: but in real charity to the man, we would not only remind him that Slave-trading is felonious, and that felony is infamous, but we would recommend him, if he has any regard for the esteem of his fellow-countrymen, to read Dr. Lushington's striking answer to question 9,070 of 1849.

Captain Rimington was concerned in conveying emigrants from the coast of Africa to the West Indies; but, strange to say, though a naval man, and well acquainted with the coast, there is not to be found in ten folio pages of his

examination, a single inquiry as to the efficiency of the blockading system; it is clear, therefore, that, like Captain Claxton, we must set him aside altogether.

Captain Riley, R.N., is a very different witness from Captain Hoare. In an early stage of his examination, (147 of 1849,) he is asked, whether the Slave-trade would increase if our vessels were withdrawn. We will connect his replies to this and the following question: "I feel confident that it would; it is as much as we could do to keep it down, with all our vigilance; and I believe that the Slave-trade would increase, and would commence again where legitimate trade is now going on, if our cruisers were withdrawn. It is my decided opinion (I form it after some deliberation), that, if you substituted steamers for sailing-vessels in the Bight of Benin, within two years you would totally destroy the Slave-trade there; it would cease in that part. I confine my observations to that part, for I cannot speak in reference to the southward, except from the information of others." At 185 and 186 and 227, he states the injury that withdrawing our cruisers would inflict upon the legal trade; and, at 215, speaking of the same contingency, he adds: "My opinion is, that you would have piracy; and that, if the Slave-trade was not suppressed, it would go on to such a degree, that you would have at last to send a larger Squadron than you have at the present time." Captain Riley was, we presume, found too dangerous a witness to be further pressed, for this is all his evidence on the present issue.

Captain Montresor, R.N., considers (320 *et seq.*), that the present force is wholly inefficient for the purpose of extinguishing the Slave-trade; that, if the object of the Squadron is the utter destruction of the Slave-trade, the keeping up the Squadron is entirely thrown away; that means very different from those employed must be resorted to. If Captain Montresor's evidence rested here, we should be compelled to yield him up to our opponents. We must even, in candour, add, that he goes further, and appears, from his answers to questions, 292 and 315, to consider, that the only ultimate remedy is, to glut the market with supply. But Captain Montresor is certainly no enemy to the blockade, though he doubts its efficiency independently of other means. He is asked (293), "Do you feel confident that, if you were to employ the three means you were adverting to, namely, of largely increasing the steam force, destroying the barracoons along the Coast,

and personally punishing the offenders, you would effect the extinguishing of the Slave-trade for ever?" "I have no doubt it would extinguish it; but, when you say 'for ever,' I believe it must, and ever will be, hydra-headed; it is not a speculation of individuals only; to my certain knowledge, in the Havana, there are Companies, even down to a man putting a doubloon into it as a speculation, in the same way as you would with a lottery; and therefore, though those means would be sufficient to put it down for two or three years, they would not be sufficient to put it down for ever, when they found that you had withdrawn your Squadron."

Upon the strength of this answer, we claim, notwithstanding his ideas of glutting the market, to appropriate Captain Montresor.

Sir Charles Hotham demands more attention, it being well known, that Mr. Hutt and Mr. Jackson relied principally upon him to make out their case. And not without reason, if the venerable Admiral had been allowed to have it all his own way. He is authoritative enough at the earlier part of his examination: but he was pressed hard by the Anti-slavery members of the Committee; and this severe cross-examination, after the usual hunting for refuge in pleas of ignorance and inexperience, at length extorted some very explicit opinions, which convert him into one of our most favourable witnesses.

He is asked (47 *et seq.*), whether he succeeded, as commander of the Squadron, in stopping the Slave-trade, or in crippling it to such an extent as to give to it a permanent check? He replies, "Decidedly not;" and again, at questions 504 to 508, he says: "It is not practically possible, by our present measures, to prevent the demand obtaining a supply from Africa;"—that, "under the present policy of attempting to stop the Slave-trade by a blockading Squadron, he cannot look forward to any definite period when it will effect its extinction;" and that "he is intimately persuaded that our present measures are perfectly futile." Such opinions as these, coming from such a quarter, could not fail of telling on the public mind; nor is it, perhaps, unreasonable to admit as an apology for the Press, that in the utter impossibility of abstracting from these large volumes for the service of a daily paper, and in the absence of all suspicion that men like Sir Charles Hotham would betray gross inconsistency in the course of a few minutes, they have merely glanced

at the evidence, and, stumbling suddenly upon such passages as these, have quoted, without collating them with other parts. This is an admission due to other papers; but the articles in the *Times* have been too elaborate, and too frequent, for that journal to claim the benefit of it. We have extracted all that is adverse from Sir Charles's evidence, except where he is argumentative, and there he is always absurd: now let us see what are his opinions, or his facts, on the other side.

He is asked (519), "Do you know whether the Slave-traders prefer the East to the West Coast for their operations?" He answers: "I am not aware; but I have recently heard that they have shifted from the West Coast to the East Coast, in consequence of the number of captures which have been made upon the Western Coast." This is a pretty large confession of efficiency! Again; at 596 *et seq.*: "I think we have taken a little more than one-third of the Slave-vessels: on the whole, we have taken 173 vessels and 15,462 slaves in two years and a half." Once more, at 639, "I only wish to assure the authorities at home, that, in the judgment of the dealers, we had driven the vessels, by the activity and exertions of the cruisers, from the West Coast to another part of Africa." We think that this is ample testimony to the partial success of our Squadron. "Yes," it will be answered, "but this falls short of extinction!" Granted: but now let us see what Sir Charles says on the subject of suspending our operations, notwithstanding that, at 665, he is unable "to suggest any modification of the present system," which at 707, he declares, that "experience has proved to be futile."

First, in reply to question 670, he says: "I do not think we can suspend our operations on the coast of Africa, without proposing some other measure; from political considerations, it would be impossible to do so; and at all events we must also reserve a Squadron of from ten to twelve sail, for the sake of protecting our commerce." This answer, at 686, he enlarges, by adding: "I alluded more particularly to the impossibility of altering the present system without proposing a substitute, because, independently of humanity, there are political considerations which should not be overlooked."

In answer to Sir Robert Inglis (672), the gallant Admiral, after the fashion of the juvenile Commander, drops a hint of a disposition to legalize the Slave-trade:

he would "allow the importation of slaves for a certain number of years;" but, conscience-struck, as we suppose, at the words which had escaped him, he replies to Sir Edward Buxton, at 680: "I anxiously hope that the Slave-trade may never be allowed; if you were to remove all restrictions, and to take your Squadron entirely away, small speculators would spring up and undersell those who are now in the market; the Slave-trade would be greatly increased in its horrors, and it would be impossible to calculate the calamities which would ensue; besides this, pirates would abound, and, in my opinion, it would be impossible for a legitimate trader to conduct his operations upon that coast." And at 688, he explains this anticipation of evil, by adding: "I apprehend the Slave-trade is now regulated by men of considerable capital, and that slaves are conveyed across with comparative ease and comfort. If you remove the restriction, men of a less amount of capital, small speculators, would embark in the trade, and then, I think, the trade would increase greatly in its horrors." This alone would be sufficient to hand Sir Charles over to us; but he is determined that there shall be no doubt of his being a true ally of the Anti-slavery cause. "I mean," he says, on explaining himself at question 700, "that as England has hitherto taken the leading part in endeavouring to put down the Slave-trade, and as she has, in every treaty which has been made, expressly inserted a clause for that purpose, and has thus set an example to the whole world, I do not think she can now depart from that course (unless she proposes a substitute), without a certain degree of degradation." And at 736, (with a little inconsistency it must be owned, if we revert to 672,) he "begs that the Committee will recollect that he never contemplated throwing the trade open;" the effect of which, as the necessary consequence of withdrawing the Squadron, he rightly describes at 771 *et seq.*, to be, that "the slaves would have been much cheaper in Brazil; there would have been a greater number imported; and the horrors of the middle-passage would have been very considerably increased by the fact of the slave-merchants being inadequately provided with capital for the purpose; they would, therefore, have sailed in smaller vessels, and the trade would have been subjected to greater horrors." Finally, at 854 and 920, the witness says: "Leaving out of account the negro suffering, I would not abandon the system we are now pursuing, because I am unwilling to

see my country descend from the high position which it has hitherto held in the eyes of the world. I anxiously hope that the Squadron may not be withdrawn, unless a sufficient substitute can be found by this Government."

Sir Charles Hotham being the *cheval de bataille* of our opponents, we have been induced to extract the more largely from his evidence; we cannot, therefore, find space for exposing the frivolous and evasive character of many of his answers; and in truth, we feel so much obliged to him for eventually coming round to our side, that we are not inclined to be ill-natured.*

Before we proceed to the evidence of the civilians on this principal issue, let us see the general result of the naval evidence. We stated at the commencement, that seventeen naval officers have been examined; but two out of the number were not interrogated upon this issue. After the view which we have here given of their evidence, we confidently appeal to any candid reader, whether thirteen out of the fifteen are not, with more or less decision of tone, in favour of maintaining the blockade, while Captain William Allen is at most to be considered as but a neutral? The only naval witness whom our opponents can fairly claim is Captain Hoare, and we wish them joy of the acquisition. But our naval evidence, as it happens, is not yet concluded. On referring to Dr. Lushington's answer to question 951, we find that the learned Judge, on occasion of the treaty with the Duc de Broglie, referred the practicability of putting down the Slave-trade by force to the judgment of three French officers of great experience on the African coast, and five English officers, of whom Captain Trotter was one, "of the greatest practical experience in the Slave-trade." "These gentlemen," says Dr. Lushington, "required several days to consider it; and having consulted the charts, and deliberated probably for seven or eight days, made a report to us, that, with a certain given force, the object might be attained." It cannot be disputed, that this gives to us an additional strength of eight experienced naval witnesses, subject only to the qualification which Dr. Lushington makes, that the admission of Slave-grown sugar into the British market, under the Act of 1846, was not at that time contemplated as a possible contingency; but we must deduct Captain Butter-

* This was written *before* an opportunity occurred of perusing the Lords' Evidence.

field and Captain Denman, two of these officers, because they have been counted already.

Thus, on the whole, we have a preponderance of nineteen favourable naval witnesses to be set against the neutrality of Captain William Allen, who never was in the service, and the adverse testimony of the solitary Captain Hoare; yet the *Times*, in one of its arrogant leading articles, had the assurance to tell its readers that all naval experience was in favour of removing the blockade!

CHAPTER III.

AND now let us inquire whether, with all the aid they can derive from Brazilian slave-merchants and slave-dealers of their own picking and choosing, Mr. Hutt and Mr. Jackson have much more reason to boast of the evidence of the Civilians?

Of these there are thirty-six; but some few of them are not interrogated upon the subject. We will take them in the order in which they are called.

Lord Palmerston is the first. He was examined twice at very great length; and, as might be expected, not a word is to be found in all his evidence, adverse to the blockade, but much, both from his own lips and from others whom he quotes, which is decidedly favourable to the continuance of it. As his Lordship's sentiments are so well known, we shall only extract briefly from his evidence.

In answer to Question 29, his Lordship says: "If it were not for the checks to the exportation of slaves from Africa, the increase of the horrors of the Slave-trade and its evils would be incalculable." In answer to Question 78: "If, by the maritime police, the enterprises of Slave-trade became no longer profitable, if the losses were greater than the profits, self-interest would of course induce people to abandon a pursuit which no longer became remunerative." Again, at 160: "I believe that the effectiveness of the means to suppress the Slave-trade has uniformly varied in direct proportion to the amount of the force employed." Once more, at 161: "I think it would be utterly disgraceful to the country," (and the words are emphatically repeated,) "from the mean calculation of a small temporary saving, to abandon the course which it has pursued. I do think, by proper arrangements, and by the combina-

tion of various means, the end may still be accomplished." And, finally, at 162, in answer to a question assuming the demand for Brazilian sugar, his Lordship adds: "It is my distinct and full conviction, that the horrors of the Slave-trade would have been greatly increased, if it had not been for the efforts of England to suppress it." We regret that we cannot, consistently with the plan of our analysis, quote more largely from the noble Lord's evidence; every word in it carries weight; and it is beautiful to see the dexterity and the force with which he parries all the sophistical *ad captandum* arguments in which the Chairman and his coadjutors indulge. His Lordship quotes, in answer to Question 11, a report from Mr. Hook, the Commissary Judge at Sierra Leone, and one of the witnesses examined last year, in which he emphatically states an opinion, that "the withdrawal of the Squadron will be a measure utterly ruinous to millions of the human family. It is my firm belief," (proceeds Mr. Hook,) "that, in nine or twelve months after the withdrawal of our Squadron, the whole of Western Africa, from Cape Verde to Benguela, would present a scene of cruelty and devastation too fearful to contemplate. All the progress of Christianity, civilization, and commerce, would be annihilated; in a word, Western Africa would, in the course of a year or two, be rolled back to its worst pristine savage condition." And again, in answer to Question 27 of 1849, he quotes the report of Mr. Kennedy, the Commissary Judge at the Havannah, where it is observed (at page 10), "If the blockade were abandoned, and slaves procured at a quarter, a third, or even one-half the present prices, it would be renewed, unquestionably, to as frightful an extent as ever. From my knowledge of this community, I feel myself warranted in saying, that no other than coercive measures will suffice to keep the trade suppressed." We shall revert to Mr. Hook's evidence hereafter. Thus we have, at the very outset of our inquiry into the Civilian evidence, three witnesses, one being a Secretary of State and the other two Commissary-Judges, in favour of the blockade.

The next witness is Try Norman, an emancipated female slave, whose evidence is not the less valuable for the simplicity with which it is given, (*vide* 819 to 824.) We connect her answers, embodying them with the questions, as we have been obliged, for obvious reasons, to do in several other instances:—"The black people of Africa think the English nation their friends for taking slave-

vessels; they would be very sorry if the Queen of England's ships were taken away from the coast; African chiefs would sell many more slaves if the Queen's ships were to go away; they prevent a great many slaves from being sold."

James Campbell, another liberated slave, tells us, in answer to 1,083:—"We were told, that the reason of our being stopped in the baracoon was, that the Spaniards said that the ships of war belonging to the English kept us from going to the Spaniards' country." Thus we have two more witnesses well qualified to judge, whose evidence, as far as it goes, is, by necessary implication, favourable to the blockade.

The two next witnesses, John Frazer and James Walker, are also liberated slaves, but they were not examined directly or indirectly upon this issue.

The next civilian examined was Mr. Carr, the Chief-Justice of Sierra Leone. He is decidedly in favour of the blockade; nor does he utter a word adverse to the system, either directly or by implication, except so far as this, that, in answer to Question 1,835, he says: "If it should be proved by evidence, that as many as 60,000 slaves had left the coast in the past year," (alluding to the year 1847,) "I would say that the Squadron was not altogether efficient, if so many vessels could have left with slaves." We must admit, that the evidence does go to the extent of 60,000 having been landed in the Brazils; but certainly—and Mr. Kennedy also doubts whether there is not exaggeration (*vide* 27 of 1849)—Mr. Carr, in answer to Question 1,829, alleges very sufficient reasons for concluding the number to be greatly overstated.

In pursuance of our determination to quote honestly, we have given the above answer of Mr. Carr's; but it will be found to amount to nothing, when balanced with his evidence in favour of the blockade. At the very commencement of his evidence (1,741) he says: "I recommend that the present cruisers should continue upon the coast, and be made more efficient, if possible." Again, at 1,746: "I decidedly consider that the presence of a blockading Squadron is the first essential pre-requisite for the suppression of the Slave-trade." Again, at 1,832: "According to my positive experience as a resident in the country, my judgment is, that the blockading Squadron is efficient in stopping the Slave-trade." Again, at 1,898: "On the whole, I should say decidedly, that a greater amount of evil would be produced by removing the cruisers." And,

finally, at 1,989: "I think that from 200,000 to 300,000 persons would be shipped from the coast annually, if the Slave-trade were left open altogether to the Brazilians." After this testimony, there can be no doubt as to the opinion of Mr. Carr being in accordance with our own.

Dr. Keogh is a military surgeon. In answer to Question 2,010, as to the measures he would advise for the suppression of the trade, he says: "I would not be in favour of doing away with the present suppressive Squadron on the coast, because I should fear the immediate effect might be the making an increased demand for slaves; but I believe that the Squadron never can succeed, managed as it at present is, at least in effectually suppressing the Slave-trade." This is not altogether favourable, but he afterwards speaks with far more decision: we couple together his answers to Question 2,012 and 2,054, "I do not recommend the removal of the present blockading Squadron; I fear that, in the present prices of Brazilian produce, if we removed our fleet from the coast, there being a considerable demand for slaves, there would be a great increase of the Slave-trade. It might be only temporary; we might glut the market; we might, by doing so, make it the interest, after some time, of the slave-proprietors of Brazil, not to allow more slaves to be imported;"—"but it would be all a work of time; and I fear that the immediate effect would be, that, there being a large demand for slaves, a large number would be immediately imported."

Mr. Joseph Smith, a native African, and apparently a man of much intelligence, states in reply to Question 2,161: "The presence of an English Squadron on the coast has a great effect upon the people, although the Slave-trade is carried on; but I think that the presence of the English cruisers has a very great effect upon the people; were it not for that, the amount of the Slave-trade would be very much increased. I have known the coast thirteen years." Thus, Mr. Smith also is in our favour.

Mr. Hutton is an African merchant, who has had thirty-five years' experience in the trade; he admits (2,560), that the results of our efforts "have not, on the whole, been satisfactory" to him; but he adds, "there must be coercive measures;" and again, at 2,565 and 2,567, "the measures of coercion must be blockade. Coercive measures would prevent it, and the encouragement of lawful commerce, when it became fully established, would effectually suppress it." The evidence of Mr. Hutton is throughout

well worthy attention in reference to the commercial aspect of the question; but, upon this issue, we will only further extract his answers to 2,595, 2,598, 2,635, and 2,648. "Under existing circumstances, I think, that a force to the extent which is now kept up there is necessary: if the Squadron were withdrawn, the Slave-trade would, in fact, be revived; the Slave-trade would, in fact, increase throughout the coast of Africa; the Squadron certainly ought not to be diminished or withdrawn till legitimate trade is established; it would be difficult to foresee the mischief which might ensue if the Squadron were withdrawn."

There can be no doubt, then, that Mr. Hutton is decidedly with us.

The next witness is the Rev. James Schön, whose acquaintance with Africa extends over sixteen years. It is rather curious, that one of the earliest answers of Mr. Schön refers to the confident hope of a Spanish Slave-trader, that England would not send her cruisers to Africa again! The evidence of Mr. Schön is almost entirely confined to the state of Sierra Leone, and the progress of African improvement, on both which subjects it is valuable and satisfactory. There is but one passage directly bearing on the present issue. He is asked, at 2,771, what he thinks would be the general effect of removing the British cruisers, and he gives the following answer:—"I have no hesitation in saying, that the Slave-trade would rapidly increase as a matter of course; that the horrors of it would be doubled very soon by war between the different tribes, and even one city with another; it would most certainly put a stop to Missionary operations; it would put a stop to the extension of British and legitimate commerce of every nation." Mr. Schön, then, is with us.

Mr. Macgregor Laird is a gentleman well known for his commercial enterprise in Africa, and, upon our principle of fairness, we must quote much unfavourable evidence from him. In answer to Question 2,858, he says, "that he does not think the Squadron has affected, in any measurable degree, the supply of slaves." In reply to Question 2,883, he is yet more decided: "I should suppose that the extent of the Western Coast is 4,000 miles, and on the East Coast, it extends from Cape Guardafui to Port Natal, —say 8,000 miles in all; I hold it to be quite impossible to put down the Slave-trade along the whole Coast. I suppose that we have now one-fourth in number of our

navy employed in suppressing the Slave-trade ; and, if we employed every pennant we have on the Coast of Africa, the Slave-trade would still go on, and with more aggravated cruelty, if the demand on the other side of the water continued." It is worth while to observe upon this answer, that the ignorance betrayed in the first half of it detracts materially from the value of the opinion given in the other half. Sir Charles Hotham (and we believe that even he greatly exaggerates) limits the slave-trading coast on the western side to 2,195 miles (*vide* 476 of 1849); while Captain Wyvill restricts the eastern slave-trading coast to 800 miles (*vide* 3,538); and Captain Denman, at 232, estimates the whole extent of the slaving-coast on the west at only 500 miles. Though these naval authorities are thus conflicting, their evidence shows, at least, that Mr. Macgregor Laird is very ignorant of the subject ; but, whether he is ignorant or well informed, we submit, that the following answers completely neutralize his previous testimony, although, at 2,904, he attempts to give emphasis to that testimony, by asserting, that the present system cannot be justified. Being asked at 2,980 *et seq.*, as to some of the effects of withdrawing the Squadron, he replies : " There is no doubt that Slave-traders would again resort to those rivers. I think, the withdrawal of the Squadron, without any other measures taken by this Government, would certainly have the effect of filling those rivers again with slavers, as they formerly were before the equipment clause was passed. All experience has proved, that the return of those Slave-traders to the rivers, would be very detrimental and injurious to the British trader. I think it essential, that every effort should be made to suppress the Slave-trade." Upon this distinct and unqualified avowal, we are not indisposed to claim Mr. Macgregor Laird as a witness in favour of the Squadron, since, on his own showing, our cruisers have purged the rivers of the Slave-trade, and, therefore, they are clearly comprised in the " every effort " which he says should be made to suppress it. Yet more might we insist upon this claim, when he tells us in another place, (2,904,) that " the British nation at large have such a responsibility regarding the Slave-trade, which they encouraged and fostered for so many years, that they are bound to do what they can to abolish it." But we repudiate Mr. Macgregor Laird altogether ; we will not *have* him ; he is not worth the gift ; for, with an inconsistency, not only of words but of principle, for which we can find no excuse,

he shamelessly avows, in answer to Question 2,907, "that if Spain and Brazil are disposed to carry on the Slave-trade, he would not interfere at all!!!" "He that is not *with* us, is against us."

Mr. John Duncan, who has acquired some celebrity by his travels in Africa, does not think "that an extension of the Squadron to double the force would effectually stop the Slave-trade" (*vide* 3,146 and 3,153); but he qualifies this by adding: "It might suppress it in a great measure, and, I think, would wholly prevent it, if aided by the encouragement of commerce and agriculture at the same time; or even if the Squadron were reduced, and commerce and agriculture encouraged." In other words, Mr. Duncan concurs with every other rational man in recommending the combination of milder means with coercive measures; but there can be no doubt, that Mr. Duncan is a witness on our side, for in answer to Questions 3,142 and 3,145, he says: "If the blockading Squadron were entirely withdrawn, I have no doubt that piracy and an extension of the Slave-trade would certainly occur, as also the destruction of our factories there. No doubt, the Squadron checks the Slave-trade to a certain extent, and has been the means of coercing some of the Spanish and Portuguese Slave-dealers into legitimate trade." We therefore claim Mr. Duncan.

CHAPTER IV.

THERE is such a kind-hearted official simplicity about Mr. Bandinel, that it is really with reluctance that, while we claim him as our witness, we are obliged (in vulgar phrase), to "show him up" a little. We are compelled to take this course, not only on account of the confidence obviously placed in him by our opponents, in respect of his half-century of official knowledge, but also by the evasive, indecisive, inconsistent, and somewhat absurd tone that pervades the fifty pages of his evidence. He exhibits himself as a querulous eulogist of his own times; quotes Burke, Fox, and Pitt, for plans of anti-slavery reform; dwells upon official despatches as the gospel of the bureau; and while he jumps from treaty to treaty, with all the activity of a flea on a featherbed, gravely affects reserve, lest the weight of his opinion should embarrass the Government!!! All this is intolerable in a witness.

The drift of Mr. Bandinel's argument is this; that the Squadron has not effected the suppression of the Slave-trade, and cannot effect it, unless combined with other means, and especially with the co-operation of the Slave-trading States; and that, for such co-operation, treaties ought to be made with the Brazils, and pledges exacted for the performance of them. To extract, in detail, his evidence to this effect, would be virtually to copy one-third of it. We think we cannot be chargeable with want of fairness, if we merely refer to the numbers of the questions, and limit our quotations to two or three places, where he has expressed himself most strongly. We refer our readers, then, to 3,244, 3,279, 3,281, 3,286, 3,322, 3,329, 3,336, 3,338, 3,341, 3,355, 3,357, 3,390, 3,397, 3,405, 3,418, 3,427; and we extract the answers to 3,390 and 3,427, as being the most decisively unfavourable to the Squadron. The following are the question and answer at 3,390:—

“Supposing that Brazil was willing to enter into these engagements, and willing to give such a guarantee to secure the faithful carrying out of the engagements, do you think that Great Britain would be acting with wisdom in withdrawing the Squadron, and all other means of forcible suppression of the Slave-trade?”—“I should say, Yes, for the present, certainly, at any rate.” His answer to 3,427 is:—“I think experience does show, that, with every possible exertion on the part of our officers, and every power which has been obtained from foreign States, their efforts have been unsuccessful; and, arguing from the past, I should say, it was likely they would be unsuccessful.” Upon this evidence, of course, Mr. Bandinel will naturally be considered hostile; but we have seen, that he proposes a guarantee from the Brazils, or, as he elsewhere calls it, a pledge, that this faithless State will for the future observe their anti-slavery engagements (*vide* 3,337.) Here Mr. Bandinel got himself into a difficulty, for the idea of new treaties with such a treaty-breaking State was too ridiculous even for Mr. Hutt; and, when the mention of pledges (3,339) naturally led to the inquiry what these pledges should be, poor Mr. Bandinel was driven to his wit's end! At first (3,339*) he ingenuously replies, “That is a matter for the Government to consider;” (Lord Palmerston will be infinitely indebted to him!) but, pressed by questions 3,367 *et seq.*, he at length, at 3,382, suggests, as an adequate pledge of fidelity, the surrender of the Island of St. Catherine's, a worthless spot

of the size of the Isle of Man, one-half of which is already given away to the Prince de Joinville! Can this be considered as anything but sheer trifling with the Committee? Mr. Bandinel well might complain, at 3,496, under the pressure of examination, after, to ten questions, (beginning at 3,480,) he had carefully evaded giving any real reply, "You might push me to an opinion which, perhaps, after all, might not be quite consonant with what I am entirely impressed with."

If, therefore, the evidence rested here, we should say that Mr. Bandinel, though a hostile witness, was obviously too ignorant, except upon mere official details, to give a sound opinion. But, though we disregard his opinion, that opinion is strongly and decidedly with us; and, what is of far more consequence, the opinion which he gives in our favour is sustained by the official statistics which he quotes!!!

In answer to question 3,281, this witness says, after quoting some antithetical nonsense from Burke: "I do not think that it would become Great Britain to relax in the least, either in regard to the Slave-trade in the West, or in regard to the Slave-trade of Africa, in being foremost in her efforts to extinguish them both. I think that we are bound to exert those efforts by every principle;—by the principle of the retribution which we owe to those people, from having been the foremost at one time in creating the cruelties which they suffered, and that from a very base and narrow motive,—not even the larger motive that the slaveholders had, of benefiting by the labours of the slaves. We bought them in Africa, and we took them and threw them out to be treated as any person might like. I think that there is a retribution which we owe to them; and I think, also, that we owe it to every principle of humanity,—we owe it to every principle of honour,—we owe it to what we have done and what we have been able to do; we owe it, also, to the general feeling of this country, we owe it to the character which we hold among the nations of the world, to be still foremost in endeavouring to extinguish the Trade; and we should do what is practicable." Now, be it observed, that this very emphatic language is used in reply to the question, whether he would rely much more upon the gentler means, upon moral influences, than upon force. The terms of the question render the answer yet more striking; but, as if to render it impossible for a doubt to remain, he adds,

five days afterwards, and, of course, after full consideration, in answer to question 3,425: "I may be wrong, but I have witnessed the Slave-trade (I mean I have witnessed it in respect to papers) and the operations of it; and I have so great a horror of it, that if it could be put down in a very limited time, even by an increase of horrors for a time, I confess that I myself (my opinion, of course, is worth nothing,) should be inclined to allow them."

And now we will show, with more immediate reference to the Issue under consideration, that, by Mr. Bandinel's statistics, the efficiency of the Squadron is fully established. If the reader will turn to the ten questions, beginning with No. 3,252, he will find that the number of slaves emancipated from the different commission and Vice-Admiralty Courts, are 103,191; (for accuracy's sake, we must observe, that 11,039 of these were adjudged between 1810 and 1819, but all the rest were emancipated subsequently to 1819;) and if, again, he will turn to 3,266, he will find that the number of slaves imported into Cuba and Brazil subsequently to 1819, are 466,500. Now, let it be borne in mind, that it is only subsequently to 1839, that our cruisers have been unrestricted as to the latitudes of capture; and the efficiency of the Squadron, even under this enormous disadvantage, is proved by Mr. Bandinel himself, to have attained the large proportion of one in four and a half. We think that, after this admission of success, under circumstances which, for twenty years, (namely, from 1819 to 1839,) almost precluded the hope of success, no sane man will dispute the efficiency of the Squadron. As Mr. Bandinel's more deliberate opinion is thus sustained by his statistics, we may consider that, notwithstanding his adverse statements, he is fairly to be enumerated with the anti-slavery witnesses.

But, though not immediately relevant to the present Issue, there may not be a more proper place to observe, that these statistics of Mr. Bandinel, in his oral evidence, directly falsify the first Resolution of the Committee, as reported to the House, and to be found at page 9 of the second Report of 1849. We have seen, from Mr. Bandinel's answer to question 3,261, that the number of slaves emancipated by capture since 1819, are 92,152; whereas, in the Resolution of the Committee, the number of slaves reported to "appear by evidence" to have been captured since 1819, is limited to 50,180, (the reader will arrive at this, by adding up the sixth column under the title of "Cap-

tured by cruisers;") and this calculation also appears to proceed from Mr. Bandinel, by a marginal note on the side of it. Now, upon these statements, self-contradictory as they are, the Committee was bound either to explain their reasons for selecting the unfavourable one, or to dismiss both as unworthy of trust; since both could not possibly be true, and a difference of 42,000 is too great to be a mere error. The larger statement, too, (at 3,261,) is given with a minuteness of detail that bespeaks confidence; how, then, came Mr. Hutt to propose the adoption of the minor quantity? Still more gravely do we ask, how he will explain away this seeming deception, when called to account by the House?

But we return to the civilian Evidence.

Mr. William Smith was Commissary Judge at Sierra Leone, and left that Colony in 1834; he is an adverse Witness, but not of a very decided character; nor, judging from his evidence, does he appear to be entitled to much weight, as the following short extracts from it will show:—

3,852. "Do you, on consideration of the whole subject, recommend, therefore, that the Squadron, or any part of the Squadron, should be maintained on the Coast, for the purpose of forcibly repressing the Slave-trade?" "I certainly should not recommend the whole of it to be withdrawn."

3,853. "Why should you not?" "For the reasons I have before stated, and because I think that the Slave-trade would be carried on."

3,854. "Is not the Slave-trade carried on now?" "Yes."

3,855. "Does the Squadron prevent the Slave-trade?" "No."

A witness who can answer in this manner, is really not worth consideration. Although, to a certain degree, he goes along with us in admitting (at Questions 3,830 and 3,840), "that the effects of the general removal of a repressive force would be, that, for a year or two, there would be a vast deal of Slave-trade carried on;" yet as, "in his humble opinion, the Squadron has proved inefficient," (3,849) we give him up to Mr. Hutt.

We have already quoted, on Lord Palmerston's authority, so strong an opinion given by Mr. Hook, officially as well as deliberately, that it scarcely requires confirmation by any extracts from his oral evidence. On our professed principle of perfect honesty, we feel bound to refer, however,

to his answers to Questions 3,900 and 3,901, as those answers are adverse to the position (if indeed such a position was ever seriously entertained by anybody), that the Squadron can *extinguish* the trade; but Mr. Hook has been already proved to be a decided advocate for maintaining the Blockade.

Dr. King is the most decided of the hostile witnesses. His answers from 3,967 to 3,971, and, again, from 3,978 to 3984, are so very decided, that we do not attempt either to claim him or to contradict him; especially as he does not appear to have been in any degree cross-examined as to the grounds of his opinion. We may observe, however, that, upon a collateral inquiry, as to the extent to which the protection of the Squadron is required by our legal trade, he is at direct variance with every other witness that was examined. The contradictions are too numerous to admit of even a reference to them by number. We might on this ground challenge his credibility; but it really does not appear to be worth while.

José E. Cliffe calls himself a native of the United States, a Doctor of Medicine by profession, and a Slave-dealer by practice; of course, he is in favour of removing the blockade. Had he been otherwise, we should have inferred that our policy was entirely erroneous, and that the coercive system was the very worst that could be adopted. Such being the case, a minute dissection of his evidence would be superfluous. It is very desultory and argumentative, extending over twenty-three pages, and is founded entirely upon the hypothesis, that, so long as there is a demand in Brazil, Slave-trading will continue, whatever we may do to prevent it. Two quotations will suffice to convey the substance of all his argument. In answer to Question 4,129, he says: "We considered that, whatever England undertook, she would carry out effectually; we afterwards found that it could not be done; and, therefore, whatever the amount to which you may increase that Squadron at the present time, so long as it is a profitable article of commerce, and we have means for fitting out vessels, you will never check it." At 4,349, he is asked, "Whether he thinks that the Slave-traders have, on the whole, gained upon the preventive means?" and immediately afterwards, "Whether the case of the British Squadron, and of those who seek to prevent the Slave-trade by it, is much less hopeful now than it was a few years ago?" To both of these questions, he replies: "Of

course." If it were worth our while to quote the inconsistencies of such a witness, we might refer to Question 4,115, where, speaking of Brazilian feelings respecting our Squadron, he says, "One party views it, (that is, our blockade,) as wild and impracticable; another party views it, that you have a wish to check the rising prosperity of Brazil." This necessarily means, that, whatever may be the opinion of this Slave-dealer as to the efficiency of our Squadron, there is a Brazilian party who take an opposite view of the matter. Again; in answer to the next question (4,116), he says:—"We are perfectly aware, that the Squadron will never be attended with success, as regards *entirely* checking the Slave-trade." This also implies, that the *repression* of it is, to a certain extent, confessed. But, though these are large concessions to be made by such an opponent, we will have nothing to do with him; so far from it, that we heartily wish Mr. Hutt had selected fifty more Slave-dealers to give yet stronger testimony. But we must not here terminate our remarks upon this Slave-dealing witness. We take the liberty of inquiring, with Lord Denman, Who brought him before the Committee? Who hunted him out? Who previously sifted his opinions? Who paid his travelling expenses? We will go further than Lord Denman, and ask, Who permitted him to insult, not only with his presence, but in terms, a Committee of the House of Commons? Who allowed him to give, unchallenged for his insolence, his audacious answers to Questions 4,118, 4,119, 4,152, and 4,153? Would not any English witness, whatever might be his rank or influence, have been rebuked with indignation, if not even committed for the contempt? Yet, here was this man, a pirate by the laws of his native country,—a pirate by the promised law of his adopted country,—a murderer by his own confession,—living by homicide and infanticide,—habitually dealing in the blood and sinews of his fellow-creatures, kidnapping them by rapine and fire, and then feeding them up to die under the torture of murderous labour, worked and used up till the soul is squeezed out of the body,—here was this man, confessing, if not exulting, in his sanguinary career, and bearding with impunity, on their very seats, the august tribunal to whom was delegated by the country the task of hereafter preventing similar atrocities!!! We avow it boldly; there is a mystery in all this that confounds us. In this matter, at least, we are diametrically opposed to Mr. Hutt; we

painfully suspect the ultimate objects of Mr. Jackson ; we think Mr. Gladstone has done himself little honour by his undisguised Slave-trading bias ; we know little of Mr. Simeon's, or Lord Lincoln's, or Lord Brackley's reasons for uniformly dividing with the Chairman ; but we will not readily believe that any one of these noble and honourable Members would lend his influence, or degrade his character, or stultify his reputation for good sense, by furthering the murderous policy of a Slave-dealing pirate ; and therefore, we can only repeat, that some mysterious influence must lurk behind the curtain, compelling these gentlemen to be the puppets in a movement which they condemn, and in which others pull the strings. We would willingly offer the same apology for our brethren of the Press, if it did not involve an imputation upon their independence, of which some of them would be more ashamed than of the crime of Slave-dealing itself.

To return from this digression.

Mr. Horsefall, an African merchant and the Mayor of Liverpool, is the next civilian, and he also begins his evidence adversely : " I am decidedly of opinion, that the keeping of a large Squadron will never effectually accomplish the suppression of the Slave-trade." But this is the only testimony he gives hostile to our views. He is severely cross-examined by Colonel Thompson (from Question 4,806 to 4,844) ; but, as the whole of this cross-examination is argumentative, no partial quotation from it will be useful, and we must, therefore, content ourselves with observing, that, having admitted (4,790) that, " on the immediate withdrawal of the Squadron, there would be a decided increase of Slave-trading," at the same time that he expresses a doubt " whether there would be any permanent increase ;" and, having again (4,801) given it as his opinion, that " the demand in Brazil must be the ultimate regulator," he is pressed by Colonel Thompson, in spite of himself, to the conclusion, founded upon commercial principles, that the operations of the Squadron must necessarily increase the price of slaves, and that the increase of price must, of similar necessity, lower the demand. (4,826.) After this compulsory retraction of his argument, (and it seems to have been extracted from him as if with a tongue-screw, if there be such an instrument of torture,) we have no hesitation in claiming Mr. Horsefall. In fact, before he was pressed by Colonel Thompson, he stated (4,799) : " I think, if the Squadron were withdrawn, whether justly or

otherwise, the inference which would be drawn would be, that parties could get more slaves, and there would be a rush; there would be an additional number of vessels put on, and an additional number of slaves exported from the coast of Africa, perhaps within the first twelve months, unless accompanied, as I said before, with some other measures." The principal part of Mr. Horsefall's evidence refers to the case of the *Lady Sale*, a vessel of his which was seized and condemned under the Equipment Article. But Mr. Horsefall is clearly with us.

And the Rev. Dr. Lang, a minister of the Scotch Church, is as clearly against us, so far as disposition goes (*vide* his answers 4,938, and 4,958 to 4,960); but he was never in Africa, and avowedly speaks, not from any personal knowledge, but only from information gained on the Brazilian Coast, that is, from Slave-dealers, and their agents. This, we think, entirely neutralizes his evidence, and we shall consider him as neuter.

Mr. Moore is a Liverpool merchant, trading with the Brazils, and, like some of the other witnesses, he begins with an adverse opinion. He is asked, at 5,341, whether the British Squadron has succeeded in its object; and he promptly answers: "I should say, quite the contrary." And again, at 5,412, still referring to the Squadron, he says: "I give it as my decided opinion, that you cannot prevent the Slave-trade; that, if you blockade the coast of Africa, you cannot prevent them taking away slaves." This would be decisive evidence of opinion, if Mr. Moore, on cross-examination, were self-consistent; but, like two or three other witnesses, his judgment is neutralized on cross-examination. At 5,359, he says: "The moment that you come to a point where the trade is not remunerative, and I should say largely remunerative, of course parties will not embark in a business attended with so much risk and danger." Then, again, at 5,521: "If you increase the Squadron, of course you will increase the difficulties of carrying on the Slave-trade; but, the more you increase it, in all probability the more you enhance the price of the slave." If there is any truth in logic, these two answers form the terms of a syllogism, which inevitably leads to the conclusion, that the Squadron, if increased, will extinguish the Slave-trade by rendering it no longer remunerative! And Mr. Moore himself seems conscious that he has been driven from his position by the force of argument; for, as if to make the *amende* for his premature

condemnation of the Squadron, he says at 5,535: "I would have nothing understood which should imply that I would do anything, or say anything favourable to carrying on the Slave-trade, because I think it is a most horrible and detestable traffic; anything that could be implied from what I have stated to the effect that I would encourage or favour the Slave-trade, I would certainly disclaim." We think that, after this, we may also claim Mr. Moore.

Mr. Tobin is an African merchant, residing at Liverpool, who, fifty years ago, went out to the African coast as captain of a Slave-trading vessel. No doubt, Mr. Tobin is sincerely penitent for the sins of his early days; there is, nevertheless, apparent here and there, such strong indications of the second nature which is acquired by the force of habit, that though the only evidence that he gave upon the present Issue is in our favour, we fear we must consider Mr. Tobin to be little better than a Slave-dealer still! For example, he is asked (5,771), "Do you regard the African to be a creature of the same flesh and feelings as ourselves?" He replies: "I really cannot answer that question; I cannot tell what the feelings of other people are; I can only tell by appearances"!!! But Mr. Tobin is a good Christian, though a bad philosopher; and, when Sir Robert Inglis explained to him the drift of the question, he answers with, perhaps, an instinctive appreciation of the high character of the honourable Member: "It is what I have always practised, and endeavoured to have practised, to treat them exactly as we would expect them to treat us." (5,772.) It is quite clear, that, whatever may have been the slave-dealing infirmities of his early youth, Mr. Tobin is an Anti-slavery man upon religious principles, and, in fact, in three successive answers, he avers, that "he should be very sorry indeed to see the Slave-trade opened again." (5,766.) As, therefore, the only evidence given by Mr. Tobin on this Issue is, that "the Squadron may put down the Slave-trade in some, places, as they have done," (5,743) we think that, slight as this evidence is, Mr. Tobin may fairly be considered as one of the Witnesses on our side.

Mr. Lilley is also an African merchant, and was agent on the coast of Africa for the Liverpool house of Hamilton, Jackson, and Co., (*vide* 5,925.) We wonder whether the honourable member of that name has any personal acquaintance with that house? If that be so, no surprise can be felt at finding that Mr. Lilley is, without qualification or reserve, a decidedly hostile Witness. In his judg-

ment, the Squadron will never effectually put down the Slave-trade; no augmentation of force will be effectual; he would decidedly recommend to the Committee, with a view to its suppression, the expediency of removing the Squadron, (*vide* 5,973 *et seq.*) It is true, that, immediately afterwards, when the question is repeated by Sir Robert Inglis (5,976), he qualifies his opinion, that the Squadron may be removed, with a proviso that permission were given to hire labour; but, as this means, in plain English, neither more nor less than a legalization of the Slave-trade, we return Mr. Lilley upon the hands of Mr. Jackson.

Mr. Macgregor is a member of the West Indian Committee; he is not examined directly or indirectly upon the subject of the Squadron; and, therefore, upon this issue, he must be considered as neutral. He gives, however, a very fair and intelligent account of the extent and real nature of West Indian difficulties, to which we may hereafter refer.

Mr. Higgins is an adverse Witness, professedly, but we have some doubt whether, in truth, he can be properly regarded as a Witness at all; for upon this, which, of all the political questions that ever were raised, is most essentially a question of humanity, and avowedly so regarded by both of the contending parties, he tells us, (6,597): "In my evidence upon this subject, I have endeavoured, as much as possible, to divest myself of all considerations of humanity, because I know that it is not generally allowed that West Indians can be actuated by the motives which, more or less, influence the rest of the human race." We have assuredly a right to take advantage of this honest confession on the part of an opponent.

The basis of Mr. Higgins's hostility to the Squadron is simply, that it does not afford West Indian relief. He observes (6,447): "I think it totally useless to retain the Squadron on the coast, if, on the other hand, we admit slave-sugar on favourable terms into this country. By the exclusion of slave-sugar, and the continuance of the Squadron, there is no doubt that the Slave-trade has, until the last two years, been very much diminished." Again, at 6,460, in reference to this previous answer, he adds: "I did not say that I thought the Slave-trade would be extinguished altogether; I said, that I considered that it might be reduced." These answers cut both ways; they are at least as much in favour of the Squadron as they are against it,

especially as proceeding from a Witness who has "divested himself of all humanity." But Mr. Higgins, having set aside the incumbrance of humanity, is resolved that his double-edged answers shall lead to no mistake; he, therefore, adds (6,461): "I think our experience ought to have convinced everybody who has examined the subject carefully, that the fleet will never be the means of extinguishing the Slave-trade." At 6,559, Mr. Higgins admits, that "there is no doubt that the fleet enhances the price of the slave;" and, again, at 6,568, "I confess, myself, I have no doubt that the existence of the Squadron renders the transit of the slave more expensive;" but the Witness is not pressed up to the point, that the Squadron may thus enhance the expense of the traffic till it ceases, because it ceases to be remunerative! The reason of this forbearance in pressing the cross-examination is, that he happened to be in the hands of Mr. Gladstone, who is far too shrewd an advocate to trouble his own Witness with inconvenient questions; hence, we are obliged to surrender Mr. Higgins to Mr. Hutt. But we will not resign this Witness without some satisfaction extorted from Mr. Gladstone. We beg that our readers will turn to Question 6,570, proceeding from Mr. Gladstone; it is as follows:—"Assuming, as in point of fact has appeared to us, that the rate of capture is under 4 per cent., you would not look at it as adding very materially to the price of slaves in Brazil?" To say nothing of the gross impropriety, when the object was to obtain an impartial reply from a Witness, self-divested of humanity, of thus avowing to him the foregone conclusions of the Committee, we take the liberty of asking Mr. Gladstone, how he could presume thus to mislead the Witness by putting the captures at 4 per cent., with Mr. Bandinel's recent evidence before him (at 3,261), that the captures from 1819 to 1847 averaged, under every possible disadvantage, $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., or nearly a fourth of the slaves exported? Of course we can anticipate the reply, that he looked to the computation tables set out in the first Resolution proposed by Mr. Hutt (at page 9 of the second Report of 1849). But this subterfuge shall not serve his turn. Mr. Gladstone well knew, that these computation tables had not been tested by any examination as to the manner in which they had been compiled; they had slipped in, unheeded as it were, among the papers of the Chairman; they were in flat contradiction to Mr. Bandinel's oral statements; and no attempt was even made to explain,

much less to reconcile, this inconsistent evidence. Mr. Gladstone is far too keen a man to have overlooked all this, (we recollect him well on the Apprenticeship Committee!) and we therefore deny that any such evasion will serve his turn. We therefore charge it upon Mr. Gladstone, that he put a leading question to a Witness, assuming an important fact to have been proved to the conviction of the Committee, which he knew, or ought to have known, was disproved by the very authority who had produced it! And we must make the Committee, too, "fork out" a little compensation for our Witness; we must not throw all the humiliation upon Mr. Gladstone. If our readers will advert to the fourth Resolution of the Chairman, at page x. of the second Report of 1849, they will find, that the same fact is stated by the Committee, but confined to the years 1846 and 1847. For the same reasons we contend, that this Resolution, though sustained by Mr. Bandinel's computation-tables, was a fraud upon the House, so far as these resolutions are offered to the House as the foundation of the Report. It is true that the Resolution is sustained by the computation; but the equivocal value of the computation itself is kept in the back-ground. This, however, is not the extent of our complaint. The evidence of Lord Palmerston, on his second examination on the 19th of March last, must have been still recent in the recollection of the Committee. At Question 25, (of 1849,) His Lordship distinctly states:—"The number of vessels captured in 1847 was 66; the number captured in 1848, though we have not the return for the whole year, was 99." We ask, then, how it was possible for the Committee, without divesting themselves of their honesty, as Higgins divests himself of his humanity, to select the average of two years, 1846 and 1847, as a fair sample of the inefficiency of the Squadron, when they had thus before them recent and unequivocal evidence to prove, that this average would have been materially affected by including the captures of 1848? Such manœuvres as these are unworthy of Mr. Gladstone and the Committee, though they may well suit the tactics of such a journal as the *Times*. In Parliament, at all events, we expect to meet with common honesty, if not always with common sense.

Mr. Barkly, a member of the Committee and a West Indian, is examined at great length, but entirely on the subjects of West Indian depression and African emigration. There is but one answer throughout the twenty pages of

his examination that touches at all on the present issue ; but that answer will be found so emphatic, when we have explained it in all its bearings, that we shall claim Mr. Barkly as a favourable Witness : “ I think that emigration is so far unfavourably affected by the presence of the Squadron, that the consequent treaties with foreign Powers seem to put difficulties in the way of our Government here allowing the West Indies all the advantages which they wish to have with respect to immigration,” (*vide* 6,672.) This, in fact, means, that no system of emigration to our Colonies, even though actually and *bond fide* free, can be carried on while the Blockade exists, because foreign States would contend, (and the argument would be so plausible that it would admit of no reply,) that we placed our cruisers on the coast of Africa to exclude other nations from the Slave-trade, while, under the name of emigration, we carried on a similar trade for our own advantage. Now, this is a well-founded apprehension on the part of Mr. Barkly ; but then it conclusively establishes a most important point in favour of the Blockade ; namely, that it is indispensably necessary to the maintenance of our national character for honour and good faith. Nor is it less conclusive a showing, that, in Mr. Barkly’s opinion at least, if the Squadron were withdrawn, and emigration were allowed to take its course, it would be an intimation to other States, that they were at liberty to follow up the same principle, obvious as it is, that no African could safely emigrate to any slave-holding State. If, therefore, our Squadron restrains emigration that is *bond fide* free, *à fortiori* does it restrain foreign emigration which would be, from the nature of the case, a mere substitution of terms, and a legalization of the Slave-trade.

Upon the ground of this opinion of Mr. Barkly, we claim him as a Witness ; for we ask the West Indians, how it can be supposed that we will give credit to slave-holding States for the good faith of their emigration adventures, when there is not one in a hundred—no, nor one in a thousand—among their fellow-countrymen at home, who will intrust the West Indians themselves with the apprenticeship of an African, lest they should make it a colour for new slavery ? Will they tell us, that this is uncharitable and severe ? We reply, that the whole bearing of the West Indian Evidence in these very papers, is, that they desire to re-establish a system of labour which free men cannot find a sufficient stimulus to undertake. Let the

strong evidence already quoted from Mr. M'Queen be borne in mind, where he states, that the Chamber of Commerce in Jamaica avows its wish for the restoration of slavery. Turn, also, to the evidence of Mr. Higgins (6,495 and 6,520), where he first admits the impossibility of forcing the negroes to labour for the necessaries of life without some other impulse than that of necessity, and then recurs, with scarcely suppressed regret, to the stimulus of the lash. Or, look again to 6,492, in the examination of the same humanity-divested Witness, where he sorrowfully contrasts the slavery energy of 450 hours per month with the free inertness of 45 hours reluctantly given by the Creole. Nay, this same Witness (in fairness to him, it must be remembered that he repudiates humanity) "thinks we should require regulations to enforce continuous work," (*vide* 6,493;) and, if anybody is curious to learn the nature of continuous work in our West India Colonies, let him refer to Stephen's "Slavery Delineated," or Macaulay's "Anti-Slavery Reporter,"—books that may fortunately yet be quoted, if necessary, in a Parliamentary debate. Even Mr. Macgregor, at 6,223, intimates significantly the necessity for an apprenticeship discipline; and the nature of his intended discipline may be collected from his answer to Question 6,207: "It comes to the question of labour, and you are putting free labour, which is, in fact, as Lord Harris described here, a few hours' work per day for a certain rate of wages, into competition with the labour of the slave, who can be lashed up to his work so many hours a day;" and again, at 6,137: "Formerly, they were obliged to engage in continuous work"—"they did exactly, I think, as most people would do; they worked as little as they could for as much as they could get." Mr. Barkly himself gives us a pretty good idea of the difference between even apprenticeship and free labour, when he tells us (6,710): "I will show the task which was *obliged* to be performed during the Apprenticeship, and the amount of labour which is now considered to represent that task, which is *very much reduced*."

We proceed to the next of the civilian Witnesses, the Rev. Edward Jones, a clergyman: he is decidedly favourable, and no adverse opinion is dropped by him. At 7,232, he says: "I think, if the British fleet were withdrawn, the Slave-trade would be likely to spring up again almost immediately:" and at 7,245, *et seq.*, he insists strongly upon it, that the introduction of any system of emigration

would only render the presence of the Squadron yet more necessary. At 7,277, he emphatically adds: "If 60,000 are carried away now, there would be treble that number if the Squadron were taken away." This Witness is clearly with us.

The Rev. John Clarke is a Missionary; but he is not examined, nor does he give any evidence, directly or indirectly, bearing upon this issue; we must, therefore, put him aside as neutral. And the same remark applies to the Rev. W. C. Barrett.

The Rev. Henry Townsend, also a Missionary, is a decidedly favourable Witness: he conceives "the presence of the Squadron to be a great benefit, and adequate to its cost in preventing the Slave-trade" (*vide* 7,772); and says again: "The presence of the British cruisers on the coast is of great value in the suppression of the Slave-trade." (7,792.) Further: "If the Slave-trade must be suppressed, it cannot be suppressed if the cruisers are taken away. If no Squadron was employed, the Slave-trade would be carried on to more than double its present amount; a larger number of slaves would be embarked; a greater premium would be given to kidnapping; the horrors of the Slave-trade would be increased; and the country would become a wilderness in a short time." (*Vide* 7,872, 7,876, 7,882.)

The Rev. Charles Gollmer is also a Missionary; he is chiefly examined upon the subject of Sierra Leone, but some important facts connected with this issue fall from him. "It is my belief," he says, "that hardly any merchant or missionary could reside in Africa, either on the coast or in the interior, without the protection of Her Majesty's cruisers" (8,042). "I believe it is impossible to say how far the Squadron has checked the Slave-trade, but it would be plainly seen, that the Squadron has greatly checked the Slave-trade, if the Squadron were removed" (8,050). This Witness adds in his next answer, but not in any sense adverse to the Squadron: "We have often been reflecting on the subject, and we thought that something ought to be done in addition to the Squadron; namely, something on shore."

The next Witness, Mr. Stephen Bourne, is examined only upon subjects connected with West Indian colonial economy; he must, therefore, be set aside upon this issue. The same must be said of William Henry Pratt and James Will,—two liberated Africans, who were examined at

some length, but on matters not at all connected with the Squadron.

Mr. M'Queen is the last Witness who was examined in 1848; and it is rather singular, that a Witness so well informed upon the subject of Africa, should not have had a single question put to him, tending to draw out an opinion on this important issue. Yet so it is, and we must set aside Mr. M'Queen also, though we have reason to know, that his evidence on this issue would have been in our favour.

The Rev. Hope Waddell, also an African Missionary, states, in answer to Questions 401 *et seq.* to 409: "I fear that the cruisers might not be safely withdrawn from that part of the coast with which I am acquainted, if the object is to suppress the Slave-trade; the effect would be, to encourage a renewal of the Slave-trade to a great extent in some places where it has been suppressed. The cruisers have thrown difficulties in the way of the Slave-trade, and have greatly diminished it in some places, and extinguished it in others. Take away the difficulties, and it will revive to its original extent." Mr. Waddell gives no adverse evidence; he is, therefore, with us.

Finally, we come to the evidence of Dr. Lushington, from whom it is hardly necessary to quote a word, because his opposition to the proposed measure is well known to be decided; but we pledged ourselves to give the evidence as we find it. At 986 of 1849, Dr. Lushington says, "he considers the Squadron to be the chief means of extinguishing the Slave-trade." At 1021, he again says: "I do say, notwithstanding the operation of new causes, I believe the Squadron to have prevented the increase of the Slave-trade." At 1,041, he again says: "I would keep up a Squadron;" and, finally, at 1,058; we find the following question and answer:—"Have you any reason to believe, that the effect of the withdrawal of the Squadron would, for a time at least, produce so great a convulsion in the minds and habits of the people of Africa, that they would regard it as a public announcement, that England had abandoned her attempts to repress the Slave-trade?" "I verily believe that that would be the case; and I am certain that, to a great extent, that is the anticipation of the Missionaries." We need not quote more of Dr. Lushington's evidence; but we cannot close it without the observation, that, within a very small compass, he puts the whole question in a very just light, and with such clear-

ness and moderation as to carry conviction along with the perusal. It is particularly deserving of notice, that he quotes the testimony of Buxton, and states at 998: "I know that Sir Fowell Buxton entertained the opinion to the end, that the Squadron ought to remain."

It is now time to look at the result of this dissection of the Civilian Evidence upon this first issue. We stated, that there were thirty-six of this class, of whom we have admitted seven to be against us. Nine were not examined at all upon the issue, and this will leave twenty in favour of the Squadron. But, in fact, the number is, properly speaking, twenty-two, inasmuch as Lord Palmerston quotes the opinion of Mr. Kennedy, and Dr. Lushington quotes the opinion of Sir Fowell Buxton, both decidedly on our side. Thus, including both civil and naval testimony, we have a majority of forty-one Witnesses to eight against us; and, by actual quotation of their Evidence, we have enabled our readers to judge for themselves of the accuracy of our calculation.

Let this result be compared with the following extract from the *Times* of the 28th of August:—"Viewing the present state of public opinion, the steadiness of its growth, and the stability of its foundation upon accumulating and irresistible evidence, we cannot entertain a doubt that the Squadron, in its existing form and capacity, will be removed from the Coast, and that the great national folly of a continental Blockade will be at length brought to a close." The matchless effrontery of this "enormous lying" can be equalled only by the same writer, who presently proceeds: "What we propose to do is, to give an outline of the several modifications of the existing system of forcible suppression, as they were suggested by their respective authors, and of the counter evidence by which the Committee were led to pronounce against them all alike, and to decide finally against the further employment of violence." The very few who, like ourselves, have mastered these voluminous papers, know, that the "accumulating and irresistible evidence" is in the proportion of forty-one to eight in favour of continuing the Blockade; and that, so far from the Committee having "decided finally" upon anything, they could only carry by the casting vote of the Chairman, a Report which decided nothing upon any point whatever. Yet, these falsehoods of the *Times*, under the cowardly protection of their anonymous shield, are published day after day, and circulated among thousands who

credit them simply because they know not of their contradiction! It is indeed greatly to be lamented, that, in times when the honesty of the Press is far more valuable than its independence, such disgraceful artifices should be adopted to excite a popular cry.

We must also make a remark, though with great reluctance, upon the modern Anti-Slavery Society. They have appropriated to themselves a name which gives them an influence with the world; and upon this occasion, they have bestowed their influence in favour of a movement directly opposed to the principles of the very party whose social name they have usurped. They have armed such writers as we have just quoted with authority for their deceptive paragraphs. In the days of Mr. Zachary Macaulay, as we know from personal knowledge, accuracy of fact, and minute research to secure that accuracy, were considered not less indispensable than force of reasoning. Will any member of the present Anti-Slavery Committee pledge himself that he has read through this slave-trading evidence? Or, if he has, will he venture to assert, that it does not hugely preponderate in favour of the position, that to remove the Squadron is to revive the Slave-trade in all its most revolting horrors? It is a grief to us, that we are compelled to address such questions to men associated as an Anti-Slavery Committee; but Parliament at least will appreciate their opinions and their pretensions as they deserve.*

* Subsequently to the first publication of these remarks; namely, in the November and December numbers of *The Anti-slavery Reporter*, a superficial commentary on the Commons' evidence appeared; the avowed purpose being to throw discredit, qualified by a little complimentary nonsense, upon this Analysis.

It is apparent, even on a glance at the paper in *The Reporter*, either that its author never read the evidence, or is so inexperienced in the consideration of evidence, as to be necessarily incompetent to the work he undertook: the very idea of dissecting four folio volumes in the compass of two or three columns of a periodical journal is so preposterous, that no man of common sense could entertain it: it is obvious that in such a case, the value and import of the evidence must be taken on the mere assertion of the commentator; whereas, our object has been to enable the reader to estimate it for himself. As it cannot be expected that in the absence of professional habit, such voluminous evidence can be sifted with accuracy or skill, failure is no reproach to the editor of *The Reporter*; *ne sutor, &c.*; but the animus displayed in the article in question, is such as to justify severe reproach for pro-slavery bias.

The Committee of the self-called Anti-slavery Society has, in the

CHAPTER V.

WE have said, at the commencement of our task, that the second to the seventh issues inclusive, may be summarily disposed of, and, as respects quotation of the evidence, this is true: still it is by no means superfluous, as regards the public, and even, we fear, three-fourths of our representatives, to explain the connection between the principal issue and these minor inquiries.

The second issue has been stated to be, whether the Slave-trade has increased of late years; and, if it has, to what causes such increase is to be ascribed? The argument of our opponents is this:—If the trade has increased, then it has gained upon your attempts to suppress it by your Blockade, and, therefore, your Blockade is inefficient and useless; and this argument is much strengthened, if, while the trade is increased, your captures have been on the decrease (as it is contended that they were in 1846 and 1847); but, even if your captures have increased in proportion with the trade, it still proves, not that you reduce the traffic, but rather that you extend it. And this seems to be founded upon a very plausible arithmetical calculation; for, it being acknowledged on all sides, that in this, as in every traffic, the demand will govern the supply, it follows that, if the cruisers intercept a fourth of the supply in one year, they will increase the demand for the following year by a fourth: thus, if the demand for the year 1846 is limited to 100, of whom the cruisers capture 25, then, the demand for 1847 will be raised to 125; and, again, if the cruisers in 1847 still capture a fourth, namely 31, then the demand for 1848 will be 131. Thus, it is contended, upon the broad commercial principle, that supply will always attempt to satisfy demand,—that the Squadron, even by its success, increases the number of Africans actually reduced to slavery.

To this plausible reasoning it is replied, that the estimates of the amount of a smuggling trade are always of necessity erroneous; for no accurate returns can be

December number of *The Reporter*, adopted its editor's views! it is enough to reply, that out of twenty-six survivors of the Anti-slavery Committee of Aldermanbury, there are only five on this new Committee, and, of those five, there is reason to believe that two (being the only men whose names are at all known to the public,) are in favour of continuing the Squadron!!!

obtained of cargoes that are shipped and discharged clandestinely; that the detections by a preventive police force can never exhibit more than a limited proportion of the offences committed; that, exactly in proportion to the risk of an adventure, the costs of it are enhanced; and that, if you enhance the costs beyond a remunerative price, you suppress the trade; that, though you may increase the price to the consumer, you do not necessarily or usually increase the profit of the trader--that profit being regulated by the expenses of the trade; that in fact, the demand of the Brazils is insatiable, as it must be in every colony where slaves are *used up* as a cheaper system than breeding them, and especially where there is an inexhaustible extent of virgin soil; that, inasmuch as the colonial price for slaves is still maintained, it is a proof, that the supply is not equal to the demand; and, finally, that there is the broad fact, that the trade has actually been suppressed, and never revived, in many parts of the African Coast.

To this it is rejoined, that the Brazilian price of slaves has, for many years, been steady and uniform, and, apparently, not affected by the operations of the Squadron; that the estimates of the amount of the Slave-trade are official, and presumably accurate! that the profits are so immense as to allow a very broad margin for increased expenses, and yet leave a remunerative price; that, if you increase the selling price, you at all events hold out a greater show of profit, and thereby tempt to extended speculation; that the want of capital in the Brazils must necessarily fix a limit to the demand, so as to allow of a glutted market; and that finally, though you may have suppressed the trade at one or at a dozen points, you have only made the smuggler shift his operations to another part of the same Coast.

It is obvious, that all this amounts to little more than reasoning upon data that not merely are uncertain, but cannot possibly be reduced to such certainty as to sustain an hypothesis. We have, however, stated the argument, such as it is, and, we believe, fairly: our readers will judge of the force of it for themselves. All that we can do is, briefly to refer them to those parts of the Evidence in which it is endeavoured to elicit the facts.

On the subject of the decrease and increase of the Slave-trade, Mr. Bandinel must be considered as the principal Witness, because his statements are not only given in detail, but profess to be founded upon official information.

The result of his calculations appears to be, that, from the year 1788 to the year 1830, there was a gradual but steady increase of the Slave-trade. From 1830 to 1835, there was a decrease in the importations of either country, and those of Brazil sank from an average of 50,000 to 15,000. The imports of Spain have continued to fall, till, in 1847 they were below a thousand; but, except in the five years beginning at 1840, when an immense decrease took place, to the extent of two-thirds, the Brazilian trade has been gaining ground from the year 1835; and in 1846 and 1847, it attained 60,000, which would appear to be its average. We refer the reader to that part of Mr. Bandinel's examination which extends from Question 3,227 to 3,226; and also to 3,286, 3,313, 3441, to 3,450; and for a summary of the gradual extension of the powers given to the Squadron, to 3,399 to 3,404. The reader will also find some evidence bearing upon the argument derived from the price of slaves and the general effect of demand, in the answers to Questions 3,355 to 3,360. It has been already observed, that there is a very considerable apparent difference between the oral evidence of Mr. Bandinel, and the documents which he put in to show the proportions which our captures have borne to the numbers exported. Unless this difference can be clearly explained, Mr. Bandinel's accuracy cannot be deemed trustworthy, except so far as regards the official data which he supplies.

Lord Palmerston gives but little information upon these points, confining himself, for the most part, to the mere expression of his opinions; but, as any opinions of his Lordship on this subject must be considered as valuable, we refer to Questions 3 to 10, 25 to 29, 74 to 76, 93 to 95, 159, and 25 of 1849, as containing the substance of his statements on the different heads of the argument which we have been explaining. We collect his Lordship's opinion to be, that, as the resources of the Brazils have become developed, their Slave-trading has gradually increased, till they have attained an average of from 50,000 to 60,000 a year; that the demand must always, to a certain extent, govern the supply; nevertheless, that, recently, (*vide* 10 and 11 of 1849,) there is reason to believe, that enterprises on the Western coast of Africa have been attended with so much loss as tends to reduce the demand, while, on the Eastern Coast, the traffic has been nearly suppressed.

The opinion of Dr. Lushington appears to be, though he does not profess to give numbers, that the Slave-trade

has been largely increased by the demand for slave sugar created by the Act of 1846 (*vide* 975 *et seq.*); that it prevails at present to a greater extent than it did in 1844 (980 and 1,023); but that, having regard to the allowance to be made for the stimulus given by the Act of 1846, our Blockade may fairly be said, on the whole, to have prevented its increase. (1,021.) Dr. Lushington, however, considers it as resolving itself into a question of supply and demand. (*Vide* 1,103.)

It is rather singular, that Mr. M'Queen, who might fairly be presumed to have acquired much information on this point, and whose judgment upon all the statistics of Africa certainly deserves respect, was not asked a single question upon this point. It is not easy to account for this omission.

Sir Charles Hotham is a Witness from whom valuable information might also have been expected upon this issue; but he expresses himself very cautiously. He considers that the Brazilian Slave-trade has been very vigorous during the last three years, and greatly exceeded the trade of 1843 (499 and 542, of 1849); but, in another place (599), he denies the possibility of getting correct estimates, and says, that the total number of importations and the official returns are merely a matter of opinion. Such, at least, we understand to be his meaning. He confirms Lord Palmerston's opinion, that the number of captures on the Western Coast is sending the trade to the Eastern Coast (*vide* 519); and he also (at 621 *et seq.*) enters into calculations to show the great profit upon such adventures.

The slave-dealer, Cliffe, estimates the number of slaves landed, in 1847, in Brazil, at from 60,000 to 65,000 (4,097), which did not equal the demand (4,103); and adds, that there is no doubt that the Slave-trade is now increasing, and will be carried on more extensively and more vigorously than ever. (4,105 and 4,124.) He admits the great reduction in 1842 and 1843, which he attributes to the belief that a more effective check was in contemplation (4,175). He states, that there has been a great decrease, last year, in the price of slaves at the Brazils (4,323 *et seq.*); and he states the profit upon every slave, deducting those who die, to be 65*l.* (4,356.) He also appears (4,347) to regard the supply as regulated by the demand.

Mr. Carr, the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone, questions the calculation of 60,000 slaves being annually exported,

and gives plausible reasons for doubting it (1,829, and 1,865 to 1,868): he considers that the Slave-trade has diminished (1,882 to 1,886); though the demand from the Brazils may extend to 300,000 annually. (1,981.)

Mr. Hutton, though he has little doubt of the increase of the Slave-trade latterly (2,551), thinks, like Sir Charles Hotham, that there is a difficulty in getting accurate returns, and that the increase has been exaggerated; he also seems to think, that any such increase is casual, because, at 2,547 and 2,558, he expresses a decided opinion that, on the whole, the trade has diminished.

Mr. Macgregor Laird thinks, that the Slave-trade has been practically extinguished to the north of the Line (2,543); but, at 2,953, *et seq.*, he alludes to the shifting character of the trade, when partially suppressed. This Witness does not appear, if one may judge from his answers to 2,963, *et seq.*, to understand very clearly the nature of commercial demand: nevertheless, at 2,986, he distinctly states, that the demand for slaves must be considered to be the limit of the supply.

Captain Denman, at 305, expresses his belief, that, compared with the year 1839, the Slave-trade is reduced to less than one-third; an opinion which he substantially repeats at 366 and 371. We must not omit to refer the reader to Captain Denman's very emphatic evidence at 424, showing the impossibility of breeding in lieu of purchasing, and thus supplying the demand. "The average of the number of women imported into Brazil is 4 to 100; the average of the women in Cuba is 10 to 100. The principle adopted there, is, that it is cheaper to get the greatest possible amount of labour in the shortest possible time out of a human being; to kill him off, and to import another to supply his place."*

It is not necessary, on this collateral issue, which is only of minor argumentative value, to go *seriatim* through the testimony of Witnesses, who, from their obscure names or non-official position, can scarcely be considered as authorities upon the subject. We may content ourselves, as respects them, with referring to the Index printed with the Parliamentary papers, and numbered 623. The perusal of the whole has impressed us with the opinion, that the Slave-trade regularly decreased, with some fluctuations, from 1839 to 1843, but that, when Lord Aberdeen's Letter

* In his evidence before the Lords Committee, Captain Denman enters more fully into these points.

of 1842 became generally known, the opinion which it expressed being *adverse* to the system of destroying the barracoons, it encouraged an attempt at larger speculation, the effects of which exhibited themselves in 1845; that the admission of slave-grown sugar in 1846, again gave a strong impulse to the traffic, which is not yet exhausted, and which warrants the conclusion, that, for the last three years, the trade has increased; that this opening of a new market for slave-grown sugars led the Brazilians into a more extensive and more systematic plan of adventure for the future, and first suggested the idea of defeating the counteracting efforts of our Squadron, by raising a cry for its removal. Of course, we do not ascribe to native Brazilians such a familiarity with the habits of Englishmen as to understand the value of a "cry;" this, no doubt, has been the ingenious suggestion of English agents, merchants, and manufacturers in partnership with them, and from whom the goods and credit, and probably the capital, were required in furtherance of those more scientific measures to which Cliffe, the slave-dealer, mysteriously alludes, while he insolently refuses to explain them. An alliance with West Indians dying for free emigration, which is obviously incompatible with the Blockade, secured to the "scientific slave-dealers" access to a well-meaning but somewhat simple representative, like Mr. Hutt. Such we suspect to be the real state of the case; and if it be, the presence of Mr. Cliffe is easily understood. It would be a great satisfaction to us, to subject Mr. Jackson to a little professional (not Parliamentary) cross-examination upon these matters. We are well assured, that money has been liberally expended somewhere, or the *Times*, with all its inconsistency, would not, at one and the same moment, have taken up the Brazilian cry of "Remove the Squadron," and the antagonistic West Indian cry, "Repeal the Sugar Act of 1846!!!" We trust that there is yet spirit enough in the House of Commons to sift this mystery to the bottom.*

* This was written in September, and before the Lords' Evidence appeared, or was in any way communicated to the author, he being at that time confined to his bed by illness; but, as will be seen hereafter, he is entirely borne out in every word by the appalling testimony given to their Lordships.

CHAPTER VI.

THIRD TO THE SEVENTH ISSUES.

THE unfair importance given to the Third Issue, has already been shown; as well as the conclusive evidence derived from the statistics of the Brazilian *using-up* system, that any loss to humanity occasioned by the modern middle-passage, is a thousand times counterbalanced by the loss of human life which opening the trade would immediately occasion in the Brazils. So well aware, however, of the value of this *quasi* appeal to humanity are the pro-slave-dealing members of the Committee, that scarcely any other point is more closely pressed upon the Witnesses than this. There is scarcely one who is not asked, sometimes in direct terms, whether the blockading system does not aggravate the middle-passage horrors; sometimes, whether the mortality does not now exceed the mortality of former years; then, whether the slaves do not die from want of water and provisions, owing to the hurry necessarily incident to smuggling shipments; and again, whether the slave-vessels are not crowded to suffocation, in order that the profit may be greater, if capture can be avoided. As if trusting to the gullibility of superficial reasoners, the ridiculous question is more than once put, whether our cruisers are not to blame for all this aggravated misery. The number of these and of similar questions may be inferred from the fact, that, on our perusal of the Evidence (as we find, on reckoning them up), we marked no fewer than 117 answers, which, either for their absurdity, their inaccuracy, or their inconsistency with each other, seemed to deserve quotation and remark. So extended a notice of a minor topic is, however, clearly inconsistent with the object of this analysis; we must, therefore, abandon our intention.

That the horrors of the middle-passage are indeed unspeakable may be inferred from the extracts we have already made from the evidence of the slave-dealer, Cliffe; and that he has not exaggerated them in the slightest degree we will show, by quoting the evidence of Captain Matson, in answer to Question 1,470: "I recollect boarding one vessel after a chase of a few hours, and a great many of the slaves had confluent small-pox; the sick had been thrown down in the hold in one particular spot, and they appeared, on looking down, to be one living mass;

you could hardly tell arms from legs, or one person from another, or what they were; there were men, women, and children; it was the most horrible and disgusting heap that could be conceived." If the reader is not satisfied with this, let him refer to the evidence of Mr. Bandinel, at Question 3,415, where the case of the Kentucky slave-vessel is mentioned: it is too long to allow of extracting the whole, but too impressive to be entirely omitted. The negroes, as they were perfectly justified in doing, rose upon the officers and crew, but, most unfortunately, did not succeed in mastering them; whereupon the crew amused themselves with "the sport" of firing down upon the slaves in the hold for more than half an hour. Now observe the catastrophe. "On the next day, they were brought upon deck, two or three dozens at a time, all being well ironed, and tried by Captain Fonseca and officers; and within two or three days afterwards, forty-six men and one woman were hung, and shot, and thrown overboard. They were ironed or chained two together; and, when they were hung, a rope was put round their necks, and they were drawn up to the yard-arm, clear of the sail. This did not kill them, but only choked or strangled them; they were then shot in the breast, and the bodies thrown overboard. If only one of two that were ironed together was to be hung, a rope was put round his neck, and he was drawn up clear of the deck, beside of the bulwarks, and his leg laid across the rail, and chopped off, to save the irons, and release him from his companion, who, at the same time, lifted up his leg till the other's was chopped off as aforesaid, and he released. The bleeding negro was then drawn up, shot in the breast, and thrown overboard as aforesaid. The legs of about one dozen were chopped off in this way. When the feet fell on deck, they were picked up by the Brazilian crew, and thrown overboard, and sometimes at the body while it still hung living, and all kinds of sport were made of the business" (*vide* 3,415.) We do not stop to ask the pro-slave-dealing Members, whether they shuddered at the recital of these horrors, which almost every witness told them, their intended policy would multiply: it is more to our purpose to inquire, what possible average of mortality can be drawn from such cases as these and those already quoted from slave-dealing Cliffe? to which we may add one mentioned by this fellow at Question 4,329, where he states from his personal knowledge, that, out of half a

cargo, (there could have been no crowding there !) consisting of 160, only ten escaped.

Now, with what fairness can such horrors be ascribed to British interference? Would it not be equally reasonable, to impute to the judge who sentences a murderer to death, all the horrors of misery and privation endured by that murderer's orphan family? or to the hospital surgeon who annually saves a hundred lives by his capital operations, the tortures of the two or three fatal cases where skill was obliged to succumb to disease?

It is worth remarking, that Mr. Tobin, the *ci-devant* slave-trading captain, observes, at Question 5,723, that he never believed in the cruelties practised in former times in the middle-passage; which opinion he charitably extends to one-half of the cruelties that are alleged to occur now, (*vide* 5,739.) Yet, this same witness admits, at 5,636, that, in a few weeks' voyage of men in prime health, (for he says, that he never took them on board in any other state,) the mortality of the middle-passage was 3 per cent.!!! Captain Denman puts the matter in the right light, when he says, at 212: "It is perfectly impossible to make a slave-voyage a healthy voyage; all the evidence showed, during our Slave-trade, while it was unmolested, that the sufferings were enormous, and the mortality very great indeed; and such must always be the case."

Captain Birch, at 2,275 *et seq.*, tells us, that the slave-vessels sometimes put to sea short of water and provisions, from want of time to embark them,—an opinion which Cliffe, of course, also entertains, (*vide* 4,204.) It may be as well to remark, that these two witnesses are directly contradicted, first, by the slave-trading captain, Mr. Tobin, at 5,746; then, upon the common sense of the thing, by Lord Palmerston, at 88; then, by Captain Denman, at 216; then, by Captain Butterfield, at 604; and finally, by the best of all possible evidence, that of a slave himself, at 1,051 to 1,054,—though the latter witness, it must be owned, is speaking of his previous imprisonment in the barracoön.

We shall here leave the Third Issue.

The Fourth Issue is, whether the Brazilian demand for slaves is insatiable, or admits of a glut by supply. Though we have called this an Issue, it would be more correct to term it a head of inquiry, because both sides find it to be their policy to establish the same fact, namely, that the demand is insatiable, and incapable of adequate supply;

for the inference which the pro-slave-dealing party draws, is, that the demand must and will be satisfied, *per fas aut nefas*; while the counterinference drawn by the Anti-Slavery party is, that an unrestricted trade, when you take away all its risk, will be carried on to an indefinite extent, limited only by attaining a non-remunerative price. As neither party is anxious to dispute the immensity of the demand, it is scarcely worth while to adduce evidence in support of the position beyond what has already been quoted for other purposes. At 2,863, Mr. Laird touches upon this subject; and Mr. Moore, at 5,461, says, that the "production of sugar on virgin soil might be carried on for hundreds, and even for thousands of years, assuming that there is a demand." But it is not out of place to repeat, that the system of *using-up* the slave, so tersely described by Captain Denman, does of itself secure an insatiable demand, limited only by the remuneration of price. If the Blockade were removed, the Brazilian Slave-trade would be, to all intents and purposes, an open trade, and, like every other open trade, fluctuating perhaps at times, but continuing till profit was at end. According to the evidence already quoted from Cliffe, the profit on the sale of a slave is 65*l.*; another witness has stated it at 45*l.*: we will take the intermediate sum, and call it 55*l.* This, by the concurrent testimony of every witness, is at least 1,000 per cent. on the capital expended. But we will reduce this to 800 per cent., because, though the point escaped attention throughout all these examinations, it cannot be doubted, that so sudden an increase of demand would in some degree raise the price on the African Coast. After making all allowances, and even supposing that a trader will not deem less than 50 per cent. a fair remunerative return, we arrive at this conclusion,—that profit (if that alone is to be the restrictive limit to the supply) will permit the trade to be multiplied *sixteen-fold*, before the Brazilian market will be glutted. In other words, 960,000 slaves (for that is the product of 16 multiplied into 60,000, the present average of the annual imports) may be introduced, year by year, into the Brazils, without lowering the profit below 50 per cent.

We are far from meaning to contend, that such a monstrous result must necessarily follow the opening of the Trade. The want of capital, the want of slave-provisions, and even political timidity, might each operate to keep it within narrower limits. But we do mean to contend, that

in a *using-up* slave country, the direct interest of the slaveholder is, to reduce his value to the lowest possible amount; and that, in the Brazils, notwithstanding the evidence of Mr. Moore to their indulgent disposition (*vide* 5,436), the expectation of life statistics already quoted from Dr. Thompson show that there is an utter insensibility to every consideration but that of profit. So far, therefore, as we can at present foresee, the principle of supply and demand would lead to the exportation of near a million of slaves per annum, instead of 60,000, so soon as the African blockade, the only restrictive power at present, should be removed. If we appear to insist more frequently and more strongly upon this point than is necessary, it is because it is all but entirely overlooked by the Committee.

The Fifth Issue is, whether Treaties with the Brazilians can be relied upon in lieu of a blockading Squadron. On such a question as this, the evidence of a Brazilian Slave-dealer, like Cliffe, or of a Brazilian merchant, like Mr. Moore, is obviously worthless; nor, among the host of witnesses, are there more than three whose judgment on such a point ought to be deemed of any value. Those three are, Lord Palmerston, Dr. Lushington, and Mr. Bandinell, to whose evidence we shall confine ourselves.*

First, Lord Palmerston tells us, at Question 31, (in direct contradiction, by the way, to Mr. Moore, at 5,344,) that he believes, "the Government of Brazil, if they chose to do so, might very effectually put a stop to the Slave-trade into Brazil; but so many persons are interested in the carrying on of that trade, from the highest almost to the lowest in the empire, that no effort is made to carry their law into execution." His Lordship repeats this opinion in other words, at Question 67; and in answer to the previous Question 66, he yet more distinctly says: "My opinion is, that, if the Spanish Government and the Government of Brazil would honestly and effectually fulfil their treaty-engagements for the suppression of the Slave-trade, the Slave-trade would be practically extinct. The necessity for our extensive measures of police is created by the violation of treaty-engagements by the Governments of Spain and Brazil." Again at Question 103: "I apprehend that you might make any treaties that you could get the Government to consent to; but I should imagine, that, as long as the interest of private individuals was adverse to the obser-

* Lord Howden's evidence before the Lords Committee is very valuable on this point.

vance of those treaties, you would have no better chance of having those treaties enforced than you have of the enforcement of the present treaties." His Lordship expresses similar opinions at Questions 106, 118, and 142; but further quotation is unnecessary.

We need make but one quotation from Dr. Lushington's evidence. At Question 1,088 of 1849, he says: I consider that the treaty made between Brazil and this Country has been grossly violated by the Brazilian Government;—"The breach of a treaty is a *casus belli* at once."

From what we have said of Mr. Bandinel, it will be inferred, that any very decisive evidence from him is not to be expected; yet, he tells us at Question 3,244, that "our Squadron does not appear to have been able to restrict the importation, and the Government of Brazil protected it in every way;" while, at 3,272 *et seq.*, alluding to our treaties in general, he says: "We have them even from Brazil, decidedly; and they have been observed, excepting in respect to Brazil and to Spain." In fact, the great argument of Mr. Bandinel against the Blockade, is, that, notwithstanding our treaties, we cannot obtain the co-operation of the slave-holding States; (*vide* 3,277, *et seq.*;) he therefore argues most illogically, (beginning at 3,337, and continuing for some pages,) that we ought to make some new treaty with Brazil, exacting pledges for its performance; though, as we have already shown by former quotations, when he is pressed as to the nature of these pledges, he can suggest nothing better than the worthless island of St. Catherine (3,382). With one more quotation, we shall take leave of Mr. Bandinel. At 3,387, he speaks out plainly: "I am of opinion, that such a guarantee might fairly be asked of Brazil; and she, in honour to herself, could grant it for a time, because Brazil has already made a treaty and broken it; she lies now under that acknowledged imputation. By the law of nations, there is no more solemn right than that which is acquired by treaty; and the violation of such a right, when amicable remonstrances have failed in inducing redress for it, is the first and great cause of war; therefore, Great Britain would be justified, according to the law of nations, in making redress by force of arms." This is in perfect accordance with the high authority of Dr. Lushington at 1,088: "The breach of a treaty is a *casus belli* at once; and if it is a cause of war, the country aggrieved may certainly apply a less remedy than war itself."

And this admits us at once to the true nature of our position. Brazil has broken faith with us, and we are warranted in having recourse to measures of compulsion against her. Nor are we by any means sure, that the cheapest and best course would not be, to remove our Squadron from the African to the Brazilian Coast, with orders to make prize of every Brazilian vessel, whether legally or illegally engaged. We will undertake to say, at all events, that, for ten years to come, the African seas would be purged of Brazilian pirates! But of late years we have acquired an almost morbid abhorrence of war. The insult to our honour must be great indeed, and the damage to our purse yet greater, in the present state of public opinion, to warrant the discharge of a single broad-side. The Brazilians know this well; so do the Portuguese; and therefore they bully and insult us; while some of our self-seeking merchants, our sulky West Indians, and the matter-of-fact, short-sighted Parliamentary niggards who ignorantly would subserve their views, though little, if anything, short of felonious, would pocket every insult, and see our flag ignominiously trampled in the dust, rather than throw away a chance of sending a few extra cargoes to the market of a piratical trade, or of importing a few thousand labourers into our Colonies to reduce wages to 6d. a day!!! These are plain-spoken truths, which it would not comport with modern Parliamentary usage to utter in the House; but we know them to be truths. We have not spent thirty years of life in daily Anti-Slavery conflict, we have not waded through hundreds of interminable Anti-Slavery volumes, we have not associated with metropolitan and provincial traders in daily search of Slave-trading information, without acquiring some insight into the real nature of that interest which constantly arrays a small section of the community in a bitter and unceasing warfare with the good and the humane; and, though motives must not be imputed in St. Stephen's, nor libels published out of doors, we will never be deterred from speaking plainly upon this subject, whenever we find ourselves compelled to speak at all.

On the Sixth Issue, whether a legal trade, if once established with Africa, will supersede the Slave-trade, an analysis of the Evidence is impossible, for the same reason that prevents it on the Middle-passage question: almost every other page is full of it, and, therefore, an abstract must either be meagre or voluminous. The printed Index,

under the head of "legitimate commerce," supplies fairly enough the most important passages upon this subject. We may name Mr. Hutton, Mr. Horsefall, Mr. Carr, and Mr. Macgregor Laird, as the most authoritative witnesses. The Rev. J. F. Schön, in answer to a series of questions commencing at 2,793, and extending over two pages, gives a very promising account of African capabilities for a most extensive commerce; and the disposition of the African to enter into it is thus emphatically stated by Captain W. Allen, at 880: "There is not a more trading race than the Africans in the interior." This, however, being a topic to which we must necessarily recur, we shall drop it for the present. As respects the power of the legal trade, when brought into direct competition with the Slave-trade, the result appears to be this; that, with the exception of some of the rivers in the Bight of Biafra, where the palm-oil trade has taken a firm hold, there is scarcely any part of the Coast, excepting in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone, in which the Slave-trade, if left unrestricted, would not supersede legitimate commerce. This entirely corresponds to our previous impressions, and, in fact, to every principle of trade; for it is sufficiently obvious, that, where there are two forms of traffic, both offering British goods in exchange, and where one traffic pays at the rate of 1,000 per cent., and the other at scarcely 100 per cent., the one can afford to give away the same cargo which the other must retail with cautious parsimony.* Add to this, that the bartered article, in the one case, is obtained without trouble, and conveyed at little expense, while, in the other case, it is collected in driblets, with no more convenient carriage than the porter's head, and it is impossible to conceive that competition can succeed under such manifold disadvantages. Instances are quoted, in which the two trades have proceeded harmoniously together; but the cause of this is sufficiently explained by other authorities, though studiously concealed throughout this Evidence: we allude more particularly to "The Journal of an African Cruiser," published by Wiley and Putnam. The fact is, that, in far too many instances, and notwithstanding the positive injunctions given to their captains by such men as

* This has been stated, almost *ipsissimis verbis*, before the Lords' Committee; such a singular coincidence not only of opinion but expression, when there has been no intercourse between the parties, proves that the truth of the position is obvious to every man familiar with the economy of commerce.

Mr. Hutton, the legal trader sells his cargo to the slave-trader for Spanish dollars, and then waits in patience till the slave-trader has left the river, if the orders are peremptory to bring home a cargo of palm-oil; or, if a discretion is left to pick up a freight, the legal trader will return in ballast to Sierra Leone, or call at the Brazils for a homeward cargo. In this manner, both trades may be conducted together harmoniously enough, because with reciprocal advantage.* On one point, the witnesses are unanimous, with the exception only of Dr. King, who considers the protection of our cruisers to be wholly unnecessary for our legitimate commerce; (*vide* 3,997 to 4,004;) an opinion which will be found directly opposed to the evidence of the witnesses who are examined by the following Questions:—228, 1,405, 1,406, 1,415, 1,574, 1,597, 1,718, 1,721, 2,359, 2,590, 2,688, 4,501, 4,553, 4,855, 5,084, 5,259. We need hardly explain, that the argument on the other side, is—“Remove your cruisers, and allow to legitimate commerce its natural influence, for it extends itself wherever it takes root:”—an argument about as rational as it would be to tell a farmer, that he needs not weed his crop, because the wheat or the turnips will outgrow the thistle. We must not forget, that all legitimate commerce in Africa is of infant growth, while the Slave-trade, first internal and then foreign, is the growth of centuries. But, in fact, were the case otherwise, the Evidence now before us (as we have long since proved by quotation) exhibits so intimate an alliance between British capital, British goods, British subjects, and Brazilian slave-dealing, that, were it only to purge ourselves of the taint, we ought to exclude from the African waters all but a strictly legitimate commerce.

On the Seventh Issue, very little remark is necessary. Captain William Allen, who confessedly knows nothing about it, is in favour of removing the Blockade to the Brazilian coast (*vide* 999, *et seq.*) Mr. Bandinel, who, if possible, knows still less, is in favour of the same step, (*vide* 3,327, 3,334, and 3,364.) We should pay but little respect to their opinions on such a point, were they not in some measure sustained by Sir Charles Hotham (*vide* 508 of 1849.) But Sir Charles annexes a condition which is hopeless, viz., “that the Brazilian Government should co-operate in our operations.” We think that Lord Palmerston takes a right view of the matter, when he sug-

* Strong evidence is given on this before the Lords' Committee.

gests, that there should be a line of cruisers on *both* coasts (*vide* 80); but he afterwards gives his "most decided" opinion, that, if the Blockade is to be confined to one coast, the African side of the Atlantic is the preferable side (*vide* 184). As the question assumes at all events the necessity for the continuance of the Squadron, it scarcely requires further notice from us; but it is notorious, that there is no coast that affords such facilities for running a cargo as the Brazilian coast: especially when our cruisers are not at liberty to approach within three miles of it.

We shall connect together our quotations upon the two following Issues, for the Ninth is, in fact, only an offset from the Eighth.

CHAPTER VII.

WE have reprobated as it deserves, the insidious attempt to open the way to a sort of modified Slave-trade under the name of free emigration with apprenticeship. If slave-labour is indispensable to the prosperity of the West India colonies, doubtless the colonies must go. The very anxiety to restore it, under any name or form whatever, makes good the position for which the Abolitionists fruitlessly contended for five-and-twenty years, till Buxton's slave-mortality speech established it; that nothing but the lash, or some of the substituted torture which Slavery has always at hand, can supply a stimulus sufficiently powerful to extort that continuous labour which the sugar-cane requires, except in the very few instances in which planters are sufficiently wealthy and unencumbered to allow of a threefold division of the gang for reliefs during the crop. It is not likely that we shall be charged with too strong a bias in favour of the West Indians; and yet, we cannot but say, that good faith has been broken with them, and to an extent even exceeding their own complaints.

There are not many men remaining in the House (perhaps there is not one, unless it be Mr. Evans), who can, of their own knowledge, state what passed, when a Deputation waited upon Mr. Stanley (now Lord Stanley) to remonstrate against the proposed apprenticeship of twelve years. That Deputation consisted of twelve or fifteen Members of Parliament, and only one gentleman who had not a seat, but who, from a concurrence of peculiar cir-

cumstances, was requested by Buxton and O'Connell to be the principal spokesman. The interview lasted for about two hours, and all remonstrance was found to be in vain. The gentleman alluded to then wound up the conversation with the following question:—"Then, are we to understand, Sir, that no concession will be made in the way of abridging the term?" Mr. Stanley's reply was very significant; and we appeal to his Lordship's memory, whether we do not accurately report it:—"Not a year, not a month, not an hour. I am pledged to the West Indians for the whole term of the apprenticeship, and I cannot withdraw." Of the accuracy of this part of the answer, word for word, we are certain; for it was written down at the time. Of the next sentence we can only pledge ourselves for the substantial accuracy. The gentleman replied:—"Then we must appeal to the country." To which Mr. Stanley rejoined: "I know very well that you can give us much trouble in that way, but I cannot recede. The West Indians, it is true, have been driven into a reluctant consent to the measure; but, without their consent, I could not have carried it, and, therefore, I stand pledged to their terms."

The Anti-Slavery papers of that day contained a report of this interview; and those who have access to the files of them will be able to check our accuracy. We are led irresistibly to the conclusion, that, if such was the acknowledged strength of the West India party, it was only because, in the unanimity which then prevailed throughout the country, the possibility of introducing slave-grown sugar into the British market could not be contemplated as falling within the chapter of accidents, that no express stipulation was made for its exclusion. It was, therefore, not only an implied part of the compromise with the West India Colonists that they should enjoy the monopoly of the British market, but an implication rendered, by the force of circumstances, so inevitable and so apparent, that stipulation would have seemed ridiculous, not less than superfluous, caution. We consider, then, that faith has been broken with their party, as much as if the twenty millions had not been paid. Yet, strange to say, when that fatal Bill of 1846 not only deprived them of their monopoly, but even menaced their existence, there was not, as far as we remember, any protest made by the West Indians upon this ground, though a formal document of that nature was extensively published, headed with the sig-

natures of Lushington, Buxton, and the surviving leaders of the Anti-Slavery party.

We have digressed a little, in order that we might explain the sympathy which we have no hesitation in expressing for the deplorable state of the West India Colonies at this moment; a state not less to be lamented for the best interests of the peasantry, than for the pecuniary interest of the planters. That can never by possibility be a desirable position for the labouring class, which virtually leaves it optional with them, whether they will carry their labour to market. We entirely go along with Mr. Bandinel, too, when he says (3,470):—"It is, therefore, most essential, even for the one object of suppressing the Slave-trade and Slavery, that Great Britain should, whatever the difficulties may be, neither omit, neglect, nor delay any means within her power for fostering the prosperity of her West Indian Colonies." The principal, indeed the only witnesses worth citation upon this head, are, Mr. Macgregor, Mr. Higgins, Mr. Barkly, and, to a certain extent, Dr. Lushington.

After advertising to the Acts of 1844 and 1845, and the differential duty of 10s., Mr. Macgregor thus proceeds (*vide* 6, 193):—"The sugar which was planted in the autumn of 1845, stimulated by those Acts of Parliament, arrived in 1847. It then met in this market the slave-grown produce that had, by the Act of 1846, been unexpectedly declared admissible: the immediate effect has been, an immense depression in the price of British plantation sugar, while there has been a moderate rise in the price of foreign." "The consequence of that depression and the enormous loss inflicted upon the sugar-growers in the British Colonies, has been, the utter destruction of all credit; money cannot be borrowed either by the Colonies as communities, or by individuals. I do not believe that a single shilling could be raised upon West India property at this moment." At 6,242 *et seq.*, the same Witness adds, that nothing effectual has been done for the Colonies, notwithstanding incessant importunity.

Mr. Higgins, at Question 6,384, states:—"In the last six months, eighteen West Indian houses have been declared bankrupt in this country. I think it is almost impossible to describe a lower state of depression than that to which the West Indies are reduced at the present moment." Again, at 6,388:—"I think every packet confirms the preceding information which we have upon the subject,

and states that their condition is going from bad to worse." At 6,480, this Witness adds:—"We certainly cannot go on with our cultivation, if the Bill of 1846 remains in force;"—while, at 6,506, he says:—"Even supposing that 10*s.* protection is conceded to us, we shall not reap the benefits which we should have done, had it been given earlier;"—though he admits immediately afterwards (6509), that 10*s.* is considered, by those best able to judge, a proper amount of differential duty. At 6,561, he recurs to the topic:—"In the circumstances under which we are at present placed, if the Act of 1846 is to stand, the best thing to do would be, to withdraw the fleet altogether, for we are actually ruined."

Mr. Barkly, speaking of British Guiana, says (6,656): "A few years ago, it was a question of getting labour at all: then, canes were left on the ground, because labour could not be procured to take them off;" and, at 6,807 *et seq.*, he attributes the pressure upon his own colony almost entirely to the want of labour; but, at 6,660, he appears to object to a protecting duty; nor does he anywhere refer to the Act of 1846 as the source of the immediate distress. In the answer to which we have last alluded, he observes: "I think that, in some way or another, the mother-country must contribute towards keeping the planters' estates in cultivation for the next few years, until labour can be procured;" but, at 6,761, he again repudiates protection.

Dr. Lushington, at Questions 971 *et seq.*, and at 1,050 *et seq.*, without immediate reference to the West India Colonies, speaks of the pernicious effects of the Act of 1846; and, at 1,052, states explicitly, that he thinks that the best means for the final suppression of Slave-trade would be, the total prohibition of importation into this country of sugar grown in any country in which the Slave-trade is practically carried on. This opinion he also strongly intimates at Question 960.

These quotations, though but scanty, will suffice to develop the real state of the case. Before the Emancipation in 1834, the West Indians were always complaining, and often roughly remonstrating, but, in fact, with little justice. Sugar-planting is a gambling trade, and the planter lived up, every year, to the profits of the occasional prize year; hence, he sank capital, and replaced it by borrowing at West Indian interest. But the mortgagee, in a usurious spirit, stipulated also for the consignments and the supplies. This involved the payment, under the

head of commission, of mercantile charges still more ruinous than even West Indian interest. A yearly rest was made in the accounts, and interest was converted into principal. Such was the process by which, to our personal knowledge, (for we examined the accounts in detail,) a fine sugar estate that long averaged 10,000% per annum, slipped through the hands of its owner into those of his mortgagee, who now makes a merit of allowing the old man some 200% a-year for bare subsistence; and such, no doubt, has been the process with ninety-nine estates in a hundred. Up to this period, the West Indian was entitled to no other aid or sympathy than charity bestows upon a ruined spendthrift. Then came Emancipation and the twenty millions. The money paid off the mortgagee, and restored to the planter his ransomed estate, but left him without a capital. Emancipation, however, implied wages; and the labour of sugar-planting, scarcely to be obtained by force of slavery and the cart-whip, implied high wages and regularity of payment. Thus, capital became more necessary than ever. But the transition from slavery to freedom shook Colonial credit, and money could not be got, unless on terms more ruinous than before. The emancipated slave soon found his vantage-ground, and, in his turn, acquired, and still retains a monopoly of that labour-market which slavery had heretofore given to his master. Thus, the tables were effectually turned; and, at this crisis, if the planter had been wise, he would have abandoned speculation, divided his plantations into petty farms, and contented himself with such rents as the more aspiring of the negro population would have been content to offer. But the charms of these West Indian lotteries were irresistible. The West Indian struggled on for wealth, while difficulties accumulated. Labour became daily more scarce, but, as wages could not increase from want of capital, the labourer turned away from his work to the easier occupation of growing provisions for the market, when, suddenly, the Free-trade principle brought with it the fatal Act of 1846, and the planter was undersold in the market, as well as deserted in the field. This is the short history of West Indian endurance: injustice has completed the ruin which extravagance began.

Under these circumstances, nothing could be more certain, than that it was for the interest of the West Indian to become the sworn ally of the Abolitionist, and to join hand and heart with him in every measure which had for

its object the extinction of the Slave-trade and the depression of Slave-trading states. Had such an alliance been effected and fairly carried out, (as it certainly would have been on our side,) we have no doubt that slave-grown sugar would have been excepted, as it ought to have been, as a case standing upon peculiar grounds, from the operation of the Free-trade principle. Lord John Russell would only have been too glad to make the exception, but he wanted the popular cry; and the Anti-Slavery party, dispersed, broken up, and destitute of a leader, not less than of allies, wanted the strength to raise that cry. If the West Indians had then, instead of throwing themselves into the arms of the Protectionists, and thus leaving no loop-hole for the Minister, rallied the Anti-Slavery party, and brought them back to their colours, they would not now have found themselves between Scylla and Charybdis, in the equally hopeless dilemma of legalizing the Slave-trade on the one hand, or of restoring the principle of protective duties on the other.

The brief review we have taken of the case and position of the West India colonists is almost a necessary preface to our consideration of the Tenth Issue involved in this inquiry; namely, whether free emigration from Africa can be arranged without being made a colour for slave-dealing transactions?

Of course, it is for the interest of the West India party to show that this is practicable; but, unfortunately, they have stumbled upon the only course by which it would be for ever rendered impracticable: they have concluded with slave-dealing manufacturers, with pro-slave-dealing journals, and even with slave-dealers themselves, to raise an outcry for the removal of the *only* security to which either British philanthropy or European and American jealousy will trust, to prevent an honest emigration from being converted into a felonious traffic. It has been before explained, that the difficulty is supposed to lie in this: If you forcibly exclude foreign slave-traffic while your free emigrants to the Colonies cross the water in safety, Spain and the Brazils would contend, and gain credit for the assertion, that your Squadron was employed only to secure a monopoly of the trade. It is a common-place remark, that only weak men are afraid to do good lest their good should be evil spoken of; and this is equally true of collective bodies. The calumnies of Brazil, or of all Europe combined, could not seriously affect the reputation of

England on such a point, since she has ceased to be a slave-holding country; but similar reproaches would be thrown upon her with far more justice, if, by removing her Squadron, she removed every impediment to British adventure in Brazilian slave-trade.

It has been observed, that this Issue of free emigration has been sifted to the bottom; nearly all the Witnesses having been more or less questioned upon the subject. Founding our conclusions upon the evidence of Mr. Hook, Dr. Thompson, Mr. Macgregor, Mr. Laird, Mr. Joseph Smith, and Mr. Duncan, (although that evidence is partially contradicted by Captain Denman and Mr. M'Queen,) we think, that an emigration from Africa to our Colonies, free in every sense of the term, might be encouraged and obtained to a large extent; notwithstanding that Mr. Carr doubts the disposition of Sierra Leone to contribute its share, and Mr. M'Queen believes, that the Kroomen are the only really free inhabitants of the coast, and that their numbers do not exceed 30,000 (*vide* 8,267).

Of course, much anxiety is shown to ascertain whether the native population are under such a species of bondage to their chief, that a fee must be paid to him for his consent to their emigration. Mr. Lilley (at Questions 5,832 to 5,850) enters fully into this point. The Rev. J. Clarke (at 7,431) also adverts to it, and seems (at 7,424) to regard it as a species of slave-dealing. But, on the whole, the impression is left upon our mind, that this payment amounts to no more than a species of feudal tax paid for permission to a subject to leave his native country. There is no doubt that, even in this country, the sovereign may, for adequate reasons of public policy, prohibit the departure of any subject from the realm; for that is, in a manner, a temporary divestment of allegiance, which no subject can throw off; and the exercise of this prerogative is a matter of daily occurrence, though the writ of *ne exeat regno* is, in modern times, issued only in cases where the security of the person is required for payment of a debt. In this view, therefore, there is nothing of slavery involved in the chief's exaction of a fee: the only question is, whether, to multiply fees, he might not compel his subjects to emigrate; a doubt that could always be resolved by questioning the emigrant himself.

On the 3rd day of May, 1842, Sir George Stephen published in the *Times* a scheme of free emigration to the West India Colonies, founded on the principle of a com-

pulsory return, with a free passage secured, after a few years' domicile in the West Indies. This scheme was, in the first instance, submitted to Mr. Burge and two other colonial agents, and was so entirely approved by them, that they considered that the West India body would carry it out at their own expense, if the consent of the Legislature could be obtained. It was then submitted to Buxton and other leading Abolitionists, the idea being, that the returning tide of emigrants would carry back knowledge and civilisation to their native countries. The Abolitionists at first approved, but ultimately rejected the scheme, lest it should be made a colour for Slave-trading. The West India party also approved of it; but the West India Committee was at that time in a very disunited state, and they rejected the scheme on account of the expense. It is rather a singular fact, that it now appears, by the whole of the evidence, that it is upon this principle of return, and upon this alone, that the practicability of this emigration depends. The Witnesses who represent the African disposition to be in favour of emigration, always annex to their opinions the proviso, that the return to Africa must be guaranteed. We shall content ourselves with referring to the numbers under which will be found information to this effect:—(*vide* 720, 1,811, 2,128 *et seq.*; 2,350, 2,879, 2,984 *et seq.*; 3,009, 3,018, 3,175, 3,178, 3,802, 3,880, to 3,889 *et seq.*; 3,939, 4,386 to 4,389; 4,425, 4,517, 4,686, page 74, second paragraph from top; 4,703, 5,080, 5,292.) But, in truth, we might multiply these references till they covered the page, were we to put down all the passages which we had marked for quotation.

But, while we thus concur in the policy of emigration, so far as the question of Slave-trading is connected with it, we cannot disguise from ourselves, that there is too much reason to doubt whether, under existing circumstances, it ought to be encouraged. The disposition intimated by Mr. Macgregor and Mr. Higgins to annex to it a severity of discipline allied to slavery, might easily be controlled by proper regulations; but the whole tenor of Mr. Barkly's evidence implies, we think, that the colonies are no longer in a condition to do justice even to their present labouring population. At 6,676, this Witness says: "I think that, a few years ago, emigration to a considerable extent would have been all that was required to save the West Indies; but I think that, in their present prostrate condition, they would neither have the funds themselves to

take advantage of the permission to obtain emigrants, nor would they have the funds to carry on the cultivation of their estates, and to give the emigrants employment." Again, at 6,795, he concurs with Lord Harris in opinion, that, under present circumstances, emigration should cease. These opinions are much confirmed by the evidence of the Rev. John Clarke at 7,385 *et seq.*; and at 7,396, where he ascribes the deficiency of labour, and the consequent abandonment of estates, to the want of money to pay the labourers, and general irregularities of payment.

If these objections are insuperable, (and the authority of Mr. Barkly stands high,) we are brought back to the dilemma, that either Slavery must be revived, or a protective principle be restored, or the Colonies be abandoned; a pleasant choice of alternatives, of which we give them joy. We are far from thinking, however, that a way might not be found to help them over the stile, if they would moderate their demands, and keep their temper quiet. But African civilisation, not West Indian relief, is the subject now before us.

CHAPTER VIII.

WE have now analysed these bulky blue-books, so far as regards all those Issues which the Committee have thought proper to make prominent in their inquiry. But our task would be incomplete, if we left off here; for who can follow us through this analysis, and still more through the volumes that are the subject of it, without comparing the terms in which the duty is delegated, with the manner in which it has been performed? We have, somewhat elaborately, pointed out the remote and circuitous connexion of these Issues with the extinction of the Slave-trade; and we have done so because we verily believe, that no stranger to the controversy could, without assistance, make out the interlacings of this entangled web. Surely however, the public was entitled to expect, on so grave an inquiry, that a systematic, consecutive, comprehensive, and well-organised plan of examination should have been pursued; that, for instance, the whole subject of the commercial capability of the African continent should have been opened, and followed up with as much determination as

the efficiency or the practicability of emigration; that the habits, and dispositions, and usages, both of the chiefs and of their people, should have been the subject of anxious research; that the statistics of population, trade, labour, markets, prices, carriage, language, agriculture, &c., &c., should have formed an elaborate chapter of investigation; that the prosperity of existing settlements, their commercial progress, with all its difficulties and obstacles, and practical suggestions for their removal, should have found a conspicuous place; and, above all, that the success or failure of Missionary exertion, in the introduction, not merely of Christianity, but of secular knowledge and improved morality, should have been fully developed and satisfactorily ascertained. These are all matters far more intimately connected with the extinction of the Slave-trade, than the temper of the Brazilians or the price of labour in Guiana. Finally, we ask emphatically, how it happened, that when British participation in these piratical adventures was again and again asserted by Witnesses of the highest respectability, the hint was never taken, nor the investigation followed up with promptitude and determination?

Will it be said, that the Witnesses were wanting? We answer, that the Evidence itself told them in what quarter they were to be found. If goods made specially for the African trade, and fit for no other, (*vide* 5,546 to 5,550, already quoted,) were stated to be in habitual supply, what could have been more easy than to have asked for a description of them,—for the names of the manufacturers,—for the exporting firms,—and then to have summoned those parties before them with their clerks, their captains, and their books, till each assorted cargo was tracked to its destination? There is not an attorney's clerk in London, who could not at once have set the Committee upon the proper track; and we can further tell them, that there is not an African house in London, who could not have given them at least a dozen clues, nor an accountant in London who would not have followed, with unerring scent, till he had tracked the cargo and its proceeds through all the mazes of book-keeping to the Slave-trading hands for which it was shipped. If it be contended, that even the transcendent powers of Parliament are forbidden thus to pry into the arcana of the counting-house, we answer, that the presumption of criminality is so strong against the man who ships Slave-trade goods to the African

coast, as to take him out of the pale of this commercial privilege.

So, with respect to the other topics we have enumerated; the Committee had a body of Missionaries before them, and might have quadrupled the number; Mr. Macqueen was at their elbow, and he certainly knows more of the African Continent than any man alive; Allen, Thompson, Laird, Duncan, were all present, and could have supplied the names of three times their number of intelligent African travellers. Far be it from us to insinuate, that these important inquiries were wholly neglected: the evidence of Carr and others, as to Sierra Leone, is both full and gratifying; the evidence of Townsend, as to Abbeokuta, is copious and most interesting; the evidence of Allen, and Thompson, and Duncan, as to the agricultural and commercial capabilities of the Interior, is abundant and satisfactory, as we shall presently prove by quotation; but our complaint is, that, on all these subjects, the inquiry is casual, careless, and imperfect: it is nowhere followed up; in the most interesting parts, it is constantly interrupted, and then altogether dropped, as if it were of little consequence in itself, and a vexatious digression from the favourite topics of Emigration and the Squadron of Blockade: hence it arises, that there is no substantial body of evidence upon these important points, on which it was possible to found any suggestions for the extinction of the Slave-trade, by calling forth the resources of Africa, and by the power of commerce in inducing civilisation. We have been at the pains (which ought at least to have been taken by the compiler of the Index) to scrape together the constantly-diverging evidence, and shall presently refer to it for the purpose of showing, that, scattered and imperfect as it is, it amply warrants some new and resolute effort on the part of Government, to combine civil measures with our maritime police.

Again; it is our duty to inquire (for there is a large and powerful Anti-slavery public still existing, who will echo the inquiry), how it has happened, that the Committee contented itself with some half-a-dozen careless questions as to other plans of a remedial character that have been suggested. It is true that a question, every now and then, seems to have been coldly and indifferently put to a Witness, as matter of form, rather than of vital interest, whether he had any suggestion to make in furtherance of the Parliamentary object; and such questions elicit, from

one a suggestion of commercial posts; from another, of subsidies and native Treaties; and from a third, a system of interior emigration from Sierra Leone and other settlements; but these crude suggestions, though all of them more or less entitled to respect, are rarely followed up to any practical result. Yet, many plans are before the public, and some of them proceeding from the very men whom the Committee had before them. We know that the Committee were not ignorant of these suggestions; then why, we ask, did they pass them unheeded?

Liberia, by the notoriety of its rapid and progressive prosperity, suggested a plan; (especially after Macqueen's remarks upon it, at 8,266;) why was not inquiry pressed into the causes of this extraordinary prosperity?

Sierra Leone suggested a plan, when it was announced to the Committee, that it exhibited the spectacle of thousands upon thousands of liberated Africans steadily frequenting worship upon the Sabbath, and many of them accumulating wealth on the week-day, (*vide* 1,808 and 1,794 to 1,798.)

Mr. Macqueen has long had a commercial plan before the public, and his African knowledge entitled it to the consideration of the Committee.

Captain Allen has also published his plan; for which, though somewhat eccentric and wild, his African experience ought to have secured a calm consideration.

Dr. Thompson offers many suggestions in his narrative; and his acknowledged intelligence made them deserving of serious attention.

Mr. Duncan suggested a plan full of practical good sense, though of limited operation.

Sir Fowell Buxton long ago produced his plan, which, to this day, has not been tested by experience, nor fairly attempted to be reduced to practice: it was defeated by sickness as soon as it was launched. Respect for his memory and distinguished services ought to have sufficed to make it a leading topic of inquiry.

Sir George Stephen suggested a plan, which was communicated to every member of the Committee at an early part of the Session. The Lords deemed it of sufficient importance to enter upon a full examination of it; and its favourable promise, not less than its simplicity, ought to have bespoken for it the same attention from the Commons.

In short, the press has teemed with recent publications, all tendering their suggestions with more or less of ingenuity

about them, and which, however tedious and troublesome the task, ought to have been read and well weighed by the Committee, as so many benevolent contributions from the public towards the attainment of the information impatiently desired by the House. To what must we attribute the visible reluctance of the Committee thus to carry out their work? Was it that they were unwilling to divert attention from the favourite step on behalf of which they had raised the cry? Was it that almost all these plans of peaceful remedy rested upon the continuance of that Blockade which they are eager to raise? Or must we have recourse to the humiliating supposition, that Mr. Hutt, already dismayed by the mass of evidence before him, shrank with horror from adding to the volume? Whatever may be the explanation, such is unfortunately the fact, that this Committee, on whose opinion the fate of millions and thousands of millions yet unborn depended, prematurely abandoned the most obvious and important branch of its duty, and neglected inquiry into any plan whatever unconnected with the removal of the Squadron. We must anticipate contradiction; we do not mean to deny, that, here and there, in many places, as we shall presently show by quotation, questions are asked that led to valuable statistic information; but we do assert, and challenge contradiction, that, with the exception of a few questions, addressed to Mr. Carr, to elicit the character of the plan which he suggested for military and commercial stations, there is no inquiry whatever into either the principle or the detail of any scheme for the civilisation of Africa, though that ought to be regarded as the superior means of working out the extinction of the Slave-trade.

Had the house desired the Committee to consider the best means which Great Britain can adopt as a substitute for the African Blockade, it would be impossible to quarrel with the course that the Committee has taken; it would have been strictly within the scope of their authority; but, when considering the means of extinguishing the Slave-trade, to restrict their inquiry to the efficiency of the Squadron, is about as rational as for the friends of a cholera patient to be discussing the merits of the doctor, when meeting him to consult how he is to be rescued from the stage of collapse.

One of the most valuable heads of information to be found in these volumes, is, the native produce of the African Continent: upon this, the information is copious.

We will first quote from Dr. Keogh, who, at question 2,092, says: "At first, we should seek to obtain articles which require little care in preparation, and which they could immediately give us, such as vegetable oils, gold, and ivory; and endeavour to turn their attention to cotton, coffee, maize, dyes, and all tropical productions, which we might in time obtain from them in unlimited quantities." This is confirmed by Mr. Joseph Smith, at 2,109 and 2,110; and at 2,187 to 2,212, he tells us, that cotton grows wild, palm-oil in full supply, and very good coffee, with abundance of maize, are to be obtained. Mr. Duncan, who gives some very useful information as to the commercial disposition and course of trade in Africa, informs us, at 3,099, that ivory, palm-oil, shea-butter, and cotton are among the articles of present export; as well as yams, manioc, sheep, goats, and cattle, of very good quality, and ground-nut; *vide* 3,119; he also speaks in very favourable terms of the quality of cotton (3,113 *et seq.*), as well as of the quantity of palm-oil. (3,195 *et seq.*) The whole of Mr. Duncan's examination, from 3,091 to 3,211, is well worth an attentive perusal; it is strongly corroborated by the evidence of Dr. King, from 4,005 to 4,029: and this Witness adds dye-woods and indigo to the list, with the important facts, that there would be no limit to the consumption of British articles in exchange (4,027), and (4,021) that the supply of cotton would be unlimited. Even the slave-dealer Cliffe (at 4,437 *et seq.*), gives his testimony to the same effect.

The subject of Cotton is so important, that, though most of the other Witnesses are but superficially examined under this head, we shall refer to some passages that confirm our last extracts. At 1,975, Mr. Carr speaks favourably of the quality of the cotton. At 2,806 and 2,827, and, in fact, in many of the intermediate questions, the Rev. J. F. Schon speaks very largely of the quantity of cotton to be obtained: "You see it growing almost everywhere" (2,819). This gentleman's Evidence as to other produce, to be found in the same pages, is also valuable. We shall take leave of the subject of native produce, by referring to the evidence of Mr. Townsend (7,825 to 7,828), who, speaking of cotton, ginger, and indigo, says, "that if the natives had the security of a market for their productions, they would grow to any amount equal to the demand made upon them."

There will be found, interspersed among all these pas-

sages, and, indeed, throughout the Evidence, the most decided testimony to the trading disposition of the African; but, as it is necessary to bring our analysis to a close, we shall advert to only one point more, which we think of the greatest importance, in reference to the plan of Sir George Stephen. At 5,239, Colonel Thompson asks Dr. Thompson his opinion as to the practicability of establishing a black navy of British subjects. The Witness replies: "On looking at the subject, it has repeatedly struck me, that that might be of great importance, if it could be attained. I do not think that at first you would be able to get black men who would be perhaps qualified for officers, but I think that you might get mulattoes."—"I think the most feasible plan would be, if a certain number of the more intelligent classes were brought from Sierra Leone and educated: as regards the crew, there would be no difficulty in getting any numbers necessary for one Squadron; and, if there were only a stimulus given to it, by introducing greater numbers of them on board men-of-war, it would tend to accomplish the end." The answer of Question 5,242 is too long to quote, but we must extract the following passages from it: "If you require steamers, a few of the most intelligent of the liberated Africans might be brought to England, and, I believe in that case, they might be of very great use and importance; if you had black engineers, you could take a steam-boat into any of those rivers, and there you could keep her without any detriment to the crew." "As regards the officers, I think you would find no difficulty in getting intelligent youths from the mulatto classes at Sierra Leone, and at Cape Coast, and different places, who, being amalgamated (*qu.* educated?) on board vessels of war for a short time, would acquire a sufficient knowledge of naval tactics to be qualified for taking charge of vessels and boats, or any other service that way." We are obliged here to correct, and, on his own authority, an inaccuracy into which Dr. Thompson has fallen in the answer from which we have just quoted: he says, that even West Indians (and he appears to be alluding to West Indian blacks) are not proof against the effects of the African climate, so far as can be inferred from the Niger Expedition. This is directly contradicted, first by the official returns of mortality, and next, by the Doctor, in his published narrative of the Expedition; from which it appears, that, out of 158 blacks and men of colour engaged in the Expedition, only one died from the

pestilence that carried off the white men. It is impossible to account for this discrepancy, if, by "West Indians" in his answer, the Doctor meant creoles of African descent. We have extracted this passage about a black navy, being the only one upon the subject, because it bears very materially upon the plan suggested by Sir George Stephen in his pamphlet on the Niger Trade.

On the whole, after thus laboriously reviewing the Evidence, we have arrived at the conclusion, that it was impossible for the Committee to present to the House a faithful report of the result of their inquiry, without honestly stating, however repugnant to their policy or to their inclinations, that the Naval Evidence was almost unanimously in favour of continuing the Blockade, and that the Evidence of the other Witnesses, including the names of all of acknowledged weight, largely preponderated on the same side. It might have been truly added, that, on the bald, abrupt statement of the Issue, several, both in the naval and in the civil class, gave answers, in the first instance, unfavourable to the policy; but then, truth would also have compelled the admission, that, upon further examination, these same Witnesses either retracted the opinion given, or so qualified it by counter statements, as to show that the first expression of it was careless and undecided;—we allude more particularly to such men as Sir Charles Hotham and Mr. Bandinel. These gentlemen and several others, when driven by the course of examination to reflect more closely than they had previously done, upon the consequences of the proposed removal, answered in a manner that admitted the fatal consequences, and deprecated them with an anxiety which necessarily implied that, on further reflection, they recalled their words. Indeed as regards Sir Charles Hotham, he expressly declared his opinion against withdrawing the Squadron. It is not by insulated passages, but by the tenor of his whole evidence, that a Witness must be judged. The newspapers which have wished to make out a case, have extracted only such answers as suited their purpose; but it was the duty of the Committee, and will be the duty of Parliament, to collate the whole of the Evidence, and to decide by the result of this careful examination. It is far from our wish to speak with asperity of their Report, for asperity in such a case savours of disrespect; yet, we are driven to the necessity of saying, that it is not only unsatisfactory, but actually delusive.

The second clause asserts a fact that would scarcely be disputed, but puts forward that fact in a manner that implies that it is *the* Issue proposed by the House for their consideration. This is a fraud upon the public as well as upon the House.

The third clause is auxiliary to that fraud, for it assumes that the proposed auxiliaries to the preventive system are suggested as remedial, when they are suggested only as giving additional power to the Blockade.

The fourth clause, in the last four lines, asserts four facts, in proof of which not a tittle of evidence was before the Committee.

The fifth clause begins with an *ergo*, founded upon the previous unfounded statements; it proceeds to decline a responsibility which never was imposed upon them, and concludes with insinuating a recommendation which they avow that they are not prepared to make.

The sixth clause is immaterial, and, to say the truth, somewhat officious.

The seventh clause is (we can find no other word for it) simply hypocritical! It seems intended as a sop to humanity; a kind of compensation-balance for the Slave-trading *animus* which they are conscious that they cannot hide.

The eighth clause (what other words can we find?) adds mendacity to hypocrisy! "Nothing," it is said, "can absolve your Committee from the duty of recognizing the truth of the case as their inquiry has brought it under view;" and this truth is stated to be "want of success," when official evidence stared them in the face, (3,261,) that not less than 103,191 Slaves had been emancipated by capture,—not to mention the effectual check given to felonious adventures by British subjects. What, we may ask, can absolve the Committee from the sin of thus suppressing the truth to deceive the British Parliament?

The ninth clause is a sop in the pan similar to the seventh; advising nothing, suggesting nothing, and meaning nothing, except by a few vague general expressions, importing good-will to humanity, to cheat the world into a belief that they have not entirely forgotten it.

And the tenth clause is made up of a set of truisms in theory, which it required no ghost to tell us, but which seemed to supply a flimsy veil to conceal their conscious negligence in the investigation of practical measures.

A more deceptive, dishonest, and discreditable Report

never emanated from a collective body. We would not employ such terms, if we had not proved their justice by the preceding Analysis. It is sad, indeed, to think that the public should be liable to be thus led astray by Parliamentary authority, upon a subject which all the country regards with feelings of intense anxiety. It is no wonder that Mr. Hutt could only carry it by his casting vote; we are rather surprised that he and Mr. Jackson did not stand alone.

To conclude. We have, with great labour, and under circumstances which have made that labour painfully distressing, brought our work to a close. In the progress of it, we have been compelled to omit all allusion to many points, important in themselves, but comparatively insignificant. Had we not exercised this forbearance, our Analysis would have required an equally troublesome abridgment. Our object has been threefold; first, to prove that the Committee have either mistaken or neglected the principal duty for which they were appointed; secondly, to show that the Evidence which they have taken is, in its true tenor and substance, directly opposed to the Report which they have made, vague and unmeaning as it is; and, finally, to provide the public, and especially our Parliamentary representatives, with the easy means of determining these points for themselves.

We are under little apprehension as to the immediate result of the Parliamentary Inquiry. We are bound by treaty to continue the Blockade for two or three years to come; and in the interim, not only will the public be undeceived, but an Anti-Slavery spirit will be revived, against which no Parliamentary intrigue can make head. But we are anxious to do more. Parliament is concluded by the appointment of its Committees from disputing the necessity of resorting to further and yet more efficient measures for the suppression of the Slave-trade. Of these, the establishment of safe commercial intercourse with Africa, is of equal, if not paramount, importance to the Blockade. Nothing has been done, and, since the Niger Expedition, nothing has been attempted, in the way of establishing this intercourse; and thus, independently of the alleged waste of our humanity, a market has remained hermetically sealed to us, of which it is proved, in the papers before us, that its demand for our manufactures would be insatiable, and the supply of tropical produce, and especially of cotton, inexhaustible! With these facts

thus pointedly brought under the eye of Parliament, not by a Committee whose Report deserves no credit, but by Witnesses whose evidence cannot be impeached, we believe it to be impossible that another Session should pass away in the same slumbering inactivity. As for the West Indians, they must fight their own battle. No man in his senses can suppose, either that a protecting duty will be restored, or that Slavery in any form will be revived. But this is their affair, not ours. If, in conjunction with the Blockade, we can open trade with Africa, the Slave-traffic is extinguished at once and for ever. We therefore trust, that the Debate which Lord John Russell has promised us, will terminate in the appointment of another Committee, "to consider the best means of establishing commercial relations with the interior of Africa." Nor let it be forgotten, that while these manœuvres are practised to carry out a short-sighted as well as cruel policy, France, and Germany, and Portugal, and the United States, are all eagerly on the watch to snap up those commercial advantages which we are neglecting, (in fact it is so stated in these blue-books,) and neglecting notwithstanding that we have secured by treaty, the command of the Niger navigation! Parliament, surely will never be so blind and so infatuated as to be cajoled by false pretences and the most transparent sophistry, into the abandonment of the noblest commercial enterprise, and the finest opportunity that ever was presented to a trading country. But, if such a Committee should happily be appointed, we sincerely hope that neither Mr. Hutt nor any of his seven adherents will be of the number. We would not intrust it to one of them to inquire into the loss of a jackass!

REPORT OF THE LORDS' COMMITTEE.

ALTHOUGH the Evidence taken by the Select Committee of the Upper House, was ordered to be printed on the 23rd of July, it was not issued till early in October, when all our recent articles on the Slave-trade were not only written, but, for the most part, already given to the public. It certainly would, in many respects, have been far more convenient, not only for our readers, but also for ourselves, to have embodied our remarks on this Evidence in the same papers; but the delay has been attended by an incidental advantage that compensates for any additional trouble it occasions. With the exception of four pages, we had neither seen nor heard the tenor of a single line of the Lords' Evidence, till it was published to the world; all the comments, therefore, and all the deductions contained in our recent papers, were uninfluenced in the slightest degree by any knowledge of the statements made to their Lordships. Indeed, with the exception of two or three Witnesses, in respect of whom some private conferences occurred, we were not even aware whom it was intended to call. Yet, we have the infinite satisfaction of finding, that every position which we have endeavoured to establish, is fully and completely borne out by the concurrent testimony of parties for the most part personally unknown to us; testimony, too, given under the solemnity of an oath, and sifted with an acuteness and perseverance of cross-examination, of which the Commons' Evidence scarcely affords a single example. It is true that, here and there, unaccountable ignorance is displayed; from some of the questions, we should almost infer, that a map of Africa does not find a place in their Lordships' library; but, on the whole, great talent, as well as a candid spirit and an honest feeling, is exhibited throughout.

As the Report itself is very short, we shall extract it *in extenso*. It is as follows:—

“ That the Committee have met and considered the

subject matter to them referred, and have come to the following Resolutions, viz.:—

“ ‘ That the Evidence which has been given before the Committee, has led them to the conclusion, that, although the efforts of Great Britain have not suppressed the Slave-trade, and although it is doubtful whether the number of slaves exported during the last two years, is not greater than in some preceding years, upon the whole, a large reduction of the trade has been effected, and its probable increase has been prevented.

“ ‘ That all the Evidence goes to prove, that the prevalent impression as to the general unhealthiness of the Cruising Squadron is without foundation; and further, that the withdrawal of the Cruisers from the Coast of Africa would cause a great immediate increase in the Slave-trade, and would inflict most serious injury on the legitimate commerce of Africa.

“ ‘ That the Committee see reason to believe, that certain alterations in the equipment and directions of the Cruising Squadron, which would be attended with little or no additional expense, would add greatly to its efficiency.’

“ But, on this and other points, the Committee are of opinion, that further Evidence should be taken, before any practical suggestions can be offered to the House; they have therefore resolved, on account of the advanced period of the session, to report to your Lordships the foregoing Resolutions, and to recommend that the Committee should be re-appointed in the next Session, to pursue the consideration of the subject, and to report finally to the House.”

Such are the terms of the Report; and we rejoice that we are able to add, after a most careful examination of the Evidence, that it not only fully sustains the Report in every particular, but warrants the assertion, that the moderation of its tone is not less conspicuous than its truth. As the work of inquiry is confessedly unfinished, it seems unreasonable to complain of any omission; yet, we must avow a little regret, that these Resolutions do not embrace two points on which the Evidence already taken is so conclusive as to justify a decided opinion. The fact is established, that the Squadron is falsely charged with aggravating the cruelties of the trade; and the large and even unlimited capabilities of Africa, as a market both of supply and of consumption, are demonstrated beyond the possibility of a question. However, the gratitude of every honest Abolitionist is so largely due to the

Bishop of Oxford for the invaluable service he has rendered to the cause, that we will not qualify the expression of it by any complaint. Indeed, we suspect, from certain indications here and there, that his Lordship has pressed his Examination very frequently with courage as well as judgment not often shown in Parliamentary Committees, and even up to a point which somewhat startled the forbearing courtesy of his noble colleagues. He is entitled to all praise, and we yield it largely and sincerely.

The proceedings of their Lordships have been distinguished from those of the Commons' Committee by some remarkable features. On the whole, there is a strict adherence to the subject of inquiry confided to them by the House. An occasional digression must inevitably occur wherever such inquiries are undertaken by a collective body; but such digressions are rare in the large volume now before us; and, when they do happen, they are but short. There is always a visible anxiety to return to the point; an anxiety not less business-like than dignified. The time of such tribunals ought justly to be deemed too valuable to be frittered away in conversational interruptions upon irrelevant matter. There may also be observed, a sound argumentative continuity throughout the course of these Examinations, combined with every reasonable allowance to the Witness, either to reconcile or to explain his answer. Nor is it less gratifying to notice, on all subjects on which the inquiry touches, an obvious desire to elicit information, and not to get up a case. This is as it should be, and will have its due weight with the public.

We must again remark, to avoid the possibility of misconstruction, that, in speaking of the Commons' Committee, we speak of that Committee only in its collective character. We well know how resolutely the Anti-Slavery Members of it did their duty to the utmost extent to which, as a minority, they could go. Such men as Sir Robert Inglis, Sir Edward Buxton, and Col. Thompson, need no eulogy from us for their constancy and zeal in every Anti-Slavery effort; but we have reason to know, that they were borne down and overpowered by a constant recourse to those arts of interruption, impatience, and frivolous dividing, which all ingenious Parliamentary tacticians know too well how to practise. When, therefore, we censure the conduct of this Committee, it must be clearly understood, that we speak of them only as a body, and intend no personal reproach, unless we specify the individual. Our respect for the

Members we have just mentioned, is, as they well know, unbounded and sincere.

From these introductory remarks, our readers will at once perceive, that we have now before us a far more agreeable, and less difficult task, than that which the dissection of the Commons' Evidence imposed. To extract the truth from the inconsistencies and self-contradictions of a host of hostile Witnesses, is at once the most arduous and the most ungrateful duty which a critic, in *loco judicis*, can be called upon to discharge. We find ourselves happily relieved from that duty on the present occasion, and can, therefore, compress the rest of our analysis within a very narrow compass. Instead of defining a multitude of issues needlessly raised, and appropriating to each its proper evidence, we shall briefly enumerate the heads of the inquiry, and the tenor of the Evidence given on each head. But, even on this simple arrangement, a few preliminary remarks seem desirable, on a matter that has an important bearing on our preceding articles, and which has hitherto been involved in some mystery, but on which this evidence throws considerable light.

There has been a strange coincidence of circumstances about the whole of this Anti-Blockade agitation. At the commencement of our series, we adverted to the extraordinary severance, as well as union of parties, which had occurred among the political and religious interests involved in the Anti-Slavery controversy of the present day. Whigs and Conservatives, West Indians and Abolitionists, Free-traders, and Protectionists, have all become jumbled and jolted together, as if they had been threading the mazes of a country dance blindfold, and were looking round in vain for the partners with whom they commenced it; while, to carry on the simile, the newspapers and other periodicals attached to their respective parties, have simultaneously raised a sort of Dutch concert or Irish howl, amid which harmonious discord, the only distinguishable notes have formed a chorus of "Away with the Squadron!" Our intimate personal knowledge of the subject enabled us to account very plausibly for this strange *melée* of parties; and our explanation, so far as it went, is borne out by the Evidence of the Lords' Committee; yet, there was much we could not attempt to explain. How happened it, that naval men, Sir Charles Hotham among the rest, concurred in decrying the services of the Squadron, though reluctantly

driven into admitting that honour and prudence alike forbid the removal of it? How happened it, that Mr. Jackson, in his place in Parliament, himself an African trader, raised the specious cry of humanity and economy, to put down the very force by which his trade is protected? How happened it, that a Society calling itself Anti-Slavery *par excellence*, and exclusively consisting of men of universal peace, has leagued itself with Slave-dealers and African traders to strike down the only shield that protects the Negro race from rapine and murder? The last question must still, for a time, remain unanswered; but it shall not be from any fault of ours, if, on the re-appointment of the Lords' Committee, some gentlemen are not summoned to make good their title to Anti-Slavery virtue, and vindicate their desertion of the colours which Wilberforce and Clarkson so nobly raised, and Buxton so gallantly supported.

To Sir Charles Hotham we impute no blame beyond that which is due to a judgment fatally erroneous, or to an ignorance unworthy of his rank. He has received high official approbation of his "ability," "energy," and "judgment," in his late command, from my Lords of the Admiralty (*vide* Question 1,679); let him make the most of it; for, if the evidence which we shall hereafter quote, may be trusted, it is likely to be the only commendation that he will obtain, except from the Brazilian Slave-traders! It is to Sir Charles, speaking on the impression made by that evidence on our minds, that we must ascribe so much of that naval inefficiency as can be truly alleged in excuse for the present cry.

As regards Mr. Jackson, we dare not, for obvious reasons, travel out of the record: we will simply put together two short extracts of marvellous significance, and leave it to our readers to draw their own conclusions.

The Question is asked at 3,771, "Does not it result as a general conclusion, that, with some honourable exceptions, what we call the legal trade is itself, in fact, subsidiary to, and in alliance with, the Slave-trade?"

"As Africa at present stands, I have not the slightest hesitation in saying, from a long and deep consideration of the subject, in all its branches, on every part of the coast of Africa, that it is impossible to carry on what we call legitimate trade, without that trade being subservient to the Slave-trade."

"3,774. If that trade were legalised, or even if it were

relieved from the presence of our cruisers, would not the connexion between that legal trade and the Slave-trade become more immediate and direct than it is at present?

"There can be no question of it."

"3,776. Would not such a measure tend to the direct pecuniary advantage of British houses, carrying on nominally a legal trade, but really allowing the legal trade to play into the hands of the Slave-traders?"

"No doubt of it; and there are several of them who have that very object in view, in endeavouring to get the Squadron withdrawn."

"3,777. Their business and their gains would be increased tenfold?"

"Yes."

"3,778. Would there be any difference in that case, so far as British honour is concerned, between carrying on such an unrestricted trade, and a direct renewal of the Slave-trade?"

"I do not see that there would; I think that the little hypocrisy which might be apparent in carrying that on, would aggravate the crime, instead of being an extenuation of it."

"3,848. Can you mention to the Committee what commercial or manufacturing firms are now actually engaged in the African trade?"

"I cannot enumerate them all; there are a number of houses in Liverpool; there is Mr. Horsfall's house; there is Mr. Jackson's house; there are several other extensive firms in Liverpool; there is the house of Tobin; there is Mr. Matthew Forster in London. I believe he principally receives consignments; he does no business of his own, it being all consignments."

"3,849. Are any present or late partners in any of those firms, now in Parliament themselves?"

"There are none that I recollect, except Mr. Jackson and Mr. Forster."

"We make no comment. Mr. Jackson may be among the 'honourable exceptions,' but we certainly should have preferred his not being on the Slave-trade Committee;—and we would rather not have seen Mr. Tobin and Mr. Horsfall among the Witnesses."

But Mr. Higgins, the Jacob Omnium of the *Times*, was also a Witness, as the *Times* itself is the dishonest advocate of the anti-Squadron party. Mr. Higgins is a West Indian connected with Jamaica, we believe;—whether

with other islands, we know not. Let us see what the Lords' Evidence says of the West Indians:

"3,854. You stated that you knew the reasons that had led to many parties in England seeking to obtain the removal of the Blockading Squadron ?

"I know it well."

"3,846. Will you explain those motives ?

"It is the great object of the West Indians connected with Demerara and Trinidad, and also the Mauritius, to have the Squadron withdrawn, in order that they may have an unrestricted opportunity of visiting every part of the coast of Africa, to procure labourers ; that has been openly stated in the Legislature."

"3847. Will you state your reasons for believing such motives to exist ?

"It has been stated by Mr. Hume, for instance, openly in the House of Commons, that it would be quite right for us to go and buy them. He is acting upon the opinion of his friend, Mr. Burnley, of Trinidad, who openly, in the Legislature in Trinidad, avowed that that ought to be allowed, and that they ought to be permitted to keep them under restriction for twenty-one years, or for life."

Mr. Hume was occasionally present in the Commons' Committee, though not a member of it. Our readers will bear in mind, that all this is *evidence on oath*, it being the practice of their Lordships to require every witness to be sworn. Let it not, however, be inferred, that Messrs. Hume, Horsfall, Higgins, Tobin, and Jackson are necessarily guilty of the matters thus in general terms laid to the charge of West Indian and African traders. That charge is most serious ; it involves moral infamy. Slave-trading is felony and piracy by the laws of our country ; it implies murders of daily and even hourly commission ; it implies incendiarism and rapine ; it implies a degree of turpitude so base,—so utterly opposed to decency and humanity,—so revolting in its concomitant circumstances,—so horrible in its results, that there is not one other crime that can be conceived more utterly fatal to a man's reception in society ; it combines in itself all that is mean, cowardly, and dishonourable in practice,—all that is cruel, loathsome, and filthy in its economy : it reduces man to a lower degree than bestiality ; it places him on a level with the vilest of evil spirits. If, in a single term, we wished to concentrate all that is degrading, disgusting, and malignant,—all that is hellish in design, and fiendish in execution, that term

would be "Slave-trade." And such, too, is the common opinion of our countrymen. Hopeless exclusion from the pale of society, to be shunned like an animated pestilence, with the mark of Cain on the forehead, is, by general assent, the righteous doom of all who, in these days, cannot purge themselves of the base suspicion. If such is the atrocity of the crime, we must pause before we bring so grave a charge as that of being implicated in it against individuals filling honourable stations, and clothed with an apparent respectability, which entitles them to be exempt from suspicion. Their African dealings may be innocent and most honourable; their gold-dust pure as when it left its mountain bed; their West Indian zeal centred in the humane object of transferring the victims of African Slavery and oppression to a land of liberty, to be apprenticed to a nobler religion and a holier morality than can be taught in their native country; their abhorrence of the Squadron may be based on that sublimated humanity which marks the same antagonism in New Broad-street; their Committee-labours may be the fruit of benevolence as pure and as disinterested as that of Wilberforce, or Clarkson, or even Howard. While, however, we stop short of inculcating them, even on suspicion, we are perfectly at liberty to say, that neither as Committee-men nor as Witnesses is their presence consistent with the decorum of justice. Let it be conceded, that we are wrong in our views, and they are right; yet, if a general opinion obtains, that the lives and welfare of millions of our fellow-creatures hang upon the determination of this Committee, or, (to take even lower, though still high ground,) if, on the authority of such men as Sir Charles Hotham and Mr. Bandinel, we have reason to believe, that the honour of our country is at stake,—is it seemly, that any should be found, among either the Judges or the Witnesses, who have a large pecuniary interest involved in the adverse decision of the inquiry?

This question, at least, must be asked and answered within the walls of Parliament; for we know that there are many noble Lords, many honourable and Right Honourable Members, who want neither the spirit nor the tact to put it, nor the firmness to compel a frank and full reply. Our present duty is, to call attention to the further proof supplied in these Papers of the utter worthlessness of the Commons' Report, and of the evidence on which it professes to be founded.

The Evidence before their Lordships requires abridgment rather than analysis; it contains so much information that

is really valuable, that we find the temptation to copious extract almost irresistible; yet we must condense, or our series will run the risk of being shelved with Parliamentary Blue-books, through the humiliating process of measurement by an *avoirdupois* standard, instead of by utility and good sense. To effect this condensation, we propose, as the most convenient arrangement, first to consider those facts on which their Lordships have reported as already satisfactorily proved; and we shall, therefore, in reference to them, limit ourselves to the names of the Witnesses by whose evidence they are established, with an occasional quotation of the most stringent passages in their examination. This will enable us to extract more freely on such matters as are unnoticed in the Report.

Five important facts are ascertained by the Report:

First. That, upon the whole, a large reduction of the Slave-trade has been effected.

Secondly. That its probable increase has been prevented.

Thirdly. That the impression of the general unhealthiness of the Cruising Squadron, is without foundation.

Fourthly. That the withdrawal of the cruisers would cause a great immediate increase in the Slave-trade.

Fifthly. That it would also inflict most serious injury on the legitimate commerce of Africa.

The most decisive evidence, on the first of these points, is that of Captain Denman. We extract it at length; it will be found in the answer to Question 4, 532:

"I have already stated Sir Charles Macarthy's account of the exports from two single rivers; which will certainly show, that those two rivers alone exported formerly upwards of 50,000 slaves a year. Here is another despatch in the year 1821, showing, that, from other parts of the coast, in periods of six and of four months, 21,000 slaves were exported; those are both north of the equator. At this time, the Slave-trade in the Bight of Benin and at Gallinas was far larger than it had been of late years. A great number of other points also existed within those limits. Besides those, there was a large Slave-trade south of the line, of which we observed nothing in those days, because we could not touch a vessel in south latitude, and by which Brazil was entirely supplied. We may suppose, at the most moderate computation, that the number amounted to 40,000 a year; and here is Captain Owen's statement, (he at that time being employed on the East Coast of Africa), that two ports alone upon that coast, exported

25,000 slaves. It is impossible to believe, that the whole Slave-trade amounted to less than 150,000 a year.

"You would, therefore, convey to the Committee your strong impression, founded upon those documents, that the amount of the Slave-trade has been greatly diminished by the British Squadron?"

"Very greatly diminished, though complete suppression has not been at all effected: had it been left to itself, instead of being now about one-third of what it was in 1821, it would have been at least double that amount."

Evidence of similar tendency is given by Mr. Staveley, in answer to Questions 100 to 107, and inferentially, by showing the large increase in the price of slaves, in answer to Question 122. At Question 1,033, the Rev. Henry Townsend speaks to the same effect; and again, at 1,072 and 1,101. It may also be convenient to refer to Sir Charles Hotham's Examination, from Question 2,016 to 2,022; for, though such admissions always seem to fall from him with extreme reluctance, yet they are of importance, as regards the success of the Squadron on that part of the coast of which he speaks. The slave-dealer Cliffe, at 2,215, acknowledges the general feeling of the land-owners in Brazil to be, that the exertions of England have raised the price of slaves; and he repeats this in different terms at 2,290. Mr. Herring confirms this, by his answers to Questions 2,400 to 2,410; and, lastly, we may refer to the Slave-trading statistics of Mr. Macqueen, at 3,733 to 3,735. Though not directly bearing on the decrease of the Trade, we quote from his reply to the last of these questions:—"Since 1828, there have been carried away for the Brazils, Cuba, and Porto Rico, 4,800,000; making 13,240,000 abstracted from Africa." This does not include any but the slaves actually landed. Upon the most moderate calculation, therefore, we arrive at the result, that, including the deaths by slave wars and the middle passage, not less than 26,000,000 of Africans have been murdered by the Slave-trade,—being a population equal to that of the United Kingdom. It is useful thus to realise ideas which at first appear too large for ordinary comprehensions. Our forefathers, to be sure, share much of the guilt, or we might allot exactly a murder a piece to every man, woman, and child in Great Britain and Ireland; being a pretty considerable contribution towards that burden of national iniquity of which we have lately heard so much from the pulpit.

It will be found, that many of the passages to which we have referred, as establishing the first fact found by the verdict of this noble Jury, also sustain the second,—that the probable increase of the Slave-trade has been prevented. Indeed, it stands to reason, that the same power which has largely reduced crime, must, to a certain extent, keep the criminal in awe. We should, therefore, pass on at once to the third finding, were it not for the great importance of the evidence given by some of the Witnesses as to the restraining operation of the Squadron. We commence our quotations with the very significant opinion of Mr. Hesketh, who has acted in mercantile and consular capacities in the Brazils for forty years:

“Question 3,172. Then, are the Committee to understand, that you are of opinion, that the main capital by which the Brazilian Slave-trade is maintained comes from England?

“I SHOULD SAY NOT THE MAIN, BUT CERTAINLY ONE HALF, I AM CONVINCED.

“3,173. Is that well understood in Brazil?

“Yes.”

“3,374. Does that impress the minds of the Brazilians with any conviction as to our sincerity or insincerity in wishing to check the Slave-trade?

“They are convinced that our commercial interests are so bound up with the continuance of the traffic, that they think we cannot seriously compel them to abolish it; that we would not risk our commercial interests in the act of a hostile or forcible termination of the traffic.”

With this introductory quotation, the following statements will appear more credible. Captain Beacroft has resided, more or less constantly, for twenty years on the African Coast, and in the very centre of the traffic. He tells us, at Question 3,542:

“If you make it a fair trade, and give licenses to ships (as was the case when the Slave-trade was carried on by the English) only to carry so many, like emigrant vessels, there would be a great many Englishmen who would venture on that trade at this day.”

Captain Matson, R.N., says: “If the Squadron were withdrawn, I believe that not only Brazilians, but Englishmen themselves would engage in the Slave-trade,” (*vide* Question 2,919.)

We have already quoted one of the following answers from Mr. Macqueen; but, on this occasion, it will bear repetition:

"3,746. Do not both trades (that is, the Slave-trade and the legal trade) essentially consist in the exchange of British goods for slaves and for produce?"

"Yes; a great portion of the goods with which the slaves are purchased, are of British manufacture."

"3,747. Are not they entirely of British manufacture?"

"They are almost entirely. They are either British manufactures, or goods brought from India. The British goods are manufactured in this country, and sent out to the coast of Africa, and sold there at the different ports on the coast, where the Slave-trade is carried on; and I find, on looking into the official returns, that, as the Slave-trade increases, so, the exports of goods from this country to the coast of Africa and to the Brazils, increase."

* * * * *

"3,748. Have circumstances made you well acquainted with the parties who send such goods out?"

"I could not but know the parties, living in Glasgow as I did, and travelling over the West Indies, and being in the stores and warehouses of the different merchants there, where I have seen the goods, and knew who imported them, and where they came from."

"3,749. Have such parties often, in conversation, admitted to you, that those goods were going out for the African Slave-trade?"

"They knew it perfectly well, and could not deny it."

"3,750. Are not the cotton and stuffs which are shipped for those depôts for the Slave-trade, made in a peculiar way as to patterns, and materials, and the like?"

"Yes, particularly so; and so also are the fire-arms which are exported, &c."

"3,751. Is not it understood in the trade, that 'African goods' mean goods of such a description as will suit the Slave-trade, and will not suit any other?"

"Yes; I remember well, at the time of the British Emancipation, that manufacturers in Glasgow were continually employed, night and day, in manufacturing goods for the Brazil market; such was the demand for them, in consequence of the expected increase of the Slave-trade."

"3,752. Were there not some of those houses in the trade, which prohibited their captains from selling their goods to slave-dealers, or agents of the trade?"

"I should hardly think so; I am not aware of it myself."

"3,753. Even if such orders were given, would they necessarily be obeyed by their agents on the coast?"

"I do not think they would; in reference to the slave-trading parts, they cannot sell goods to any one but a person engaged directly or indirectly in the Slave-trade."

* * * * *

"3,760. They pay for those articles generally in bills, do not they?"

"I believe, now, a great portion of them are paid for in bills."

"3,761. Are not Pedro Blanco and De Souza among the number of those whose bills are commonly received?"

"Yes; AND THERE ARE BILLS ON HOUSES IN LONDON."

"3,762. They* being notorious Slave-dealers?"

"They are notorious Slave-dealers, &c."

"3,774. If the foreign Slave-trade were legalized, or even if it were relieved from the presence of our cruisers, would not the connexion between that legal trade and the Slave-trade become more immediate and direct than it is at present?"

"There can be no question of it."

* * * * *

"3,779. Supposing the Squadron to be removed, can you tell the Committee what would remain to prevent a British vessel from clearing out at a British port with a cargo of 'African goods' calling at Cadiz to ship foreign sailors, proceeding to a Slave-trading port, there to equip with slave-decks and water-casks, exchanging her goods for slaves, transporting those slaves direct to Rio, and returning in sugar to this country?"

"*I am not aware of any hinderance to it*: I am afraid, since the abolition of our Navigation-laws, a foreign vessel may do that," &c.

"3,787. Would not the withdrawal of the Squadron tend to introduce a multitude of British adventurers with small capital into that trade?"

"Certainly; British and all other adventurers: if our Squadron were withdrawn, it would be the signal of one of the most hideous scenes that it is possible to conceive."

* * * I look upon it as one of the most destructive things which could be done."

* The pronoun refers, of course, to Pedro Blanco and De Souza, not to the London Houses.

"3,843. Supposing the British Cruisers were removed, and the emigration principle carried out, would it, in your opinion, endanger the restoration of the direct Slave-trade?"

"I think there would be scarcely another step to take, if you go there and buy people; what a man buys, he has a right to sell; and FROM THE FEELING WHICH IS SPREADING IN THIS COUNTRY, ADVOCATED VERY STRONGLY BY HIGH AND INFLUENTIAL PORTIONS OF THE PRESS, FOR REASONS WHICH I KNOW WELL, THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY WOULD NOT, AFTER SUCH A STEP WERE TAKEN, HAVE THE SLIGHTEST HESITATION IN RENEWING THE SLAVE-TRADE ALSO: I do not think they would hesitate about it, if they could make money by it."

The Rev. Thomas Peyton, at Question 2,745, confirms some of the statements as to the supply of British manufactures.

This quotation has been long, but it is of deep interest. Perhaps, there is not more important evidence to be found in all these volumes, important as they are. The facts were long since well known. "Can it still be necessary (asks the author of the pamphlet on the 'Niger-trade,' published before the Lords' Committee was appointed,) to ask why our African ships return in ballast? Or has Lord Denman no reason to denounce the infamous participation of British capital and British subjects in felonious profits? These facts, or facts of a precisely similar character, have long been known; they are notorious; there is not a man familiar with Anti-slavery research who does not know them; there are some who can walk the city, and point with the finger to the very individuals who have that day paid or accepted De Souza's, or Pedro Blanco's bills; there are houses in London, in Cadiz, and in Havannah, as well as in New York,—'highly respectable,' 'honourable and distinguished merchants,'—who can, if need be, attest character by witnesses as 'honourable' and as 'respectable' as themselves, and purchase the sympathies of the public through hirelings of the Press."* Now that these startling statements of the pamphleteer are reiterated in the sworn evidence of a Witness, we cannot doubt that Parliament will be moved to activity, even if some pressure from without should not be exerted. That pressure, however, will not be much longer restrained.

We will only add to our references on the second finding of the Report, the answer to 4,258; and we add this, simply because the *Anti-Slavery Reporter*, in its Anti-Squadron zeal, has quoted Captain Chads as hostile to the Squadron; and has so quoted him on the authority solely of an inconsiderate letter, the true value of which is here explained by Captain Chads:

"If the Squadron were removed," says the Captain, "at first, I think, there would be an immense export; but I think, after that time, there would be a constant and regular demand."

The third fact, respecting the healthiness of the African Squadron, rests upon the evidence of Sir Charles Hotham, 2,119 and *seq.*, of Captain Matson, 2,913 and *seq.*, of Captain Butterfield, 3,337, of Captain Sprigg, 3,713 and *seq.*, of Captain Adams, 3,975 and *seq.*, of Captain Symonds, 4,031 and *seq.*, and of Captain Horton, 4,655. As the fact does not appear to have been questioned, it is unnecessary to give any extracts in support of it.

That the withdrawal of the cruisers would cause a great immediate increase of the Slave-trade, is almost the same position as, that the Squadron has prevented its probable increase; though the Committee have, for some reason or other, appeared to distinguish the one from the other. Much of the evidence that has been already quoted, is equally applicable to both positions; and, indeed, there is scarcely a witness examined, who does not concur in this testimony, though with some difference of opinion as to the probable duration of the increased demand. It may be assumed, that the evidence on which their Lordships found this part of their Report, is that given by Mr. Stavelay at Questions 117 to 119, by the Rev. H. Townsend at Question 1,083, by Dr. Lushington at Question 1,158, by Sir Charles Hotham at Question 1,003, by the Rev. Thomas Peyton at Questions 2,575 to 2,577, by Captain Matson at Questions 2,928 to 2,932, and by Captain Fishbourne at Question 4,346. From these opinions, we select Dr. Lushington's, not merely on account of the general respect in which he is held, but also because it sums up the evils likely to arise from the withdrawal of the Squadron, in a manner at once concise and emphatic.

"I think the consequences would be very serious. In the first place, I think, the consequence would be, an increase of the Slave-trade to an almost indefinite extent. In the second place, I think that legitimate commerce

with Africa, which I consider to be a valuable commerce and an increasing commerce, would be considerably diminished. In the third place, I think it would be a finishing blow to all hope whatever of cultivating our West Indian Colonies with any advantage. In the fourth place, I think that the renewal of the Slave-trade, to a great extent, would be very destructive of all the efforts that have been made to introduce Christianity and cultivation into the country," (*vide* 1,158.)

And such is the opinion of all, with some little variation of language: we may refer to Captain Matson's and Captain Fishbourne's Evidence as the most decisive.

On the fifth and last finding of the Committee, that the removal of the Squadron would inflict most serious injury on the legitimate commerce of Africa, every witness of whom the question is asked, is very decided. It will be found, that all those to whom we have just referred, in common with Dr. Lushington, mention this as an inevitable consequence. We shall extract only two or three Answers to this effect, though they abound:

At Question 877, Mr. Townsend says, alluding to the possible removal of the cruisers, "I think it would be the destruction of all other trade but the Slave-trade."

At Question 3,114, Mr. Dawson "thinks, that it would lead to the coast's abounding with piratical and other vessels, which would greatly interfere with lawful commerce."

At Questions 3,437 *et seq.*, Captain Beacroft says, "The legitimate commerce would be embarrassed, and fail in a great measure, by the overpouring in of the Slave-trade."

Our last reference shall be to Mr. Macqueen, who concludes his evidence in such a prophetic spirit, that we shall quote nearly the whole of his Answer to Question 3,885. He is interrogated as to the consequences, generally, of withdrawing the Squadron:

"My belief is, unquestionably, from a deep consideration of the subject, and from my acquaintance with the Western world, or a very large portion of it, and with the feelings and the wants of that portion of the world, that it would extend the African Slave-trade without bounds. There would be no bounds to it; I do not see where the bounds would be. For instance, the Brazils are a country containing three or four millions of square miles of the finest soil in the world; it would take a population of 240 millions

to people it half as densely as Barbadoes. There are no bounds to the extent of slaves there; and what is a very serious consideration is, that, as you extend the cultivation and the population in the Brazils, and Cuba, and Porto Rico, and similar places, you extend the markets for foreign manufactures, both in Germany and the United States; as those countries extend in population, they take back those people's colonial produce in return. While upon this point, I will just draw the attention of the Committee, for one moment, to this important fact; that by the extension of the Slave-trade since 1808, there has been an increased production in the Slave-holding countries in the Western world,—including, of course, the United States; the production has increased from twenty millions to a hundred millions,—making a difference of eighty millions sterling of additional trade and commerce thrown into the market of the world; one-half of which, perhaps, is on the English account; the rest is shared by foreigners settled among us, and who, by their united exertions, press upon the Government, on all occasions, measures which are diametrically opposed and hostile to the best interests of England and her Colonies: you cannot help it,—there they are; it is an influence which is greater than all our foreign trade put together; it embarrasses all our commercial operations; it embarrasses all our diplomacy: it browbeats the Government, and very often defeats them in many objects they have in view," &c.

We will frankly confess, that we do not exactly see, at whom, or at what, these concluding remarks are pointed; and, moreover, we doubt whether the present Government is wont to be embarrassed or conquered by any American or European commercial interests adverse to their own political principles. We can, nevertheless, perfectly understand, that the vast accession of colonial wealth secured by indulging the Brazilians in an unfettered Slave-trade, may invest that country with a political strength and ascendancy, not only very prejudicial to our own maritime and colonial power, but also highly injurious to our commerce, and most embarrassing to our foreign relations. Such we take to be the meaning of Mr. Macqueen; and hence, we have quoted his words at length, because he appears to put the subject in a light as novel as it is important; and there are few men whose knowledge of the political bearings of commerce entitles them to more respectful attention than, Mr. Macqueen. Certainly, it would not be convenient to

have a second edition of the United States, and of very inferior type, in the South American Continent.

Had any of the above facts on which the Report rests, been convertible on the evidence before them, we should have adhered to our principle of collating and comparing the conflicting testimony; but their Lordships, not being engaged in the African trade, nor dependent on West Indian prosperity, nor indulging any hidden propensities for the bargain and sale of human flesh by way of barter for cottons or hardware, gunpowder or spirits, have proceeded directly to the point, neither embarking in controversy themselves, nor giving occasion for it in others.

BEFORE we advert to those other points on which we think that the Evidence would have equally sustained the expression of a decided opinion in their Lordships' Report, it is expedient to call attention to a subject of controversy which is of great importance in itself, and is rendered doubly so by the new light thrown upon it by their Lordships' inquiry.

All the world knows that, in the year 1840, Captain Denman, who was then cruising on the African station, destroyed certain baracoons at the Gallinas,—a course of proceeding that was warmly commended by the public, and decidedly approved by the Government. As we are not in the secrets of the gallant officer, we can only assume, that it was in consequence of his experience of the immediate utility of such a step, that he suggested a new system of naval operations for the suppression of the Slave-trade, of which the principal features were, a strict blockade of the Slave-dealing points on the coast, and a merciless destruction of the baracoons wherever they might be found. The plan is explained by Captain Denman, in a paper handed in by him at Question 245 of his examination before the Commons' Committee, to which paper we refer our readers for the details. We slightly adverted to this scheme in the second Chapter of this Pamphlet, pages 20 and 21; and we then expressed some doubt of its general practicability, founded on the evidence of Sir Charles Hotham at Questions 476 and 580 of the Commons' papers. It is apparent, that both the Committees have regarded this as a question of serious importance; for, on the one hand, if

Captain Denman's system admits of general application, its efficiency, and, consequently, the efficiency of the Squadron, is unquestionable: on the other hand, if the scheme can only be brought into partial operation, it seems to be allowed on all sides, that many slaves must escape. Let us look a little into the merits of the issue thus raised between Sir Charles Hotham and Captain Denman. We are the more anxious to do so, because, in our former remarks, we were biassed by a confidence in the naval judgment of Sir Charles, which we now find to have been utterly misplaced.

On the 5th of December, 1848, Sir Charles Hotham wrote a despatch to the Admiralty, in which is the following passage:

"The plan under which we have been hitherto acting, has entirely failed; it matters little, whether we keep our ships in-shore, or allow them to cruise; it never could succeed. It is a point to be decided by seamen, and requires neither African experience nor local knowledge," (*vide* page 167 of the Lords' Evidence.)

In the same despatch, he recommends, as a substitute for the Blockade, a negotiation with the Brazilian Government, of which the first Article is proposed to be, "to sanction the importation of slaves until a fixed period," (*vids* page 168.)

If this were all, it would amount only to matter of opinion and good taste. Sir Charles Hotham is equally entitled to express an opinion with Captain Denman; and, though it is almost as bold a step, to recommend to our Government the sanction of piracy, as to enter a foreign territory and destroy its factories, we might find an excuse in the simplicity natural to our frank, plain-spoken seamen. But it is *not* all.

Their Lordships had on the table before them, a certain Chart of the African Coast, a copy of which is appended to the Evidence, (it will be found at page 74,) and which was referred to in a despatch of Sir Charles Hotham's, dated the 17th August, 1848. In this despatch, there is inserted a blue line, running parallel with the coast, from Cape St. Paul to Nayumba, being a distance of sixteen degrees, or 960 geographical miles, and about 1,300 in actual measurement. This blue line is intended to represent an interior water communication, extending all this distance, (though the copy of the chart expresses a doubt as to the continuity of this communication,) between the Cameroons and the

River Gaboon,—a space of 300 miles. This Chart *was sent to the Admiralty by Sir Charles himself, (vide 2,116:)* and the object of so sending it would seem to have been, to satisfy the Lords of the Admiralty that he did not speak without sufficient warrant, when he represented the inutility of the Blockade, or of destroying baracoons; for how could the shipping of slaves be prevented, or how could the loss of the factories prove more than a temporary inconvenience, when such facilities were afforded by the nature of the coast, to convey the slaves from point to point by water, out of the observation of vessels at sea? This reasoning was so plausible, (though not then supported by the Chart,) that, when urged by Sir Charles on the Commons' Committee, it even staggered ourselves as to the soundness of Captain Denman's scheme; and hence, the doubts we expressed. A single glance at the Chart brings conviction to the mind, that the Slave-trade must of necessity be migratory, and that an effectual Blockade is consequently hopeless! We will not trust ourselves to give, in our own words, the result of the able examination of their Lordships. We must quote, however, largely, that we may not be chargeable with gross and malevolent misrepresentation.

At 2,789, Captain Matson is asked: .

"Are you able to speak of the coast south of the line, from your personal observation?"

"Yes; during the last three years of my service, I was there constantly."

"Will you turn to the Chart which you have before you: you will see traced on that Chart a blue line, extending from Cape St. Paul, north of the line, to Loango Bay, five degrees south of the line?"

"Yes."

"That blue line is stated, at the top of the map, to show the extent of the Lagoons by which slaves may be transported along 1,300 miles of coast; do you know that part of the coast from your own observation?"

"Yes."

"Are there any such Lagoons in existence?"

"Certainly not; there certainly never was a greater topographical error, than that of describing the existence of such Lagoons."

"Why do you say that there is no such thing as that extent of Lagoons?"

"I have been over every part of the coast: I have made a trigonometrical survey of a great part of it; and from my

own observation, I know that it does not exist, except a small part, which I will explain."—"About 170 or 180 miles; that is the only Lagoon that exists." (2,789 to 2,795.)

"Then, are the Committee to understand, that there would not be facility for conveying slaves along the coast, by one river joining another?

"No; except just about the Bonny and New Calabar." (2,797.)

"Are you able to state to the Committee, from your own personal observation, that that blue line, representing the existence of Lagoons from the Cameroons to Loango Bay, is wholly imaginary?

"Decidedly it is."

"And that no such water communication exists?

"None whatever." (2,801, *et seq.*)

At Question 3,332, Captain Butterfield is asked:

"Are you able to tell the Committee, whether there is such a line of Lagoons as you come from the south?

"I cannot state it of my own knowledge, but persons to whom I have spoken, tell me, there are no communications; until this morning, I believed that this Lagoon did not even reach to the Bonny, but I have, since then, seen a person who has been there."

"But the south line is wholly imaginary?

"Yes; I am almost certain of that, from everything I have been told." * * * *

"Had there been any Lagoon, you must have passed it?

"Yes," (*vide* 3,332 *et seq.*)

Further, Captain Beacroft, a resident on the coast for twenty years, is asked:

"There is no connected line south?

"No; the Lagoon only goes from St. Paul's to Benin.

"So that the whole of the rest of those assumed 1,300 miles, is perfectly imaginary?

"I do not know of any other Lagoon; I have not heard of any," (*vide* 3,449 *et seq.*)

Captain Hay, at 3,575 *et seq.*, gives similar evidence; as does Captain Sprigg at 3,689 *et seq.* Captain Adams, at 3,906, states, that he never landed on that part of the coast. It is but fair to say, that Captain Symonds, at 4,019, though doubtfully, confirms the accuracy of the Chart; but he is not minutely examined about it; nor was any question on the subject addressed to the other naval officers.

Of course, we do not mean to insinuate, that Sir Charles Hotham could possibly be guilty of forging or constructing a false chart to mislead the Admiralty; but what can be thought of the "judgment," or "the zeal," or even the common prudence of a naval commander-in-chief, occupying such a position, and writing officially on such a subject, who rests his opinion respecting a great practical question of national policy, upon an imaginary chart of the very station where he commanded, and who even forwards that chart to the Admiralty as the best vindication he could offer for advising a change of system?

We wish that this were the only instance of a manifest disposition to bend facts to fit his immature and ill-considered advice, which duty compels us to expose. Still intent on making out his case, and, as it would almost seem, relying on the ignorance of the Committee in all local matters, when (at Question 1,856) his opinion is asked as to the practicability of blockading the mouth of the Congo, Sir Charles replies:

"I think I can answer that question satisfactorily, because a trial has been made; we have had a cruiser anchored off the place in the most convenient spot for intercepting vessels which might come down the river; but such is the strength of the current, and the strength of the wind which occasionally blows down that river, that a vessel comes down, sails by with the strength of the current, and, taking advantage of approaching night, is out of sight almost before the cruiser is under weigh; *therefore, it is literally impossible to watch the Congo; I believe, and I am supported in that opinion by officers of practical experience, as far as the Congo is concerned*, that such are the difficulties about it, the number of creeks, and the number of places of embarking, that *it would take five men-of-war to watch the Congo alone.*"

Let our readers mark the words that we have printed in italics, and compare them with the opinions of some "officers of practical experience" in the Congo. Captain Matson was seventy miles up the Congo (2,955), and has been twenty or thirty times up the river (2,960): what may be his opinion?

"I should say that *one vessel* must blockade the mouth of the Congo absolutely."

"It would be quite contrary to your opinion to hear, that five men-of-war would be required to blockade the Congo?"

"I really cannot understand such an assertion."

And then, the words of Sir Charles having been quoted,—

“The Committee are to understand, that, in your opinion, that is not at all a picture of the ordinary result of watching the Congo?”

“Certainly not; I am quite sure, that, if one steamer were stationed off the river Congo, no slaver would attempt to enter it; it is a complete *cul de sac*, from whence there is no escape.” (2,955 to 2,961.)

What says Captain Butterfield?—

“I have been up the Congo several times. I should certainly say, that one steamer would prevent any slaver entering; one steamer cruising about the mouth of the river Congo would effectually seal it from anything going in.” (3,315 to 3,319.)

What is the Evidence of Captain Hay?—

“For ten months I was stationed in sight of the river Congo. When I went there at first, the Slave-trade was very brisk, but I do not think that, during the ten months I remained there, a single slaver escaped from the river. The *Prometheus* alone was employed to guard that river, and, in my judgment, effectually guarded it.” (3,590 to 3,594.)

Captain Sprigg, also, “considers, that one efficient steamer, and one sailing-vessel in sight of the mouth of the Congo, on its northern shore, would be quite sufficient to answer for effectual interference with the trade in the Congo.” (3,693.)

Captain Adams, “with one steam-vessel, would undertake to blockade the Congo effectually.” (3,920.)

Captain Symonds “has been several times up the Congo (4,015), and thinks, that one vessel constantly cruising off the Congo, might seal that river from the Slave-trade: he has never heard the opinion yet, that the difficulties of watching the Congo are so great that it would take five men-of-war to watch that river alone.” (4,017 to 4,026.)

Captain Chads “is acquainted with the mouth of the Congo. His impression is, that one vessel, together with her boats, might blockade it—would entirely seal the river from the Slave-trade.” (4,065 to 4,072.)

Thus, Sir Charles is directly contradicted by no fewer than seven officers of great practical experience on this point: indeed, we may say eight, for, though not examined expressly to the same point, Captain Denman casually gives similar evidence at 4,511. Must Sir Charles again take refuge in ignorance? and on a matter, too, which most especially fell within the immediate range of his duty?

But we have not yet done with him. "I am not aware," he says, at Question 1,818, "with the exception of the rivers, of any one place where you have eradicated the Slave-trade." Poor Sir Charles! why, we "Gentlemen of England, who live at home at ease," are better informed on naval matters than this! Another official chart is appended to the Evidence, in which no fewer than six places are marked, where it has been entirely eradicated; and this contradiction is likewise afforded by Mr. Landor, of Cape Coast Castle, at Question 343; by Captain Matson, at Questions 2,778, 2,779, 2,840, 2,961; by Captain Trotter, 4,399; by Mr. Waddell, 4,404; by Captain Denman, 4,454, *et seq.*; and, finally, by himself, at 2,029 and 2,033! Must we ascribe this also to ignorance? Be it so; but, to what must we ascribe the singular confessions involved in the following answers? Sir Charles is interrogated at Question 1,942, on the subject of his despatch of the 5th of December, 1848:

"Did you, in that despatch, express your opinion generally upon the system of cruisers, and your suggestions as to what you thought the only way in which England could effect her great purpose?"

"Evidence was sent out to me by the authorities of the Admiralty, and I was instructed to give their Lordships any opinion, or to offer any comments that I might think proper upon that Evidence; therefore, it became incumbent upon me, not only to examine the whole most minutely, but also, in some degree, to offer a counter plan, inasmuch as it would have been very unbecoming in me, on the one hand, to have declared that the Government scheme had totally failed, without, on the other, being some way prepared to suggest something else. At the same time, I must take occasion to say, that *I was very far from supposing that my plan would be adopted; nor did I think it at all necessary that it should be*: I merely threw it out as a duty," &c.*

And, at Question 2,096, being interrogated as to his reasons for urging, as a matter "of essential importance," the infliction of personal penalties, he says:

"The question having now been put pointedly to me,

* It is singular, that almost on the same day that Sir C. Hotham wrote to the Admiralty, suggesting a continuance of the Slave-trade, a Mr. Cruikshank, employed on a mission to Dahomy, tenders, in his report of that mission, dated the 9th November, 1848, similar advice, avowedly on the authority of De Souza, the greatest Slave-trader in the world! (*Vide Appendix*, pp. 187 and 188.)

whether I thought that any great benefit would be derived from it, I reply, *that I did not consider that there would be,*" &c.

Again, being asked (2,098),

"Did you not add a further recommendation, that powers should be given to the officers in command to destroy factories containing goods belonging to parties known to promote the traffic?"

He replies :

"That, again, is given under the same consideration. I was bound to suggest everything that occurred to me, to my employers; and I *thought it was the business of other people to see whether those measures were valid or not,*" &c.

Thus, we have Sir Charles Hotham suggesting, with all the weight of his high official position, measures which he felt could not be adopted, or, if adopted, could not be beneficial, or of the efficiency of which he could say nothing, to amuse his employers at the Admiralty; or to be quoted as influential with Parliament, to supersede a great system of national policy on which we have acted for nearly half a century!!! We do not ask whether this was simply puerile and foolish; we are entitled to ask, rather, whether it was honest, either to "his employers" or to the country? No man is excusable for making frivolous suggestions, calculated, from the quarters from which they proceed, to give a shock to public feeling, (as in this case they have done to a great extent,) merely "to say something," lest silence should be imputed to indifference. It is virtually to these crude crotchets of this sagacious commander-in-chief, that we are indebted for compliance with the self-interested clamour that led to the appointment of these Committees; and now it appears, by his own confession, that he was all the time playing with the Admiralty Lords! But can we even let him off so easily? We have our doubts. His Evidence, in many places, seems to justify a suspicion, that the complimentary letter of the 12th of April, 1849, with which he introduces himself to the Committee, was designed for something in the nature of chloride of lime!

It is only fair to give Sir Charles's apology for himself, before we quote the passages which appear to inculcate him. At Question 1,700, he acknowledges, that "he did not comprehend the whole duty of the station under a year,"—having just confessed to absolute ignorance of it at the commencement. (1,691, 1,692.) He also tells us (1,697), that "it is a more difficult station to become acquainted

with than any other, except the Mediterranean." Let him have all credit, then, for any amount of ignorance he desires; let him be allowed any conceivable degree of dullness of apprehension; it is not the first occasion on which an illustrious personage has prayed, "Write me down an ass!" Yet, will he thus sufficiently vindicate himself from the reproaches conveyed by the following extracts? We trow not. At 2,895, Captain Matson is asked:

"Will you now state to the Committee, what, from your own experience, would be the mode in which you would employ these cruisers; as to whether they should be near the shore, or whether they should cruise at a distance from the shore?"

"They should cruise near the shore, decidedly; their not doing so, is one of the principal reasons why they fail now; particularly, I consider, under the system lately pursued."

"From your experience in the service, are you able to give a decided opinion as to whether cruising from fifty to seventy miles' distance from the coast must be a failure or not in suppressing the Slave-trade?"

"I think it must be a failure. I have read several of the late Commander-in-Chief's orders, and this is the plan he goes on. We will say, that Loango Bay is a Slave-trading port; he stations a vessel in a square off that port, embracing a certain parallel of latitude and meridian of longitude, and the cruiser cannot go outside that limit, the slave-merchant at Loango knows where that vessel is; she cannot remain there many days before her position becomes known all along the coast, although she herself can know nothing of what is going on around her; they send orders to the captains to make the land to windward of Loango Bay; that is, to run in in a certain parallel of latitude, which is not very difficult. * * * They send word to the captains of the Slavers in Brazil, or they send a boat to meet them at an appointed rendezvous, at a spot where no slaves could be embarked, and consequently where there is no cruiser. A vessel is cruising off Loango Bay; it is supposed she will catch the Slaver when she comes in for the slaves, or when she goes out. If the Slaver would run direct to or from the port, of course they would take her; but, knowing that the cruiser is there, the captain has orders to make the land to windward of the Slave-port; the wind always blows up the coast: he runs in to Loango Bay from the southward, and then, having shipped his slaves, he runs along the coast

to the northward, knowing that he shall clear the cruiser ; and he goes on, round and round, and the vessel all the time is in the square marked out for her station, and she cannot move from it It is the easiest thing in the world to embark a cargo of slaves upon that system." (2,896 *et seq.*)

A pretty game of blind man's buff, to be sure, at which Sir Charles has been amusing himself for the last two years ! Or shall we call it a nautical effort to quadrature the circle, by way of relieving the dullness of a long cruise ?

" So that, from your experience, distant cruising is sure to fail ?

" I think it must fail," &c. (2,898.)

" Will you state to the Committee, what, in your estimate, would be the value of the evidence of a naval officer, as to the impracticability of stopping the Slave-trade, whose plan for stopping it was by distant cruising ?

" If he adopt that as the system to be pursued, I do not wonder at his thinking it impossible."

" Are the Committee to understand, that you would attribute that impossibility to the failure of his plan, and not to any real impossibility in the matter itself ?

" I see no impossibility."

" Before Sir Charles Hotham adopted the plan of distant cruising, was it the system to cruise ~~nearer~~ the coast ?

" It was."

" Was the success greater than during the time of Sir Charles ?

" I think so." (2,898 to 2,904.)

Our quotation from this very intelligent officer's Evidence gives the whole substance of the case. We may, therefore, without extracting further, content ourselves with referring to the answers of other witnesses by numbering them.

Captain Matson is confirmed by Captain Chaloner at Questions 3,250 to 3,255. His last answer, being short, may be quoted, because it is emphatic.

" I think it quite impossible that an effectual guard of the coast could be maintained at that distance from the shore," (alluding to the distance at which Sir Charles ordered him to cruise).

Captain Chaloner then proceeds, at Questions 3,262 to 3,268, to show, in the same terms almost as Captain Matson, that Sir Charles Hotham's opinion is not worth a straw.

Captain Matson is further confirmed by Captain Butter-

field, at Questions 3,324 to 3,329; and the confirmation is not inferential only, but direct and complete.

Similar confirmation is given by Captain Beacroft at Questions 3,415 to 3,419, and by Captain Sprigg at Questions 3,656 to 3,666. It appears, from the last answer, that Sir Charles's orders for distant cruising remained in force till the end of January, 1848. Captain Sprigg gives an answer to Question 3,685, which must be quoted:—"I think that the failure of the Squadron is not to be attributed altogether to the want of power in the Squadron, but more to the means of applying it."

Captain Adams, again, corroborates Captain Matson in terms so decided, that, if space permitted, we should gladly quote him at length, (*vide* 3,907 to 3,911.)

Captain Symonds gives similar evidence at 4,009 *et seq.*, and at 4,035 *et seq.*

Captain Chads replies to a similar effect at 4,057 *et seq.*, as does Captain Fishbourne at 4,334 *et seq.*, and Captain Trotter at 4,387 *et seq.*

Captain Horton gives some very significant facts, tending to the same conclusion, at 4,605, *et seq.* We exclude Captain Denman's evidence at 4,436 to 4,444, because this issue is virtually raised between him and Sir Charles; and we refer to Captain Lysaght's, at 4,152 and 4,182, in a spirit of fairness, because he is the only witness whose opinion affords even a colourable apology for Sir Charles's proceedings. Thus, without reckoning Captain Denman, we have eleven experienced naval officers (all but one being in the Royal Navy), who concur in ascribing to the orders of Sir Charles Hotham, the comparative inefficiency of the Squadron! We know not the gradations of value in "naval judgment." Possibly, there may be, in Admiralty use, some table of multiplication, analogous to the old adage, "that nine tailors make a man;" so that two commanders make a captain, and twelve captains make an admiral. By such a process of calculation, Sir Charles will still have the best of it; we must, therefore, throw into the scale the paramount weight of the Admiralty itself. In the large chart annexed to the Evidence, there is indicated by a cross, the place of capture of each of the 164 Slave-vessels taken during the years 1847 and 1848. On examining these places, it will be found, that the proportion of the captures effected in compliance with Sir Charles's cruising principle, to those captured in violation of it, is 43 to 121!!! So that, what with his describing squares to cover circles for evening amusement in his cabin, and ordering

his cruisers to blindfold themselves for Christmas gambols, the efforts of the whole Squadron would have been all but paralysed, had not the officers, with one consent, exercised a discretion in obeying orders! Of a verity, it is easy work to purchase from my Lords of the Admiralty, a letter of compliment for "ability and energy," for "judgment and discretion!"

We have so effectually demolished Sir Charles, that it seems scarcely worth while to advert to another striking mark of his "discretion," to be found in his orders of the 3rd April, 1848, produced at Question 3,687, whereby he prohibits "the detention of any launch, unless thirty slaves should be on board!" The effects of this prohibition are explained by Captain Sprigg, in answer to that question, and by Captain Fishbourne, at 4,335; the latter stating, that, "it would be quite contrary to the object for which the Squadron was placed there," and "would very much cripple the efficiency of the cruisers; at such a place especially." But, possibly, in the judgment of Sir Charles, our cruisers were sent to search for nobler quarry than a few small launches trading retail in slaves!

We contend, then, that we have proved by this evidence, beyond the possibility of question, that Sir Charles has (we say not intentionally) deceived the Admiralty by a false Chart; that he has misled, or attempted to mislead, the Committee by erroneous opinions, the error of which he ought to have known; that he has trifled with the Admiralty, by sending suggestions which he felt to be frivolous and impracticable; and finally, that he has, in most culpable ignorance, pursued a system of cruising, calculated to defeat the very objects for which he was intrusted with this high command. Can another word be necessary to show, that this Slave-trade-revival negotiator so tender in his consideration towards the Brazilian pirates, so chary of their interests, and so anxious for their blood-stained prosperity, is about the last man in England on whose opinion the welfare of Africa and its countless millions of oppressed population should depend? As Captain Denman's scheme is assailed by no other opinion, we do not hesitate now to avow our unqualified assent to it, both in principle and in practice. We sincerely trust that he will be appointed commander-in-chief on the station, with unfettered power to pursue his own judgment. We will answer for it, no more complaints of inefficiency will be heard, at all events.

To avoid breaking in upon more important matter here-

after, we may as well mention here, that the Slave-dealer, Cliffe, is entirely crushed by some inquiries which their Lordships made respecting him, of Mr. Herring, a gentleman long resident in the Brazils, (*vide* 2,500 and *seq.*) The fellow seems to have exhibited before their Lordships the same vulgar and affected familiarity of reply which marked his examination by the Commons' Committee; but we presume that they regarded him with too much contempt to reprove him for it. Yet, even this animal (man we cannot call him) seems at one time to have had his compunctions. He is asked (2,165), whether he had not stated to the House of Commons' Committee, that he had discontinued the practice of Slave-dealing?

"I did; I left it off like a fool, because I thought there would be a retribution for all that blood!" &c.

It is indeed "the fool" who "hath said in his heart, there is no God!" May our country and our legislators be spared that just retribution, which even this wretched being had, at one time, sense enough to anticipate—"RETRIBUTION FOR ALL THAT BLOOD!"

There are three propositions which, we think, are so clearly established by the evidence as to have warranted their introduction into their Lordships' Report. It is most probable that they were omitted only in contemplation of their resuming the inquiry, and of thus being enabled hereafter to report on the whole case more copiously and more decisively. To us, however, it appears, to be proved beyond dispute, even in this early stage of the investigation:

1. That the horrors of the middle-passage, under a British legalised system, were such as to be utterly incapable of aggravation.

2. That legitimate trade and the Slave-trade cannot co-exist, and that the former admits of infinite extension.

3. That the indigenous products, and the disposition of the African population, are in the highest degree favourable to commercial enterprise.

The most important witness on the first of these points, is Mr. Stokes, a gentleman who has, throughout a long and useful life, been almost exclusively engaged in the study of the statistics connected with the Slave-trade and Slavery. He was acting Secretary to the Sierra Leone Company; subsequently, Secretary to the African Institution, and then to the Anti-Slavery Society. We believe that he filled the same office to the Civilisation of Africa Society, during its brief existence. There does not exist another

individual who can boast of half a century of such confidential intercourse with all the leading men of the Anti-Slavery party. This gentleman has employed himself in examining into the evidence given at the bar of the House of Commons in 1792, when the atrocities of the middle-passage became so notorious as to demand legislative control. He appears before their Lordships, to furnish them with the results of this examination. The evidence of 1792 was so voluminous, that Mr. Wilberforce felt the necessity of abridging it for the convenience of the House; and the execution of this task was confided to Mr. Burgh, of York; Mr. Babington, late M.P., for Leicester; and the Rev. Thomas Gisborne. To avoid the suspicion of unfaithfulness in the abridgement, it was carefully compared with the Evidence by two members, Mr. Matthew Montague and the Hon. E. J. Elliott. Mr. Stokes put in this document; and we wish it were in our power to give every word of it to our readers. It will be found at page 238. We do not select our quotations; it is needless, for all is to the same effect:

"The *Briton*," says Henry Ellison, of 230 or 240 tons, purchased 375 slaves; * * * they buried near 200. * * * He has seen the platform one continued scab. * * * Hauled up eight or ten slaves dead of a morning; the flesh and skin peeled off their wrists when taken hold of; many entirely mortified: they buried, in the *Nightingale's* second voyage, (a small snow about 170 tons,) about 150, chiefly of fevers and flux." (P. 239.)

Mr. Claxton was surgeon of the *Young Hero* brig:

"They had 250 slaves, of whom 132 died, chiefly of the flux; so crowded, that they could only lie on their sides; if they did otherwise, it created quarrels among them; they were stowed so close that he could not go among them with his shoes, without danger of hurting them. * * *

* * * They were, therefore, obliged to place together those that were, and those that were not diseased, and, in consequence, the disease and mortality spread more and more. * * *

* * * Some of the diseased were obliged to be kept on deck, with a sail spread for them to lie on; this, in a little time, became nearly covered with blood and mucus, which involuntarily issued from them; and, therefore, the sailors who had the disagreeable task of cleaning the sail, grew angry with the slaves, and used to beat them inhumanly with their hands or with a cat; the slaves, in consequence, grew fearful of committing this

involuntary action, and when they perceived they had done it, would immediately creep to the tubs, and there sit, straining with such violence as to produce a *prolapsus ani*, which could not be cured. * * * Slaves whose flux was accompanied with scurvy, and such oedematous swellings of the legs as made it pain to move at all, were made to dance, as they called it, and whipped with a cat if they were reluctant. The slaves, both when ill and well, were frequently forced to eat against their inclinations; were whipped with a cat if they refused. They used other means still worse and too nauseous to mention. * *

* Fell in with the *Hero*, Captain Wilson, which had lost, he thinks, 360 slaves by death; he is certain more than half of her cargo. Learned this from the surgeon; who also told him, that, when removed from one place to another, they left marks of their skin and blood upon the deck, and that it was the most horrid sight that he had ever seen." (P. 239.)

Another surgeon of a Slave-ship, Mr. Falconbridge, states:

"In every voyage, when the ship was full, they complained of heat and want of air: confinement in this situation is so injurious, that he has known them go down apparently in good health at night, and found dead in the morning. * * * Almost all the men slaves were taken ill with the flux; the last time he went down it was so hot he took off his shirt; more than twenty had fainted, or were fainting: he got several hoisted upon deck; two or three died, and most of the rest before they reached the West Indies. * * * He cannot conceive any situation so dreadful and disgusting; in the *Alexander*, the deck was covered with blood and mucus,—it resembled a slaughter-house. * * * Has known two or three instances of a dead and living slave found in the morning shackled together." (P. 239, 240.)

Not to continue these disgusting extracts, we must add, that Mr. Stokes, at page 240, describes the manner of stowing a cargo of slaves on board the *Brookes*, of which an engraving is given, proving to demonstration, that such horrors as the Witnesses relate are inevitable; and he proceeds to observe:

"The advocates for the withdrawal of the cruisers also say, that such a measure would save the loss of life which now takes place by the detention of the slaves in barracoons, from want of food and from ill-treatment, in the case of the

place of embarkation being watched by a cruiser, and by their being put on board in haste, when an opportunity of doing so occurs. But the Evidence laid before Parliament, prior to the abolition of the Slave-trade, will show, that it was then no uncommon occurrence for Slave-vessels to remain on the coast for months, collecting their cargoes, and that, during this period, their victims were either confined on shore or on board ship, where they were always chained together; and that it was not till they left the coast, that the women were, in most instances, released from their fetters; *the returns show, that a large portion of the deaths that occurred, took place on the coast; that is, during the period of detention prior to the commencement of their voyage to the West Indies.* I am decidedly of opinion, that the sufferings of the slaves were far greater, and the deaths much more numerous, from their detention on ship-board, while the cargo was collecting, than has been the case since the establishment of our cruisers has led to their detention in barracoons."

Mr. Stokes proceeds to justify this opinion, by reference to the admeasurement of Slave-ships; and he shows that, even under our humane provisions, when only 451 slaves were allowed to be shipped on board the *Brookes* (a Slaver of 320 tons), the floors were covered with the bodies in actual contact! "What, then," he reasonably asks, "must have been their situation, when 600 were stowed in them, at the time alluded to by Dr. Trotter, who belonged to this ship; and 609, by the confession of the Slave-merchants, in a subsequent voyage?" (P. 241.)

"Then the Committee are to understand, that you gather from these extracts, that the crowding of the Slave-vessels before the institution of the cruising system, was as great as it is at present?

"Quite as great:" (*vide* Question 2,756.)

The calculations of the comparative profits of close packing, by Captain Fishbourne, in answer to Question 4,300, to prove that such a system is opposed to the interest of the Slave-trader, deserve attention; the object being to prove, that self-interest affords no security against cruelty.

We will refer to only another passage, in the evidence of Captain Denman; and we do so to show that, in 1834, when the Portuguese Slavers laboured under no apprehension of capture by our cruisers, the same horrors existed in the middle-passage. Captain Denman was four months on board a Slave-ship captured off Rio, but afterwards released:

"There were between 400 and 500 slaves on board at

the time of her capture; I was forty-six days on the voyage; and, altogether, four months on board of her, where I witnessed the most dreadful sufferings that human beings could endure," &c., (*vide* Question 4,415.)

The Rev. H. Townsend, at Question 972, scouts the idea of our cruisers having increased the horrors of the Trade.

We think that, on this conclusive evidence, it would have been competent to the Committee to report, that neither interest, nor common humanity, nor even parliamentary control, availed to diminish the horrors of the middle-passage; and if such was the case with British Slave-trading, what may we expect from the miscreants of Brazil, who are confessedly amenable to no law? (*vide* Lord Howden's Evidence *passim*; especially Questions 149 and 215 to 223, 243, and 249.) Here let us stop for a moment, to inquire how it has happened, that the Lords' Evidence of these horrors has not yet been disclosed to the world? Of course, nobody expects that *The Times*, and other daily journals, should be guilty of such suicidal honesty as to publish evidence to convict themselves of favouring, for some mysterious purposes, the re-opening of these "slaughter-houses" and shambles for human butchery. Those writers, too, may possibly plead the excuse of ignorance, and that it is no business of theirs to wade up to the knees in the "blood and mucus" of slave-vessels, merely to contrast a legal with a smuggling system. But there are some other parties whom such lame excuses will hardly serve. Did Mr. Hutt, a Member of Parliament, a would-be legislator in behalf of humanity, prepare himself for the chair of the Commons' Committee by diligent study of these sanguinary records? If not, how could he venture to approach this solemn inquiry in such inexcusable ignorance? Or, put it the other way, and say that he had duly "got up his subject;" we then ask, with what decency could he sanction the Report deprecating the aggravation of such horrors, when there was not a tittle of evidence, not a solitary document on the table of the Commons' Committee, to graduate the scale of cruelty? How could they compare the butchery of 1848 with the butchery of 1792, when the latter was studiously kept back from sight? How could they estimate the Evidence of the Slave-dealing Tobin at its worth, without turning to the Commons' Library close at hand, that gave him the lie direct?

Again; was it no part of the duty of the self-called Anti-Slavery Society, to give to its members and the

public generally, all the evidence requisite to form a correct judgment, even though it bore strongly against their own opinions?—for what purpose is their Reporter published, if not to convey true and practical information, such as distinguished it in the days of Mr. Macaulay? This is a convenient place to state a fact which will tell with the world. Out of nearly forty noblemen and gentlemen who formed the Committee of the old Anti-Slavery Society, of Aldermanbury, all of whom, except six or seven, still survive, there are but eight on the Committee of the new Society, and of these eight, four—namely, Sir E. Buxton, Dr. Lushington, Mr. Conder, and Mr. P. Sturge—are decidedly opposed to the removal of the Squadron!! The writer is not acquainted with the opinion of Mr. S. Gurney, who is a fifth; he has not copies of the lists of the two Committees, but though writing from memory, he is assured of the general accuracy of this statement.

A second point, which seems sufficiently established by the Lords' Evidence, is, that legitimate trade cannot co-exist with the Slave-trade; but that, if protected, it may be indefinitely extended.

Our first quotation on this subject will be from Mr. Macqueen. We have already adverted to the following answer of this gentleman:—"It is impossible to carry on what we call legitimate trade, without that trade being subservient to the Slave-trade." (3,771.) He afterwards is more explicit:

"It is utterly impossible for any merchant in the legal-trade to compete with the Slave-traders, because the Slave-trader does not care what he sells his goods for, provided he gets a return cargo of slaves. Therefore, he can undersell the legal trader to any extent, and, in fact, ruin him. It is quite impossible for the latter to compete with him. His profit consists not in the sale of his goods on the coast of Africa, but in the sale of his slaves when he gets them to the Brazils and Cuba; whereas the profit of the legal merchant is on the sale of his goods on the coast," (*vide* 3,796 to 3,800.)

The reciprocity of this system, as it acts on the mind of the African chiefs, is well explained in the last paragraph of Mr. Cruickshank's Report, at page 189 of the Appendix. It is far too long to extract, and it will not bear abridgement.

We may also refer to the evidence of Mr. Dawson, as confirming these opinions of Mr. Macqueen (*vide* Ques-

tions 3,042, 3,082 to 3,085), and of Captain Beacroft (at Question 3,404), who says decidedly, "*The legitimate traffic and the Slave-trade cannot co-exist together*; it is impossible, if slave-traffic is free." The same witness's answers to Questions 3,405 to 3,409, corroborates Mr. Macqueen, almost in terms. Captain Fishbourne coincides with the rest at Question 4,300, and delivers in a table to show the increase of the palm-oil trade by extinguishing the Slave-trade in the Bonny. The Rev. Henry Townsend thinks that, "if the Slave-trade were left uninterrupted, it would be the destruction of all other trade" (877); and, in the answer immediately following, he assigns his reasons for this opinion; at 1,057, he says emphatically, that "the Slave-trade and lawful trade cannot co-exist." The Rev. Thomas Peyton, at Questions 2,573 *et seq.*, gives the same evidence and very similar reasons. Mr. Lahdor, however, at Question 396, offers a contrary opinion; and he is the only witness who does so: he was not pressed to account for his opinion.

The evidence of Mr. Macqueen, from Question 3,802 to 3,318, is quite conclusive as to the extent to which legitimate trade may be carried in Africa, under favourable circumstances. He begins with saying, that "Africa is capable of producing the goods which would form a means of legal traffic to an unbounded extent: there is scarcely any tropical production known in the world, that does not thrive to perfection in Africa;" and he proceeds to enumerate sugar, cotton, dye-woods, &c. Mr. Dawson gives a similar catalogue at Questions 3,030 to 3,093.

It certainly appears rather singular, that Captain Trotter was not examined on this head; for the information given by Dr. Thompson and Captain Allen, in their narrative of the Niger Expedition, is, if possible, more abundant and specific than even the evidence of Mr. Macqueen. The same passages to which we have just referred, establish the third of the propositions; but we shall be pardoned for only referring more specifically to the statements made as to the disposition and character of the African population: these statements are most interesting and important.

The whole of the examination of the Rev. John Miller deserves attention. It is confined to Liberia, and exhibits a most satisfactory account of the prosperity and progressive influence of that hybrid colony. It is supported by the production of several documents, which are set out in the Appendix, and which give a graphic representation of the advance of the Liberia Republic in all the mysteries

of commercial and political economy. The principal motive for this close inquiry into the state of the colony, seems to have been, to found on it a very promising practical suggestion, that we may avail ourselves largely of Liberian influence and power, in suppressing the Slave-trade, by assisting that State to extend its purchases of territory along the coast; a policy which they have already pursued with the most beneficial effect. They have reclaimed from the traffic nearly 700 miles of sea-board heretofore swarming with Slavers; and they have accomplished this solely by purchase. We shall only extract one passage from Mr. Miller's examination, bearing on the point now before us:

"Six kings, of various tribes to the leeward, owning territory along the coast for fully 100 miles in length, and extending a considerable distance into the interior, have (after repeated and earnest solicitations to purchase, always refused, on account of the limited means at disposal for such an object) actually met, united together, and made a formal cession, without fee or reward, of their entire land, and the privileges thereof, for ever (binding themselves, as is usual in all similar treaties, to abstain from participating, directly or indirectly, in the Slave-trade, under penalty of death), so that they might be under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws and customs of the Colony," (*vide* Question 573, p. 58.)

So, also, the whole of Mr. Macdonald's examination, respecting the Colony of Sierra Leone, of which he was lately the Governor, is extremely valuable for similar reasons; but we refer specifically only to Question 1,385, because the answer affords another instance of the same anxiety to cede sovereignty for protection.

The Rev. John Clarke states, in answer to Question 1,675, that "some of the natives would agree to sell their land," (on condition of restraining the transit of slaves across it to the coast,) "because some of them very much disapprove of the Slave-trade, and would gladly substitute legitimate commerce instead." He then delivers in a memorandum of his general opinions; from which we extract the following passage:

"All that is likely to raise the character of the African, should be attempted; kindness is the key to his heart; and from those he believes to be his friends, he will take advice, learn habits of industry, improve in understanding, forsake the evil practices of his country, and show that a right education alone is wanting to raise him to the station he ought

to occupy. Where the confidence of the natives is obtained, civilization and religious instruction would extend along the coast and into the interior; and by these means the Slave-trade would gradually, but effectually, be destroyed, and internal slavery would ultimately cease. This belief, I think, is authorised by the results already produced at Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Palmas, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Aguapin, Old Calabar, Fernando Po, Bimbia, Cameroons, and the Gaboon," (*vide* p. 140.)

The Evidence of the Rev. T. Peyton gives a glowing account of the prosperity and general conduct of the liberated Africans at Sierra Leone: as respects their natural bias to trade, we may refer to Questions 2,646 to 2,662.

The Evidence of the Rev. Henry Townsend respecting *Abbeokuta* is equally impressive; but we limit ourselves to Questions 1,105 and *seq.* for his opinion on the African disposition. The inclination to trade, and the vast extent to which commerce may be pushed, are well explained by Mr. Macqueen at 3,807 to 3,813. "Many chiefs, I find, in many parts of Africa, (for I have tolerably good information throughout the whole of it,) are inclined to extend cultivation and commerce, if they had only the means and adequate security afforded them." (3,812.)

Several suggestions for the suppression of the Slave-trade, appear to have occupied the attention of the Committee, and, among the rest, the establishment of a line of armed factories, if not entirely round the coast, yet, at those parts which are chiefly infested by the traffic. Mr. Landor expresses a decided opinion on this policy at Questions 351 to 370, and again at Questions 382 to 393. In his judgment, they would be very beneficial. Mr. Townsend concurs in this opinion at 961; Captain Trotter at 4,398; and Captain Winniett, R.N. at 709, combines the forts with Captain Denman's principle of blockade, and considers that Slave-trading will never be suppressed by any other means. We cordially concur in the policy of uniting the two systems, if the expense be not too formidable; but, except in combination with the fleet, we distrust the efficiency of the forts. At present, neither the King of Ashanti nor the King of Dahomey will assent to the suppression of the Slave-trade, (*vide* Mr. Cruikshank's Report in the Appendix, as to the latter chief, page 183.) They are supported by immense military power; and it is probable that the proposed forts, so weakly manned as they must be, would at once fall into their hands, if, by the forcible suppression of the traffic on this

extensive coast, we provoked them to hostilities. Should we ever be unfortunately compelled to show our strength in the interior of Africa, it must be with irresistible power; but forts, with a mere handful of isolated troops, would be carried in a few hours by such a disciplined army as the King of Dahomey's.

The plan of subsidising Liberia, to enable that Republic to extend its coast territory, holds out better hopes; especially if we were to proceed on the same policy in other places, as at Cape Coast Castle. Liberia has already an efficient militia; and we could create a similar force, at little trouble or expense, if we had more sea-board territory to make it worth while. We are far too indulgent to Horse Guards' prejudices. For our own part, we can see no reason on earth, why a black man should not make as good a soldier as a white man, whether officer or private. Of all the professions in civilised life, there is not one that, except in the very highest grades of it, requires, or generally exhibits, such a low average of moral or intellectual character as the military profession; and so it must be from the nature of things, when merit consists in unqualified submission, and power is not entrusted except in obedience to superior control, reducing rationality to a level with the cart-horse or the steam-engine. If the African native is not even fit for this, we may bid adieu to all hope of civilisation by means of commerce; he can be fit for nothing. But the extraordinary progress of Liberia assures us of better things. The Evidence of Mr. Peyton as to the capacity of the negro, is very striking, (*vide* 2,562 to 2,570); and the answers of Captain Butterfield to Questions 3,345 and *seq.*, bear forcibly upon the same point.

A suggestion made by Captain Denman deserves particular notice for its feasibility and reasonableness. He proposes, that a legal disability to sue in our Courts of law for any damages incident to our efforts to suppress the Slave-trade, should be imposed by statute; (*vide* 4,527; and, for his argument in support of this proposal, 4,521;) and there is some plausible authority to be found for such an innovation in the existing law, which disqualifies an alien enemy from suing in our Courts. If the infraction of Treaties is a *casus belli* (as Dr. Lushington clearly lays down), then, the Brazilians are already in a sort of hostile relation to us, and deserve far severer punishment than legal incapacity in Westminster Hall. Surely, such a Bill *would pass without a division.*

The only suggestion for facilitating the introduction of legitimate commerce, upon which their Lordships have entered fully, is that of Sir George Stephen, to which we have before alluded, in examining the Commons' Evidence: the explanation of his scheme, and the arguments in support of it, will be found at Questions 2,519 to 2,537. Mr. Dawson casually supports Sir George's plan by his answer to Question 3,006,—“that it would greatly facilitate the Trade, if the natives could be induced to warehouse goods ready for shipment.” Captain Beacroft, being interrogated generally on the scheme, (of which, at its first enunciation, he doubts the practicability,) gives a reply at Question 3,500, which inadvertently sanctions the very principle of it: “*If there were any commercial Company established on the river, they might do a great deal of good with the legitimate traffic in the interior.* The natives told me, that they would rather have legitimate trade than anything else; that they would do away with the Slave-trade, if *they could get any quantity of legitimate trade up the Niger.*” This reply embraces both the principle of the scheme and the theory on which it is founded; and we may observe, in passing, that it is a fair instance of the inconvenience of cursory examination. Had Captain Beacroft fully understood the proposed system, it is probable, from this answer, that he would not only have approved, but have improved it, so coincident as it seems to be with his own preconceived ideas. No other questions about it were addressed to any of the witnesses; and we have reason to believe, that this is one of the subjects which it is intended to resume on the re-appointment of the Committee. We therefore refrain from further notice of it at present, except to express our firm conviction, that it will bear the test of close investigation; though it is to be expected that doubts will, here and there, be intimated about it, by those who distrust, but cannot clearly foresee, the extent to which it may clash with their personal interests.

There remain three witnesses to whose evidence we would call attention in general terms. Mr. Staveley's explanation of the state of our Slave-trade treaties, is very clear and intelligent, (*vide* Questions 1 to 126.) Lord Howden supplies copious and most instructive information as to the state of the Brazils, both commercial and political. The whole of his examination, which occupies only twenty pages (from 17), deserves most attentive perusal by all who propose to take a part in the future debates. He is very strong on the subject of slave mortality in the Brazils

(*vide* 170 and 191), fully supporting Dr. Thompson. Finally; the twelve pages of Dr. Lushington's examination, beginning at page 97, will well repay those who wish to understand our position, whether with Brazil or with other countries, in reference to the Slave-trade in connection with international law. The learned Judge, too, has his plan, (and who is without one on this perplexing subject?) and no doubt it would be most efficient, if our several treaties sanction its adoption. It is neither more nor less than to pass an Act to enable our Courts of Law to try and punish all foreign Slave-trading offenders, in the same form as we would try and punish British subjects,—subject only to a power of reclamation on the part of those countries to whom their allegiance is due. Could we exercise such a jurisdiction as this, much might remain to be done for the civilisation of Africa, but, for the extinction of the Slave-trade, nothing: it would be accomplished! We doubt whether even a special retainer to Sir Fitzroy Kelly would “get off” a Spaniard actually captured on board a Brazilian or Cuban slaver. Moreover, by getting good hold of a captain or two, a better insight might, perchance, be obtained into the way in which “these things are managed” on the Royal Exchange. Hopes of pardon elicit wonderful disclosures at the Old Bailey! Dr. Lushington's plan is, for immediate use, by far the best of them all; and we heartily wish it may be adopted.

Here our task ends. In discharging it, we have, on the one hand, exposed ourselves to much obloquy, even from some who ought to have understood the subject better; in taking our leave of them, we entreat them to remember the awful responsibility they have incurred; if the error is on our side, the evil is at most but negative. We do not accomplish so much as we designed; but if they are wrong, it is impossible to overrate, it is difficult to conceive the extent of the horrors which they will have assisted to revive. Peace, civilization, education, and Christianity are exterminated from Africa, and by the aid of those who call themselves her friends! Such are the consequences of *their* error, if they be in error, and consequences predicted by the Africans themselves in a petition about to be presented to the House. Will not even this reflection make them pause?

But on the other hand, we have been cheered by the commendation and encouragement of many, who, to use the expression of one of them, “envied us the duty.” If *have discharged* it in a manner to tell upon future *is of the House*, we are a thousand times repaid.







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